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executive Summary 
I. LABOUR MARKET ANALYSIS AND FORECASTS 
1. The labour force 
The structure of the Italian population has changed radically since the 1960s. Births 
have declined steadily, producing one of the lowest fertility rates in the world, while life 
expectancy has lengthened greatly. In the '80s Italy shed its historical position as a land of 
emigration and began to take in significant numbers of European and non-European 
immigrants. In combination, these trends have resulted in the '90s in a negative natural balance 
and a positive migratory balance, and consequently a considerable expansion of the working-
age population. 
Labour force trends have been decisively characterized by gender. That is, the behavior 
of men and women has diverged sharply, more or less everywhere in Italy. On the demand 
side, the additional labour demand has been directed exclusively to the female segment; but it 
has also had a decisive geographical concentration in the Centte and North of the country. 
A key structural feature of the labour force is the existence of nearly 2.5 million non-regular 
positions, as well as another 441,000 non-declared employed. All told, such "non-institutional" 
economic activities involve some 159Ί of Italian residents' employment positions; in addition, about 
700,000 jobs are held by non-resident aliens (unregistered immigrants). 
The employment slump of 1992-95 destroyed 1.2 million jobs (nearly 6% of total 
employment) but did not alter these fundamental characteristics. If anything, it exacerbated 
them. In particular, while female labour demand stagnated after two decades of virtually 
uninterrupted growth, this did not affect women's labour market participation, which continued 
on its growth path. And if there was an attenuation of the prevalence of youth unemployment -
which had traditionally permitted the social effects of joblessness to be buffered through 
families - the incidence of the more mature unemployed increased. This is a new phenomenon 
and a rupture with the social and economic model that, at least until now, has succeeded in 
keeping social tension relatively defused, even in the South, despite exttemely high levels of 
unemployment. 
2. Job creation and job loss 
From 1970 to 1995 Italian GDP recorded average annual growth of 2.6%, while the 
number of full-time equivalent workers increased by 0.4% a year. The rate of output growth 
has been much higher in manufacturing (3.7%), but this sector recorded average productivity 
gains of 4.4%, so that growth was insufficient even to maintain the level of labour input, and 
employment shrank at a rate of 0.7% a year. Only in the service sector, in connection with 
relatively poor productivity performance, was growth of output achieved with increased labour 
input (2% per year). During the '80s the demand for labour in the industrial sector declined as a 
consequence of far-reaching restructuring and reorganization; at the beginning of the '90s, 
these trends began to affect the service sector as well. 
Only the public sector has been sheltered from the adjustment process, even though public 
employment contracted in 1993 and continued to decline, though less steeply, in 1994 and 1995. 
Firm size provides the key to understanding the changes that have taken place in work 
organization and employment in Italy. Small and tiny firms have increasingly become the main 
source of job creation, while large firms (except in retailing) are steadily destroying jobs. More 
generally, the main features of job creation in Italy are now the following: 
• a recent resumption of job creation in the services, especially the advanced services 
sector, after a phase of intensive reorganization that did away with over 600,000 jobs; 
• the steadily growing employment role of small and tiny firms; 
• an upward trend in self-employment and atypical employment; 
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• a recovery in the demand for Iemale labour and skilled labour, but not sufficient to offset 
the expansion of the labour force in these segments. 
3. Wage and salary trends 
Wages and salaries in Italy have traditionally depended on two main factors: cost-of 
living indexation and productivity. The tripartite agreements signed in July 1992 and July 1993 
established a new wage-setting framework, based on clear-cut guidelines: 
• all wage indexation was finally abolished; 
• the bargaining system was reformed, and the wage provisions of collective agreements at 
national and local levels were strictly defined; 
• national contracts should regulate industry-wide minimum wages, with reference to 
official inflation targets; while local (firm or district) contracts should set gross wage 
differentials, according to local productivity and profitability; 
• new, more flexible methods of workforce utilization were allowed for. 
Since 1993, however, productivity gains have not always been equitably shared either 
between workers and employers or among industries and occupations, thus fostering 
inequality. From 1993 to 1995, average annual productivity gains came to 5% in agriculture 
and 6.8% in transport and communications, but the rates of real wage increase were 
substantially lower (2.5% in agriculture and 2.3% in transport and communication). In the 
public sector real wages actually declined (-1.2%). 
Furthermore, nominal wages have risen less than the cost of labour, as social 
contributions have continued their powerful uptrend, testifying to the slowness of the pension 
system in adapting to the new framework ushered in by the accords of 1992 and 1993. In 
short, even though the agreements have effectively curbed wages and profits have increased 
very substantially, this has not led to job creation on a large enough scale to recoup the jobs 
destroyed during the slump. 
4. The principal causes of unemployment 
The increase and intractability of unemployment in Italy cannot be traced to any single, 
simple cause. One key aspect, however, is certainly demography. As the working-age 
population has expanded and participation rates have risen, the economy has proven unable to 
keep pace by creating jobs. To grasp the nature of unemployment, we must consider three 
qualitative changes in the demand for labour. 
• tertiarization: in the '60s, '70s and '80s the service sector expanded continuosly, reaching a 
share of almost 60% in total employment. During the '90s, while agriculture and industry 
continued to shrink, for the first time there was a contraction in the incidence of the service 
sector, where job losses were even more severe than in industry; 
• feminization: one of the most striking traits of the Italian labour market is the growing 
feminization of all its main facets in the last 20 years (at present women account for 37% of 
the labour force, 35% of employment and more than 50% of unemployment); 
• employment age concentration: another evident phenomenon of the last 30 years is the 
progressive concentration of employment in the middle age-groups: in 1995 the 
employment rate of 30-49-year-olds was 50% higher than that of the entire working age 
population (aged 15-69); in 1966, the gap had been only 20%. 
The present dramatic situation (2.8 million jobless, corresponding to an unemployment 
rate of 12.2%) is the result of the progressive deterioration in the labour market in the South, 
where the demographic pressure has been much greater. 
II 
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Aside from demographic and investment trends, the main explanatory variables of the 
dominant feature of Italian unemployment, which hits mainly women and first-job seekers with 
intermediate educational level, are institutional factors and qualitative labour mismatches. The 
Italian social and economic system rests solidly on the role of family, so that for mature men 
work is both a right and a duty. The allocation mechanism of scarce jobs therefore ensures full 
employment only to people in the central age-groups. The same age-based criterion 
increasingly applies also for women, whose participation pattern (particularly in Northern 
regions) is coming to resemble that of men. The present, increasing concentration of jobs in the 
central age-groups is, for men, merely the accentuation of a historical tendency while, for 
women, it represents a structural change that has taken place in the last twenty years. This 
pattern, given an almost constant number of job opportunities and an expanding labour supply, 
has entailed increasing difficulties for young people of both sexes in entering the job market. 
Rising household incomes are at the origin of the progressively higher educational level 
of the incoming cohorts; but the occupational mix has not evolved in an analogous way. 
Technological progress seems, on the contrary, to be provoking a polarization of the skill mix. 
Here again, wages cannot be expected to act as an equilibrating mechanism because of 
technological rigidities on the demand side, the lack of downward flexibility on the part of the 
better educated, and the length of the interval between market signals and school-leaving. This 
model implies a worsening of the situation of the young and of women as the imbalance 
between demand and supply worsens, and is therefore consistent with the regional pattern of 
unemployment. The dearth of demand in the South has become so acute that job opportunities 
no longer suffice even to satisfy all the men in the central age-group. Accordingly, even this 
group is beginning to display significant unemployment. 
5. Macroeconomic policies and forecasts 
The present macroeconomic situation differs from that of the turn of the decade. 
Notwithstanding the disequilibria of the labour market, the financial picture has improved 
markedly. This result reflects policy-makers' decision to concentrate on financial solutions to 
the monetary turmoil of 1992 and overcome the country's budgetary difficulties, in order to 
qualify for European Monetary Union. The economic adjustment has been pursued mainly in 
two ways: countering inflation through a severe incomes policy and reducing the deficit by 
spending cuts and tax increases. 
Fiscal policy has benefited the equilibria of the economy, defusing the inflationary 
threat inherent in devaluation and positively orienting expectations with regard to the financial 
framework. Since 1993 one of Italy's traditional macroeconomic relations - the pass-through of 
devaluation to domestic prices - has been rendered inoperative. The sharp devaluation of 1992-
93 resulted in no upturn in inflation but, instead, in a slowdown and a tendency to convergence 
towards the EU average. The key to this remarkable achievement was the concertation of 
wage dynamics (although it is not yet clear how greatly the lack of an upsurge in inflation was 
due to this concerted incomes policy and how greatly to sluggish domestic and international 
demand. 
In any case, the adjustment has come at the cost of the worst employment crisis since 
the Second World War, in connection with such factors as the slump in public capital spending 
(with a severe impact on the construction industry) and the labour market reprecussions of tax 
and contribution increases. The negative impact has been only very partially offset by the 
devaluation-related export boom and the structural adjustment caused by the policy of 
disinflation, which have influenced expectations and investment less than expected. 
On the one hand, today's inflation figures confirm the efficacy of the measures adopted; 
but on the other the economic downturn, the repercussions for the public finances, and the 
forecasts of economic growth far from sufficient to curb unemployment have aggravated the 
ill 
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difficulty of sustaining economic expansion while avoiding the risk of failure to meet the 
Maastricht criteria and consequent exclusion from EMU. 
For 1997-98, yearly GDP growth below 2% will mean employment growth of about 0.2%, 
and an unemployment rate well over ¡2.5%. 
II. LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND LEGISLATION 
1. Public institutions 
The public institutions entrusted with the regulation of the Italian labour market are: 
• the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, which with its central administration, its 
regional Agencies and its local offices has overall responsibility for drafting, applying and 
monitoring labour legislation and for providing placement services; 
• the National Economic and Labour Council (CNEL), which consists of representatives of 
social partners plus experts, and acts as an advisory institution for the Government and the 
Parliament; 
• the Institute for Workers' Training and Guidance (ISFOL), a public law institution that 
works in cooperation with the Ministry of Labour and Regional governments to develop 
vocational training and guidance; 
• the specialized offices of local authorities (Regional, provincial and municipal governments). 
Regional governments play the fundamental role in providing vocational training and 
guidance. 
This system is currently under reconsideration, as its relative effectiveness calls for 
decentralization and closer integration with private and non-profit local agents. 
2. The system of industrial relations 
Employer-employee relationships are subject to a substantial body of legislation 
comprising social security and labour law and regulations. The fundamental rights of workers, 
among which are freedom of opinion, union rights, protection against disciplinary actions and 
reinstatement in case of dismissal without just cause, are laid down by the Labour Rights Act 
(Law 300 of 1970). 
Trade union freedom is guaranteed by the Constitution. The protection of the weaker 
party in the labour market (i.e. the worker) extends to the constitutional guarantee of the right 
to strike, widely recognized and recently regulated by law in the public services. The Labour 
Rights Act further establishes the right of the most representative unions to have company-
level representatives. 
In view of the possible inconsistency between local and national representativeness, some 
limits to this right were introduced in the wake of a referendum held in 1995. 
Employers are represented by three main organizations: the Confederation of Italian 
Industry (Confindustria), the Confederation of Commerce (Confcommercio), and the 
Confederation of Agriculture (Confagricoltura). 
The trade union movement is strong, in spite of major recent transformations. Union 
membership is not compulsory. The major national trade union confederations and their 
political orientations are: CISL (centre), CGIL (left), UIL (centre-left), and CISNAL (right). 
The three most representative organizations (CGIL, CISL, UIL) are engaged in a difficult 
process of convergence into a single confederation. There are unions at the industry, sector 
IV 
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and company level. Unions at every level have the right to call strikes. The largest and most 
powerful industrial unions are those of the metalworkers and the chemical workers. 
During the last decade many unions not affiliated with the main confederations have greatly 
increased their bargaining power and capacity for action. These new organizations have arisen 
mainly in such key public service sectors as health, transportation, and education. 
The most important changes to the industrial relations system introduced by the 
tripartite agreement of 23 July 1993 were: 
• a general agreement in principle on incomes policy; 
• the definitive abrogation of the automatic wage indexation mechanism and the introduction 
of partial cost-of-living coverage during intervals in the renewal of expired contracts; 
• complete separation between national and local, non-overlapping levels of negotiation; 
• the institution of wage bargaining every two years at the national, industry-wide level (while 
the legal and work rules portions of the contracts run for a four-year term); 
• new matters for local bargaining (at company or territorial level) every four years. 
The rationalization of the bargaining system was complemented by provisions for the 
formation of a unified body for worker representation at the company level. The members of 
this representative council are mostly elected by the work force, and in smaller part are 
designated by the trade unions themselves. The council has powers to conduct company-level 
collective bargaining. 
3. General Labour Policy 
Between July 1992 and October 1995 more than 1,200,000 jobs were lost, with very 
substantial repercussions on the unemployment rate. The trend was particularly adverse for 
young people. The recent debate on labour market policy has accordingly centred on measures 
to increase the flexibility of the labour market by changing work time regulations, increasing 
occupational mobility and helping labour deployment within firms. The debate was relaunched 
at the end of 1993 by the European Commission's White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness 
and Employment. The Italian Ministry of Labour responded immediately with a paper of its 
own, Obiettivo occupazione: una strategìa di medio periodo per il mercato del lavoro 
italiano. According to this document, the Italian labour market is characterized by a slow 
expansion of both female and youth employment, and by education rates far below the 
European average. With respect to European convergence, Italy is at a disadvantage not so 
much in its high unemployment rate as in its low employment rate. In this respect, the main 
policy line is to put into full operation the provisions of the agreement of 23 July 1993, 
regarding vocational training, human capital, research and development, and "regulated 
flexibility" in employment relations. The new Pact for Employment (24 September 1996) 
moves further in this direction. The main labour policy initiatives of recent years have been in 
three areas: 
• increasing labour market flexibility through the introduction of new regulations on atypical 
employment and hiring procedures; 
• granting general reductions in payroll taxes, as well as cuts in wage costs and social 
insurance contributions for various regions and economic sectors (these efforts have proven 
quite unsuccessful, as the actual growth of social contributions has continued to outpace 
inflation); 
• fostering integration or reintegration of disadvantaged groups (women, young people, 
workers on short-time compensation and on the mobility rolls, drug abusers, etc.) into 
working life. 
More recently, in accordance with the agreements reached by the EU Member States in 
Essen in 1994, Italy has prepared a Multiannual Programme for Employment based on the 
following priority objectives: i) to increase the rate of employment, especially in southern Italy; 
ii) to invest in human resources, current and future, and implement the principle of equal 
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opportunities; iii) to broaden the productive base and sustain its growth; iv) to ensure the 
effective operation of the labour market, by encouraging flexibility; v) to offer a variety of 
services to workers and businesses: accurate signals, information, individual guidance, training, 
etc.; vi) to guarantee, on certain conditions and through integrated management of incentives 
and social shock absorbers, financial protection for unemployed people actively seeking work. 
4. Employment protection schemes 
As regards individual dismissals, Italian rules have traditionally been more restrictive 
than those of other major EU countries. Severance pay and notice requirements are stricter; the 
acceptable causes are somewhat loosely worded in the law, making dismissal decisions by firms 
more easily contestable; and "just cause" for summary dismissals is more stringent. Perhaps the 
most important restriction, however, is the heavy penalty levied on the employer if a dismissal 
is judged "unfair": economic compensation and also mandatory re-hiring. Together with the 
favourable rulings traditionally handed down by the courts to workers appealing dismissals, 
this has made outright dismissal infrequent as an instrument of adjusting the size of the work 
force. Legislation has moved to attenuate the stringency of these regulations. Exemptions from 
the most onerous regulations have been granted to small firms. As in the case of hiring 
restrictions, this has probably affected Italy's overall industrial structure. The main employment 
protection schemes are as follows. 
Regular short-time earnings compensation (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Ordinaria), 
aimed at guaranteeing industrial workers' wages in case of lay-off or a reduction in the 
company's activity due to temporary events not attributable to the employer or to the 
employees, or caused by the economic situation. Eligible for regular benefits are production 
and clerical workers and middle-level management and technicians who have been temporarily 
laid off or are working reduced hours in industrial firms. Regular CIG compensation is fixed at 
80% of the gross wage for the hours not worked (from 0 up to the contractual maximum), but 
never more than 40 hours a week. The compensation is paid over a continuous period of at 
most three months, which may be extended quarter by quarter in exceptional cases, up to a 
maximum of 12 months during a given 2-year period. 
Special short-time earnings compensation (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni 
Straordinaria - CIGS), whose purpose is not only income maintenance but also employment 
protection in case of restructuring, reorganization or conversion. The special compensation 
benefit amounts to 80% of the pay the workers would otherwise have earned, up to a gross 
monthly ceiling (in 1996, 1,340,000 lire for workers earning up to 2.9 million lire gross, and 
1,613,000 lire for those earning more). 
Work-sharing agreements (solidarity contracts), aimed at preventing labour shedding 
and collective redundancies during the course of the procedure for CIGS or for placing 
workers on the mobility rolls. The two sides reach collective agreements providing for reduced 
working time with a corresponding cut in collectively agreed wages. The reduction may be 
"horizontal" (daily) or "vertical" (monthly, weekly, yearly). In both cases the Government 
provides a quarterly allowance that is divided between the firm and the workers. The size of 
the allowance is variable: i) if a working time reduction of more than 20% is agreed, employers 
are entitled to a 25% reduction of their social insurance contributions; ii) if the working time 
reduction is more than 30%, the contribution relief amounts to 35%. The rates rise to 30% 
and 40% respectively for companies operating in the areas listed under Objectives 1 and 2 of 
EC Directive 2052/88. 
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5. Working time regulation 
Full-time: the maximum legally allowable working time in industrial and commercial 
firms is 8 hours a day, or 48 hours a week, plus up to 12 hours of overtime under agreement 
between employers and unions. The legal working week has been gradually supplanted by a 
contractual week — generally a 40-hour, 5-day week — that is now universal. The contractual 
working week thus determines the normal duration of labour services without affecting the 
maximum. 
Overtime: legally defined as those hours worked over and above legal working time, 
overtime is counted separately and paid at least 10% more than the normal rate. The rate is 
fixed by collective agreement, depending on category of overtime (day or night work, working 
days or holidays, etc.). As a general rule, the law prohibits the indiscriminate use of overtime 
and specifies the cases in which it is admissible. Overtime that is not purely occasional is 
prohibited, except in exceptional cases required by production and technical constraints where 
averaging work time over a given period is impossible. 
Part-time work is designed to enable workers who wish to do so to work fewer hours 
than those provided for in collective bargaining agreements, or to work for predetermined 
periods of time in the course of a week, a month or a year. Workers willing to work reduced 
hours can ask to be registered on a special placement list. Part-time contracts must be written, 
specifying the functions and the organization of working hours. 
Flexible hours have been regulated with increasing care since the early '80s, both in 
collective bargaining agreements and in legislation (mainly using social shock absorbers). 
However, the tendency to abandon standard criteria in fixing the quantity of work in favour of 
a broader, more varied range of times, modes and models (multi-period schedules, annual 
calendar, functional and internal flexibility, part-time) has not been adequately sustained by 
Italian legislation. 
Fixed-term employment contracts are authorized when the duration is limited by the 
nature of the work (seasonal), or for the temporary replacement of an absent worker (who 
retains the right to his/her job), or for carrying out a specific task or service predetermined in 
time and of an extraordinary or occasional nature. They can be authorized also for tasks or 
series of tasks that require workers with different skills from those normally used in the firm, 
and for personnel related to specific shows or to specific radio and television programmes. 
Early retirement programmes have sought both to make possible shorter careers and to 
safeguard the income of workers in troubled or restructuring firms and industries. Lacking any 
universal legislation, these programmes have been governed by a series of temporary measures 
designed for individual sectors. A new phase in the programme was opened by Law 223/1991, 
which significantly amended the previous rules: i) it extended early seniority pensions to 
sectors where the programme had always been based on old age pensions; ii) it mandated the 
Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning to check early retirement eligibility, in an 
effort to make the programme independent from the short-time compensation programme. 
6. Contractual minimums 
Unlike such countries as France, Spain and the Netherlands, in Italy workers have no 
economy-wide minimum. They do enjoy a Constitutional guarantee (Article 36), that calls for 
equitable compensation in proportion to the quantity and quality of work. Therefore, every 
contract establishes differential contractual minimums, according to grade and skill. Under the 
new wage-setting provision agreed upon by the July 1992 and 1993 agreements, a four-year 
national industry-wide contract, with renegotiation of the wage provisions and the recouping 
of any differential between actual and target inflation every two years, sets contractual 
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minimums consistent with the target inflation rates. Since 1992 such minimums have risen very 
little, usually well below both inflation and gross wages, thus giving grounds for conflict over 
the compensation for losses in purchasing power, most notably in the case of the 
metalworkers. 
While average inflation from 1992 to 1995 was 4.7%, the average annual rise in contractual 
minimums was 2.5% in agriculture, 3.4% in industry, 3.8% in wholesale and retail trade and 2.8% in 
transport. 
III. LABOUR POLICIES 
1. Passive labour policies 
The recent trends in the main income support programmes are the following. 
Regular and special short-time earnings compensation experienced rapid growth in the 
number of hours compensated in 1991, 1992 and 1993; the trend was reversed in the first 
quarter of 1994, with a significant differentiation between regular and special compensation; by 
December of that year regular benefit hours had declined by 50%, while special benefits had 
slipped by just 1%. This pattern continued in 1995 and 1996. However, regular short-time 
compensation, which had fallen first and most sharply, turned upwards with growth of 12.7% 
in the first quarter of 1996. 
The Mobility programme, designed for workers who are definitively removed from 
production, provides two advantages: first, registration in special mobility rolls, which offer 
preferential hiring; and second (for a smaller group), entitlement to the special mobility benefit 
(the same amount as CIGS). So-called "long" mobility has taken on special importance in 
recent years: for some workers put onto the mobility rolls in certain periods, the mobility 
benefit was extended until retirement age (provided that the worker was within 5 years of the 
retirement age and had 15 contribution years). The recent progressive decrease in resort to 
special compensation has entailed a corresponding increase in the mobility rolls, which are 
expected to further expand, at least in the near future. The number of mobility allowances, on 
the contrary, in 1995 declined 7%, owing in part to the gradual exhaustion of the eligibility 
period. 
Solidarity contracts, recently reformed with the aim of making them more attractive to 
both firms and workers, have shown a strong impulse in the employment crisis, while, after a 
period of continuous reduction, early retirements increased again by 6,000 in 1995, totalling 
102,000. Due to the high costs, the Government has recently announced its intention to forgo 
any further early retirement programme. 
2. Active labour policies 
The Italian vocational training system is still marked by quite a sharp dichotomy 
between academic education and vocational training, so that there are notable discrepancies 
within the school-training-work circuit. In a highly fragmented labour market, in any case, 
training is mostly directed to two distinct groups: i) young people, with the development of 
training strategies designed for work access; ii) adult workers, for whom the necessity is 
training plans to maintain human capital and to prevent social exclusion. 
Trainee contracts provide tax incentives to firms that hire and train young workers. In 
1994 the eligibile age range was extended (now 16 to 32), and two distinct types of trainee 
contract were provided for, aiming respectively at: i) the acquisition of an intermediate skill 
level or else a high skill level (maximum duration, 24 months); ii) facilitating job market access 
through a job experience (maximum duration, 12 months). 
VIII 
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In areas of the country where unemployment rates are above the national average, the 
law now provides for work access plans, to bring young people aged 19-32 into the work 
force. The age limit is extended to 35 for the long-term unemployed, i.e. those on the 
employment service rolls for more than two years. Such plans can be embodied in projects 
providing for socially useful jobs and participation in training activities, or providing both 
training and work experience for professionally qualified persons. 
Introduced to provide employment for workers on special short-time compensation and 
on the mobility rolls, socially useful projects (characterized by their social purposes and by the 
fixed time frame in which they must be completed) have recently enjoyed considerable success 
in achieving job market reintegration or access. Work cannot exceed 80 hours a month for a 
maximum of 12 months. The mounting number of workers on special short-time compensation 
and mobility and the inability of the public finances to defray the cost of adequate income 
supports have prompted government, employers and trade unions to relaunch the projects, 
making short-time and mobility benefits conditional upon participation in the projects. 
Employment and job creation subsidies have seen quite heavy use since the late '80s. 
These programmes are quite numerous. Italian laws aimed at expanding employment through 
new enterprise formation carry the names of De Vito (Law 44/1986) and Tremonti (Law 
489/1994). Law 44 was designed to promote the formation of businesses constituted by young 
people and located and operating in the South. The success of the measure in improving both 
labour markets and the local productive fabric persuaded Parliament both to extend its 
geographical ambit and to substantially increase the funds appropriated. The law now extends 
to all depressed areas (i.e. the districts qualifying for Objective 1, 2 and 5b). To make the 
implementing agency more flexible, the law creates a public limited company, the Company for 
Youth Entrepreneurship, whose shares may be purchased by public bodies and other economic 
organizations. Its mandate is to provide services to organizations, agencies, firms and other 
economic bodies, for the creation of new enterprises and support to small and medium-sized 
enterprises formed chiefly by young people aged 18-29 or exclusively by those aged 18-35. 
Measures to expand the employment base were also taken in 1994, in the effort to 
foster and speed up the economic recovery and ensure that it led to job creation. Parliament 
granted incentives both for self-employment and for payroll employment. The Tremonti Law 
enacts substantial tax relief and simplification for new enterprises started up by people younger 
than 32, by unemployed persons and the handicapped. The law restricts the alternative tax 
treatment to specified areas of the economy. 
These are: a) energy efficiency and the promotion of renewable energy sources; b) natural, 
biological and biodynamic agriculture; c) differential collection of trash and garbage; d) water and 
flood control, environmental clean-up, and planning for the. upgrading, maintenance or restoration of 
historic city centres; e) products that have been assigned the ecological quality seal pursuant to EEC 
regulation 880/1992. 
One of the great weaknesses of Italian labour policy is a lack of evaluation of the 
effectiveness and the efficiency of programmes. The evaluation of labour policy measures 
involves essentially three aspects: the consistency of instruments with objectives, impact, and 
the way in which the programme is implemented. In Italy, only very rarely has the need to 
accompany labour policies with active evaluation been recognized. In recent years, however, 
greater attention has been accorded to these issues. The new organizational structure for 
labour market regulation, created by Law 56/1987 and Law 223/1991, includes monitoring and 




IV. OTHER POLICIES THAT INFLUENCE THE LABOUR MARKET 
1. The education system 
The Italian labour market is sharply distinguished from those of other European 
economies by its relative underendowment of human capital. Only 30% of all labour force 
participants older than 25 have more than compulsory schooling, compared with 35% in the 
European Union as a whole; only 10% are university-educated, compared with an EU average 
of 25%. The education system is divided into two main sub-systems. 
• School and university education. Schooling is compulsory up to the age of 14, with all 
children following the same national syllabus. A bill is being drafted to raise the minimum 
school-leaving age to 16, to fit in with European standards. Once compulsory education is 
completed, youngsters must decide on the next level of education, making a choice from 
three main groups: academic high schools ("liceo"), technical schools and vocational 
schools. 
• Regional-based vocational training. Each of the 20 Regions offers a great variety of 
vocational training courses. Training structures are completely separate from the school-
university track, but proposals for linking the two systems are under consideration. Initial 
training given to school leavers is of interest to youngsters that leave school immediately 
after the termination of compulsory education or that drop out of upper secondary school. 
For certificate-holders and university graduates courses are often specialized; school-leavers 
are often given general training courses. 
The transition from school to work is anything but immediate and consequential. At the 
national level, there are (as we have seen) labour market instruments to facilitate young 
people's entry, including apprenticeship and trainee conctracts. 
2. Social security and welfare 
Public spending in the field of social security and welfare takes up a considerable 
amount of the budget. In 1995 it amounted to 443.1 trillion lire, around 25% of GDP and over 
50% of public spending. 
The social security sector has created problems for the Italian economy and in 
particular for the labour market: besides the imbalance between services and benefits, there is 
the high cost of the pension system, which includes welfare-based benefits and allowances 
improperly aimed at redressing labour market imbalances. Quite notable is the problem of 
inadequate spending for families. Also to be noted is the inefficiency of the national health 
service, which has costs similar to those borne by other European countries, but with lower 
service standards. The sector is weighed down by high personnel costs to the detriment of 
investment. Scant (or unrecorded) assistance is given to the economically disdvantaged, 
whereas legislation does safeguard the rights of deserving categories, such as the disabled, the 
blind, the deaf and dumb. Finally, there are important regional disparties in the quality and 
efficiency of the local health and welfare authorities. 
Recent efforts to curb spending and increase quality in three sectors (social security, 
welfare and health) have had uneven results. Cost effects have been significant and visible in 
the health sector, and there has been relative cost stability in the welfare sector, whereas social 
security spending has continued to rise pending the effects of recent pension reforms. 
A direct consequence of the reduction in public spending has been a parallel increase in 
private health spending. 
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3. Industrial policies 
The economic and social gulf separating the northern and soutern regions has always 
been among Italy's most severe and intractable problems. The search for solutions to this 
dualism has centred on the fight against unemployment, which has taken on dramatic 
proportions in the South. Over the years the state has focused on developing productive 
activities and creating jobs, but with unresolved problems such as the poor quality of public 
services and spotty communication and transport infrastructure, economic policy initiatives 
must be made more efficient in order to create the conditions for self-sustained development of 
the southern economy. An interesting series of initiatives in the spirit of the Confidence Pact, 
known as the "Territorial Pacts", is intended to explore changes in local development. This 
instrument requires the participation of local political and economic actors, agreeing on a local 
development programme in accordance with the objectives outlined by the European Union 
Support Framework. 
V. THE DEBATE ON EMPLOYMENT 
1. The Italian model 
The Italian economy is at a notorious disadvantage with respect to its nearest European 
competitors. It is set off by a number of specific features, involving both macroeconomic 
arrangements and the employment equilibria. The macroeconomic factors include an extremely 
high saving rate, traditionally high (though now steadily declining) structural inflation, 
inadequate capital formation (two thirds slower than in the other leading countries), public 
services poorer in quality and lesser in quantity than in most European countries, and a public 
debt still larger than GDP, despite four consecutive primary budget surpluses. 
Among the specific features of the labour market, the following are worth recalling. 
• The employment rate is significantly lower than the average for the industrial 
economies; only half of all Italians of working age are engaged in economic activity. 
• Female participation is percentage points lower than in northern European countries. 
• Joblessness rates are perceptibly higher than in most OECD countries. 
• The share of total employment accounted for by self-employment is significantly above 
the average for the industrial countries, and still rising. 
2. North-South dualism 
In the central and northern regions the unemployment rate is now between 7% and 8%, 
more or less in line with other EU countries if not lower. But in the South the rate is over 
21%; moreover, the participation rate is low as well, especially for women; and whereas in 
northern Italy the bulk of the jobless are unemployed workers (i.e. job-losers), in the South the 
largest group is that of first-job seekers. 
Another disparity consists in the share of non-regular employment in the two parts of the 
country. Non-regular work now represents some 34% of total employment in the South, as against 
18% in the Centre-North. 
A series of Government documents have stressed the need for constructive dialogue 
between central and regional governments and the social partners, to map out the most 
appropriate lines of action to foster the conditions for development in selected areas. The 
terms of the 1993 agreement and the 1996 Pact for Employment leave no doubt as to the 
general consensus on the main strategy for countering the dualism in the labour market. The 
fundamental option in favour of concertation and negotiation with the social partners is an 
integral part of the Italian model of industrial relations. In this context, the Government has 
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provided for local, territorial agreements pursuant to Law 341/1995, to provide stimulus and 
direction for local job creation initiatives responding to the needs of depressed areas. This 
strategy is based on the Committee for Employment, instituted in 1992. 
The Government recently sought to transcend Italy's traditional development policy, 
centred solely on extraordinary development assistance, with a series of measures mapping out 
a new strategy of action based on broader, "ordinary" regional development policies for all the 
disadvantaged parts of the country. And, finally, there is agreement that a prerequisite3 to 
speeding up economic growth is effective action to combat organized crime, an area in which 
important though not yet definitive successes have been achieved. 
3. Employment flexibility 
The Italian labour market has traditionally been characterized by a pervasive set of 
rules. The relaxation of this regulation is thus considered a vital requirement for employment 
growth. Government and social partners have long agreed on the need for additional 
accompanying programmes to activate and strengthen the labour market and bring it into line 
with Europe, by fostering the enlargement of employment in the "secondary segment" of the 
labour force (less than full-time, open-ended contracts). 
The need for flexibility was recognized by the July agreements of 1992 and 1993. The 
signatories to the 1993 accord agreed that increasing employment would depend not only on 
stable economic growth but also, crucially, on more flexible regulation of the labour market 
and flexibility in bargaining, as concerns forms of employment and wages. 
The controversial question of wage flexibility has not been dealt with directly by the 
Government, which holds that this is the prime province of management and labour 
negotiators; however, Government did pledge to ease, to some extent, the contributions levied 
on the productivity- or profit-linked increases negotiated at company level. But the ensuing 
action was very limited. 
4. Vocational training and human capital 
One of the most striking shortcomings of the education system is that, unlike other EU 
countries, Italy still does not extend compulsory schooling beyond age 14. Moreover, the 
dropout rate is high at all levels, especially in vocational schools and in the universities. Despite 
a number of initiatives, including some in the private sector, vocational education remains 
limited and very little diversified at the post-compulsory level. At both upper secondary school 
and university levels, furthermore, links between training and work access are difficult. 
Continuing training on the job still involves only a minority of firms and workers. 
Government and business and labour organizations have agreed on the need for 
modernization and requalification of education and training systems, in order to enrich basic 
and vocational qualifications and skills and enhance industrial competitiveness and the quality 
of services. The July 1993 agreement stated that this process would entail both resolute actions 
to improve and develop the various types of training and the evolution of industrial relations 
and corporate policies to implement initial training for work access, vocational requalification 
and continuing training. 
With the concurrence of the social partners, the Government undertook a number of 
initiatives to promote investment in vocational training by simplifying procedures, providing 
technical assistance, and meeting deadlines for public cofinancing. Law 341/1995 provides for 
territorial agreements. This is a new approach taking advantage of the contribution of business 
and labour to initiatives for the development of the South and areas in crisis. 
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5. The public employment service 
Since given Italy's present levels of unemployment no possibility must be left 
unexplored, government, business and labour have agreed in formal tripartite documents on the 
need to make the public agencies for employment more efficient in actually matching demand 
and supply. There is broad consensus on the need for very significant decentralization of labour 
policies and institutions. To this end high-quality services, both public and private, must be 
available locally and in virtual networks. It is universally agreed that the role of the Regions 
must be enhanced, while naturally maintaining a national system that ensures compliance with 
certain standards. The regional Employment Agencies have shown their usefulness in action, 
but are still less than fully satisfactory. 
New models and mechanisms for greater efficiency, effectiveness and economy in 
production have been introduced into the public services, which should also bring some benefit 
in terms of employment. In this direction, a very important step is the phasing out of the public 
monopoly on job placement, with the authorization of private agencies, which could be spurred 
by the introduction of provisions for temporary employment. Despite numerous attempts to 
improve the public employment service and experiments with private placement initiatives, 
overall reform is still needed. 
6. Concealed and irregular work 
In terms of labour market regulatory provisions, Italy's low employment rate is 
reflected in a structural imbalance in the overall employment mix. While the segment of typical 
employment relations is more or less in line with that of its European partners, Italy has a 
disporportionately small "secondary" job market. A policy of incentives to bring underground 
activities to the surface, combined with measures for training human resources, could raise the 
employment rate without making the entire job market precarious. This would directly increase 
social contribution revenues and, indirectly, tax revenues. Changes in the system of income and 
social security tax levies on atypical employment (part-time, second jobs) could eliminate 
disproportionate costs. At the same time, suitable forms of checking by the labour inspectorate 
need to be instituted, shifting staff from today's often pointless placement functions. In 
addition, measures are needed to do away with the present complicity between underground 
employers and workers. 
Atypical jobs, with reduced social contributions and income tax incentives, could be 
associated with lesser social security benefits, especially for the young, postponing their full 
entitlement until they move on to standard, primary-segment employment. Another proposal is 
partial income tax deductibility for domestic assistance, which would help to bring a good deal 
of off-the-books work into the net. 
So far Italian governments have not clearly resolved to eliminate or at least attenuate 
this anomaly, which damages not only the labour market but also the public finances. An 
indirect commitment was made in the 1993 agreement, with the government's recognition of 
the need to make atypical employment contracts attractive. The massive presence of non-
regular employment stems essentially from a peculiar system of relative prices, i.e. a set of 
fiscal and contribution provisions that has affected the structure of employment. To cite just 
one example, one full-time worker costs significantly more than two part-time workers. 
To alter the structure of comparative advantage as between regular and underground 
activities, while at the same time progressively changing the social welfare function, greater 
responsibility must be exercised by all economic and social actors. 
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7. The Prodi Government programme for employment 
The Government of Romano Prodi made clear and explicit commitments regarding 
employment in its Economic and Financial Planaing Document for 1997-1999, presented to 
Parliament in June 1996. The Document makes employment a priority objective, with special 
attention to the South. Structurally, the Government has made a number of practical 
commitments: 
• to promote the enlargement of the productive base and support new enterprise formation 
and employment in small firms, with incentives to small and tiny businesses that are formed 
or that increase their work force, with a view to closer integration with large firms; 
• to reform the state employment service through decentralization, liberalization and a lighter 
state presence, making the most of the role of private parties; 
• to revise, through concertation, both social shock absorbers and employment incentives to 
achieve greater certainty and less administrative discretionality; 
• to plan socially useful projects in conformity with the principle of mutual solidarity; in this 
regard the government plans to promote the growth of the non-profit sector, which realizes 
solidarity in decentralized and generally efficient fashion and which can be expected to play 
a major role in providing services and creating jobs; 
• to devise, in agreement with the social partners, a set of measures for regulated flexibility on 
both the demand and supply sides of the labour market; 
• to draft a plan for part-time hiring of young people by government departments; 
• to foster initial and continuing training programmes, both in and out of the school system, 
both in-service and for the unemployed, to improve and update human capital; 
• to ease the tax and contribution burden on the cost of labour by shifting part of it (health 
service contributions, for instance) from payroll taxes to general taxation; 
• to promote and provide incentives for self-employment and enterprise creation by young 
people, with support to the law on youth entrepreneurship and "word-of-honour" loans for 
young people, including student loans as well as business start-up loans. 
The Government further proposes to move in several directions: 
• fostering a favourable climate for investment, economic activity and the exploitation of local 
resources by extending tax relief to firms that invest and create jobs; 
• testing, in the South, new forms of labour market flexibility, with special attention to young people; 
• developing local pacts and company agreements for flexibility, which in the past have succeeded in 
shrinking the underground economy and encouraging capacity expansion and new investment; 
• stepping up the vast array of real services to industry, service businesses and the tourist sector; 
• upgrading public administration; 
• promoting investment in transport and communication infrastructure to facilitate the movement of 
people, goods, services and above all information. 
The subsequent tripartite Pact for Employment, signed on 24 September, ratified the 
social partners' consensus on this overall policy approach and set out measures, incentives, 
contribution relief and tax reductions designed to tackle the employment emergency but also 
to upgrade and improve the labour market in general. The pact is certainly an appreciable 
measure, with such positive features as less rigid discipline of apprenticeship, innovations 
concerning part-time contracts, strong incentives to new employment and so on. 
The fruitfulness of so many significant commitments in practice will depend heavily on 
the climate of mutual trust and confidence that the social partners and local governments 
manage to establish, so as to sustain at the grass-roots the effort undertaken at the central 
level. The task is not at all an easy one, as is clear from this year's investment and employment 
figures as well as from the bitter dispute over renewal of the metalworkers' contract. 
Nevertheless, an honest effort to establish such social trust, confidence and loyalty is a "real 
requisite" for the meaningfulness and completeness of Italian participation in Economic and 
Monetary Union. 
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I. LABOUR MARKET ANALYSIS AND FORECASTS 
1. Demographic trends 
Since the turn of the 1960s the size and composition of Italian population have 
changed dramatically, under the uneven influence of demographic factors. 
The annual number of births has declined progressively, from a peak of 1,016,000 
in 1964 to just 526,064 (Graph 1.1) while the fertility rate has dropped to 1.2, one of 
the lowest in the world. This phenomenon, which took demographers and economists 
totally by surprise, occured in just a twenty-year period: in fact births were already down 
to 556,000 in 1986 and the number has remained pretty much constant since then. At the 
same time Ufe expectancy has increased to 74 years for males and 81 for females. Italy, 
historically a country of emigration, has been since 1973 a country of net immigration 
and this is already reflected in the multiethnic look of the country's cities, large towns 
and factories. 
Therefore, at present Italy is characterized by a negative natural balance and by a 
positive migratory balance, and both values are expected to increase at least in the next 
few years. 
Total population has risen from 49.2 million in 1961 to 56.6 in 1995, while 
population structure and geographical distribution have been radically transformed 
(Table 1.1). From a structural point of view, the decrease of the birth rate and the 
increase of the average age at death has produced an aging of the population that can be 
captured observing that the weight of young people has lost 7.9 percentage points while 
the working age population and the elderly have gained respectively 5.1 and 4.6 points. 
Although these trends have been common to all Italian regions, their timing and 
dimensions have been differentiated. The process has affected Northern regions first, 
progressing from North to South, so that while in the Northern part of the country the 
relative weight of the young is already down to 12.6%, in Southern regions - where 
46.3% of Italian young people live - the figure is still 19.5%. 
Between 1961 and 1995 the working age population increased by more than 8 
million. Table 1.2 shows the relative role of generational turnover (entries and exits by 
age), migration and death. The picture is a rather complicated one, reflecting drastic 
changes in the roles of these three contributory factors over the years. 
Until the turn of the '80s, generational entries into the working age population 
increased, reflecting the post-war baby boom. This trend was partly counteracted, 
however, by an increase in generational exits, so that the impact on the generational 
balance was rather modest. Moreover this period was characterized by a negative 
migratory balance. 
In the 1981-1991 period the drop in the birth rate began to be felt, so that 
generational entries have progressively decreased while the positive trend of exits has 
continued, with the exception of the years from 1981 to 1986, when the cohorts that 
were involved in the Second World War exited from the working age population. As a 
result we register a drop in the yearly natural balance of around 100,000. During the 
same period we find a total positive migratory balance of almost one million. 
2. The structure of the labour force 
Recent labour market trends 
Premise 
In the last three years, the Italian labour market has suffered the worst slump 
since the Second World War. Employment has plunged and unemployment has begun to 
rise again, reversing the first timid improvement favoured by stagnant population, 
especially the shrinking size of new entry cohorts. 
What was actually happening was not perceived immediately, partly because 
Istat's quarterly Labour Force Survey, the main source in this field, had modifed its data 
observation system and revised its method of calculating the reference population. Just as 
the slump was beginning Istat substantially changed the survey questionnaire and the 
criteria for classification. The aggregate itself was also revised for alignment with the 
findings of die 1991 census.' 
The fundamental trends of the 1980s 
The fundamental labour market developments of the '80s were a pronounced rise 
in unemployment but also an increase in employment. While not sharp, the expansion of 
employment was certainly not negligible; it grew more than during the '70s, when by 
contrast unemployment had not increased. The gain in employment in the '80s was 
almost entirely accounted for by women, but this did not prevent the growth of female 
unemployment. This reflected underlying changes in labour market equilibria that were 
asymmetric as between the two sexes. There was a significant decline in the men's 
participation rate and a substantial rise in the women's. 
The geographical breakdown adds a further element: nearly all of the gain in 
employment came in the Centre and North, nearly all the increase in unemployment in the 
South. The expansion of the female labour force was faster in the South than in the 
Centre and North, but it mostly took the form of additional unemployment, not 
employment as in the rest of the country. 
In short, the changes in the labour supply were highly gender-specific, with 
divergent trends for men and women, but basically common nationwide. The growth in 
the demand for labour was not only gender-specific but also geographically 
characterized, concentrated in the northern part of the country. In what follows we 
examine how the employment crisis has modifed these underlying trends. 
Recent trends in employment and unemployment 
Graph 1.2 is an index of employment trends in the last three years, with 1993 
equal to 100, as in the other index graphs.2 The drop in employment has been 
substantial, a loss of 350,000 between April 1993 and April 1996. The trough came in 
1 The revision of the questionnaire could not be put off any longer. It had to be brought into line with the 
Eurostat definitions, from which it diverged too substantially. But this created problems of continuity 
with existing data series, and the difficulties of adjustment have not yet been entirely resolved. 
Accordingly we have elected to separate the analysis of recent trends from that of the longer term, which 
is set forth in section 2.5 below. 
2 The actual numbers referred to in the text are reported in the statistical appendix. 
April 1995, at 400,000 below the starting figure. Since then there has been a gradual 
recovery that seems to be in course of consolidation. 
Unemployment has risen significantly. The number of persons unemployed, by 
the Eurostat definition, has risen from 2,373,000 in April 1993 to 2,816,000 in April 
1996. The differentials between men and women have remained unchanged, with the 
male unemployment rate rising from 7.8% to 9.6% and the female rate from 15.0% to 
16.7%. 
The recession does not seem to have altered the basic relative patterns of the 
labour market of the '80s; rather it has had the effect of worsening the existing 
tendencies. Graph 1.3, for example, shows that during the two years of recession male 
employment, which had been roughly stable during the '80s, dropped sharply, while 
women's employment, which had been increasing rapidly, declined only slightly. In the 
last year, that of economic upturn, female employment has resumed its growth, while 
male employment has achieved only a slower rate of decline. Thus the relation between 
the two has remained virtually unchanged. 
Some elements, aside from the relative positions, are worth underscoring: 
a) women's employment stopped growing after 20 years of uninterrupted expansion; 
b) this had no effect on women's participation, which continued its significant growth. 
This has had an impact on discussions of the determinants of labour force 
participation. The "discouraged worker" hypothesis, long debated in Italy, posits that 
during employment slumps the labour supply may contract because the more marginal 
strata, especially young people and women, give up looking for work and are thus no 
longer counted as unemployed. 
The consequence is that during recessions the true severity of unemployment may 
not emerge, but it will be harder to reduce in the subsequent recovery because this latent, 
temporarily hidden labour supply will return to the job market. 
Can this thesis still be sustained? The powerful growth of the female labour force 
in the '80s was certainly fueled and "pulled" by a rapidly growing demand for labour. But 
the growth in the supply far exceeded that in the demand. It was accordingly suggested 
that certain key features of women's labour force participation had been modified: that 
work outside the home, once transitory and sometimes utterly marginal in women's lives, 
had become increasingly basic, fundamental to women's identity. 
If the increase in the labour force corresponded to basic cultural changes in the 
female component, this had crucial implications for the functioning of the labour market 
itself. It was theorized that the "new female labour force" tended to be much less 
"discourageable" than in the past, less dependent on ups and downs in demand. 
The pattern of the employment crisis of the last three years provides evidence in 
support of this thesis. The female labour supply in fact continued to grow even as 
women's employment declined. This does not mean that there were no signs of 
"discouragement", but that such signs were common to men and women. In the three 
years, there has been a growth in the "potential labour force" of men and women alike 
(Graph 1.4), i.e. people who say they are looking for work but have not taken any job 
search actions in the month preceding the survey. And for both sexes there was an 
increase in the number of persons "outside the labour force but willing to work" (Graph 
1.5), i.e. those declaring that they are not looking for a job but would take one if it were 
offered. 
Sectoral employment trends 
In the '80s, employment expanded solely by virtue of the services sector, both 
public and private, while the secular decline in agricultural employment and the more 
recent but equally pronounced drop in industry, especially in large firms, continued. In 
ten years more than a million jobs were lost in farming, which counted under 2 million in 
1990. Another 900,000 were lost in industry, bringing the total in 1990 to 6.8 million. 
However, employment in the services grew by 2.6 million over the decade, and by 1990 
the number employed in this sector had reached 12.6 million. 
Graph 1.6 shows that the slump of the early 1990s affected the services first and 
foremost, blocking their employment growth immediately and until April 1995. Since 
then there has been a gradual recovery, but nothing comparable to the previous dynamic 
job creation. The performance of industrial employment was better than expected, with a 
loss of 70,000 workers in manufacturing during the first two years, mostly recouped in 
the last year. Overall, then, industry excluding construction performed better during the 
three recession years than during the decade of employment expansion. The contraction 
in construction employment, however, was sharp, with a loss of 150,000 jobs in three 
years. Many observers have noted that this is also a "political" crisis due to to the virtual 
freeze on public works projects triggered by the uncovering and prosecution of 
widespread graft and corruption (and this explanation is applicable to a good number of 
components of the services sector as well). 
As for the relative weight of salaried employment and self-employment, the latter 
has performed decidedly better (Graph 1.7), as has been the case for a number of years 
now. 
The geography of recession 
As noted, the expansion of the '80s was sharply diversified geographically. The 
growth of employment came almost entirely in the Centre and North, that of 
unemployment in the South. In the last three years the disparity has worsened. As Graph 
1.8 shows, the fall in employment in the North was relatively sporadic, and the three 
years actually ended with a positive net balance, employment rising from 10,348,000 in 
April 1993 to 10,401,000 in April 1996, while the South experienced a severe collapse, 
employment dropping from 6,010,000 to 5,640,000. Meanwhile, unemployment 
increased by just 25,000 in the North and by 380,000 in the South. 
The trend in central Italy was more contradictory, with only a moderate decline in 
employment but a substantial rise in unemployment. The data are recent, however, and 
their proper assessment will require additional information on the structure of the labour 
force by sex and education, for which sufficiently long series are not yet available. 
In any case, now as never before, after a decade of overall expansion and three 
years of grim recession, the problem of employment in Italy can be identified with the 
regional problem. Three figures sum it up: in 1996, the South of Italy accounted for 36% 
of the total population and just 28% of employment, but a full 57% of unemployment. 
Elements of labour force structure 
Aspects of "non-institutional" work in Italy 
The data presented here were developed as part of Istat's project to re-estimate 
the national accounts. They are thus official data but not gathered directly; instead, they 
are derived by comparing different sources. A brief summary of the definitions will 
accordingly be useful. 
a) Regular employment positions: the positions of employees regularly registered on 
firms' payrolls and of self-employed persons whose activities are performed in work 
premises identifiable as such as the seat of enterprises. 
b) Non-regular employment positions: the positions of employees not officially on the 
payroll of firms and of self-employed persons whose activities are performed in work 
places that cannot be described as the seat of enterprises. Statistically, these are counted 
by subtracting payroll staff of firms from the number of persons explicitly employed as 
found in the labour force survey. 
c) Undeclared employed persons: labour force survey respondents who do not explicitly 
state that they are employed but do say that they have worked at least some hours during 
the reference week. 
d) Non-resident aliens: this estimate covers only non-resident aliens employed by Italian 
enterprises. 
e) Second jobs: employment positions in addition to the primary one. 
In 1995, Italy counted nearly 18 million regular employment positions, as well as 
nearly 2.5 million non-regular positions and 441,000 non-declared employed (Table 1.3). 
Primary employment positions that can be described as "non-institutional" thus involved 
some 15% of total residents' employment positions. In addition, there are some 700,000 
non-resident aliens; for these, only salaried employment is estimated, not self-
employment. 
Non-institutional employment is equally common among wage-earners and the 
self-employed; the sectors in which it is most widespread are the market services and 
construction. 
The situation as regards second jobs is more complicated. Istat reports some 7.2 
million jobs. This would mean that about a third of all persons employed have a second 
job. Obviously, these jobs are highly sporadic; they may even produce substantial 
earnings, but when converted into standard (or full-time equivalent) labour units, they 
amount to just 1.8 million "normal" jobs. The vast majority of these second jobs (some 4 
million) are in agriculture; the rest consist mainly in self-employment or salaried 
employment in the market services. 
Part-time work 
Traditionally, part-time work has played a marginal role in Italy, though efforts 
have been made of late to adapt contractual provisions in this regard. In 1994, just 
1,176,000 of Italy's 20,120,000 employed persons were working part-time. 
Unsurprisingly, the large majority are women working in the services. 
The structure of the labour force by age 
One specific feature of Italian unemployment, by European standards, has always 
been the prevalence of youthful first-job seekers in total unemployment. By means of 
mechanisms that have not yet been thoroughly studied, the job market has always 
favoured the employment of the more mature workers. This feature used to be ascribed 
to lack of mobility, the standard image of the job as a "fortress" that may have been hard 
to get into but, once obtained, even harder to be gotten out of. But then it was found 
that the Italian labour market is marked by very considerable mobility; and on reflection 
this was only to be expected, given the clear predominance in all sectors of small and 
medium-sized enterprises, one of whose characteristics is high turnover. 
The fact is that in the past adult workers certainly enjoyed very good job security; 
above all, however, it was always easier for them than for younger workers to find 
another job. More than in other countries, the best passport to jobs has always been 
having one already. 
Yet this feature of the labour market, i.e. high youth unemployment, has 
permitted the effective buffering of the economic repercussions of unemployment, which 
have been shifted onto families. Households are highly resourceful; they can activate 
even "pieces" of a job (notably those second jobs mentioned above) to cope with the 
delayed entry of children into the job market. 
This method of blunting the economic consequences of unemployment has 
proved extremely efficacious, making very high unemployment rates "tolerable" for long 
periods. The social repercussions have not been unproblematical, however, with the 
exclusion of the younger generation from work socialization, especially in the South. 
What needs underscoring, though, is that with the job crisis of the last few years 
this mechanism has begun to jam. Not only has unemployment increased; the incidence of 
mature workers has risen sharply. In just three years the share of all unemployed 
accounted for by persons over 30 rose from 35% to 40%. The sharpest rise was 
registered by the 30-39 age-group, which corresponds to the age when a household's 
need for income is greatest. This alteration not just in the extent but in the social nature 
of unemployment has not yet been suitably discussed; much less have the inevitable social 
and economic consequences been assessed. 
Labour force and educational attainment 
It was long said, in Italy, that academic degrees were "useless" and 
unemployment in general was described as "intellectual unemployment" of upper 
secondary school and university graduates. 
Actually, however, the problem of "intellectual unemployment" must be 
significantly put in perspective. True, these more advanced degrees no longer guarantee 
immediate success in the labour market with a secure, well-paying job. But as we shall 
see it can certainly not be sustained that better education is useless or counterproductive. 
The age and educational distribution of the employed and the unemployed is 
given in Table 1.4. Clearly, the university degree gives you significant advantages in the 
labour market: graduates constitute 10.7% of total employment but only 6% of the 
unemployed. Those with just the upper secondary degree unquestionably encounter 
greater difficulty: 35.2% of employment but 37.1% of the unemployed. Those with no 
more than compulsory schooling (still only to age 14 in Italy) are worse off still, 
representing 37.2% of the employed and 47.2% of the unemployed. The probability of 
being unemployed thus decreases as one's educational level rises. The sole exception is 
persons with no more than elementary schooling (having dropped out at age 10); indeed, 
they appear to be favoured. Of course, these people gravitate around unskilled jobs that 
most Italians now tend to reject. 
In any event, the figures on education cannot be grasped in their full significance 
unless they are adjusted for age. When this is done we find that young university or high 
school graduates do appear to have greater difficulty finding work than their less well 
educated counterparts. 
However, the figures need proper interpretation. A single example should suffice. 
Take young people aged 20-24. In this age-group, upper secondary graduates account 
for 47.8% of the persons employed and 55.8% of those unemployed, while for persons 
with only compulsory schooling the opposite holds: the employed distinctly outnumber 
the unemployed. Holding the high school degree thus seems to entail some sort of 
impediment to success in the job market. The fact is that unless the data are corrected 
along a time horizon, they can be misleading. A 20-24-year-old lacking the high school 
degree is not at an advantage. It is only that he has had more time to find a place in the 
world of work, since he left school an average of four or five years earlier. His more 
educated contemporary has probably just entered the labour market, not yet had time to 
make the transition from school to work, an especially lengthy process here in Italy. 
From this perspective, the entry problems of those with better educational attainments 
are largely scaled down. 
Looking at the older agre-groups, the situation is decisively reversed. Among 
those aged 40-44, those with upper secondary degrees account for 35.2% of the 
employed and no more than 20% of the unemployed. The same goes for university 
graduates. 
On the whole then, it appears that possession of a high school or university 
degree does not greatly shorten the waiting time before entry into employment; but those 
who have gotten their degree and completed the transition phase have much lower risk 
of remaining unemployed. 
Labour market and education: gender specificity 
The rise in the average level of education since the Second World War has been 
more marked among women. Traditionally, men tended to be better schooled than 
women. Over the years the difference narrowed and was eventually inverted. Today, in 
the 25-29 age-group, 53% of the women have at least an upper secondary degree, 
compared with 49% of the men. Their better education has not yet produced any 
advantage in the labour market; women continued to have more trouble finding the first 
job than men, and to be hired to lower positions when they do find work. 
One reason for this is the type of schooling selected. Many women still incline to 
the humanités, whose only vocational outlet is teaching, but the number of teachers is 
contracting in line with demographic trends. And this can only worsen, as there is no hint 
of even a levelling off of the birth rate. 
3. Main trends in job creation and job loss 
From 1970 to 1995 Italian GDP recorded an average annual growth of 2.6%, 
while labour units (full-time equivalent employed) increased by 0.4% a year. Thus the 
growth rate in output has been achieved largely by raising productivity. However, this 
broad trend proves to be significantly differentiated both by time period (see Graph 1.9) 
and by productive sector. 
During the '70s GDP grew by a yearly average of 3.7%; this expansion was 
accompanied by the increase in the number of salaried labour units at a rate of just over 
1%, while self-employed labour units increased by 0.6% a year. During the '80s the 
growth of output slowed to 2.4%, and that of employee labour units to less than 1%. 
The self-employed labour force, by contrast, appears to have increased at a higher rate. 
The faster growth of self-employment was fostered both by the expansion of the business 
and personal services sector, and by changes in the relationships between firms and 
workers. In construction, for example, firms have elected to "sub-contract" work rather 
than take workers directly onto their own payrolls. Thus, the individual worker is 
increasingly treated as a "firm", no longer working as an employee but operating on 
commission. 
In the first half of the '90s output growth has averaged just 1.4% a year (Table 
1.5). This slowdown precluded all growth of the work force, which in fact registered 
annual decreases of 0.6% in employee labour units and of 0.9% for self-employment. 
The rate of output growth has been much higher in manufacturing industry. 
During the '70s the annual average increase was 6%. Growth slowed progressively to 
2.8% in the '80s, then was forced to a recession in 1991 and 1993, and picked up again 
in 1994 and 1995, to average 1.5% for 1990-95. Only during the '70s was there any 
expansion of employment in the sector, with the number of standard labour units rising at 
an average annual rate of 1%; there was contraction of 1.4% a year during the '80s, and 
the job loss quickened in the '90s to 2.0%. 
During the three decades, output in the market services expanded at annual rates 
of 4.5%, 3.2% and 2.0% respectively. The very modest productivity gains of this sector 
allowed for more substantial growth of the work force, which expanded by an annual 
average of 2.5% over the period. In the early '90s, however, this employment growth 
slowed to 0.5%. 
The interplay of productivity and output was such that Italian firms had to 
expand the volume of production by more than 2% a year in order to create any jobs at 
all. In manufacturing in particular, which recorded average productivity gains of 4.4%, 
output growth of 3.7% was insufficient even to maintain the level of labour input, so that 
employment has shrunk at a rate of 0.7% a year. Only in the service sector have jobs 
been created; there, due to the sector's relatively poor productivity performance, the 
growth of output was achieved with increased labour input. 
Following the oil crises of the '70s, Italian industry engaged in a drawn-out 
adjustment process. The need to save on energy costs and remain competitive 
internationally spurred Italian industries to adopt the "just-in-time" model of production. 
To effect this adjustment, they cut down stocks and contracted out a large volume of 
service activities and component production to smaller enterprises, which were able to 
manage their work force with greater flexibility. 
During the '80s the demand for labour in the industrial sector declined; the 
growth of the service sector was favoured, as this was traditionally an area of real 
opportunity to start up businesses. However, the additional work force caused a drop in 
average productivity, which was already rather low. 
In the early '90s a slump in output owing to the recession that set in in the second 
half of 1990 combined with steady productivity gains to provoke severe job loss, most 
especially in manufacturing, and seriously impeded job creation in the services as well. 
Major industries restructured production systems; with regard to the work force, 
they resorted to the Short-time Earnings Compensation programme, which paid benefits 
to workers who had effectively been laid off. This programme enabled enterprises to 
make more flexible use of their work force, enhancing competitiveness and cyclical 
adaptability. Sometimes, when required by particular circumstances, output growth could 
be achieved by reducing resort to short-time compensation and increasing overtime. The 
result was that only firms experiencing prolonged expansions of output needed to hire 
additional workers. 
At the beginning of the '90s, this kind of restructuring emerged in the service 
sector too. The first to be affected was transportation, notably the state railways; the 
process then spread to communications and, more recently, banking. At present far-
reaching changes in work organization are proceeding in the distributive sector as well. 
Major retailers are competing more and more effectively with small stores, as new 
shopping centres, discount stores and supermarkets, offering wider choice of products at 
lower prices, are being established almost daily in residential neighbourhoods. 
Only the public sector has been left out of the adjustment process, so far. The 
government sector now appears to be a drag on employment growth for the entire 
economy. The priority, recently, has been public financial adjustment rather than the 
promotion of efficiency or structural adjustment. Under budgetary restrictions, most 
government departments have been hiring only to replace (not even entirely) retiring 
employees. 
Accordingly, public sector employment has been declining since 1993. In that 
year the overall employment rate fell, due to the decline in output combined with the 
effects of restructuring in the services and public budget cuts. The contraction of 
employment continued, though less steeply, in 1994 and 1995. During these years, job 
losses were especially severe in construction and the energy sector. The main cause here 
was the recession, whereas in transport and communication it had been sectoral 
restructuring (Table 1.5). 
The key factor to consider in examining the processes that have determined the 
changes in work organization in Italy is firm size. The dichotomy between large firms, 
characterized by job loss, and small ones, with job creation, has in fact become more 
pronounced. 
Between 1990 and 1994 some 700,000 to 800,000 employee labour units were 
eliminated each year; in the same period about 650,000 or 750,000 new units were 
created annually. 
Job loss prevailed substantially, with a net loss of more than 400,000 during the 
period. The vicissitudes of job creation and job loss determined the nature of the 
restructuring processes. In the end, enterprises employing more than 20 workers 
experienced job loss, whereas minor enterprises have registered net job creation. 
In the five years from 1990 through 1994 the larger enterprises dismissed a net 
total of more than 500,000 workers, as each year 300,000 to 400,000 labour units were 
eliminated and just 200,000 to 300,000 new ones created. By contrast, minor enterprises 
employed more than 100,000 additional units, since the 350,000-400,000 units destroyed 
every year were more than offset by the creation of new labour units (Tables 1.7 and 
1.8). 
As regards the unemployment rate, the effects of changes in the demand for 
labour may not be immediate or unambiguous. Apart from cyclical factors, the Italian 
labour market is characterized by a set of features that influence the unemployment rate: 
• the secular rise in labour market participation by women since 1972, which was only 
briefly interrupted from 1992 to 1994 and has in any case not been dependent on the 
demand for labour; 
• most women continue to conform to the typical worker-housewife-worker career 
pattern; accordingly their alternating labour force entry and exit pertains to the area of 
the transitions between non-labour force and labour force, more than to the demand 
for labour; 
• workers who lose their jobs before regular retirement age tend not to look for another 
job; most simply withdraw from the labour market; 
• the great difficulty encountered by young people in finding work obliges them to 
remain students, perhaps longer than they would like; consequently, many are 
recruited directly from the so-called non-labour force, rather than from among the 
officially unemployed. 
All in all, neither the employment nor the unemployment rate can be fully 
accounted for by the alternating phases of economic recession or expansion. The only 
reliable basis for an analysis of labour market trends is appraisal of the main tendencies in 
job creation and employment. 
However, average unemployment rates do underscore with great clarity the 
enormous gap between the southern and northern parts of Italy. In 1995 the average 
unemployment rate in Italy was 12%; in the central and northern regions the rate was 
7.8%, as against 21% in the South. The recent recovery in output has been export-led, 
and domestic consumption has lagged far behind. The result is that in 1995 modest 
improvement in the employment rate was found only in the Centre and North, where 
most export firms are located. Obviously, this could not but aggravate the disparity 
between North and South. 
The sharp employment crisis of 1992-1995 interrupted the steady increase in 
women's participation since 1972. The service sector had drawn women into the labour 
force, as it had been relatively immune to cyclical downturns, at least until 19923. In 
1995 women's participation again turned upward, but largely in the status of "other job 
seekers", demonstrating their basically marginal role within the labour market. During the 
current year the female employment rate has risen in the northern and central regions, 
where the men's rate has been essentially stable. The data for the South, however, show a 
persistent decline in both female and male employment rates. 
The decline comes in an economy already suffering from structurally low 
employment rates. The reasons for structural unemployment in the South are discussed in 
detail in section 1.6. What is most interesting is the evidence of one key feature of the 
Italian economy adversely affecting job creation: investment. A look at the performance 
of investment in the long run highlights this fundamental weakness of the labour market. 
In the quarter-century from 1970 to 1995 the pace of real gross capital formation in Italy 
has come to just 40% of the average for the G-7 countries.4 The impact of this gap on 
employment rates has been exacerbated by a disproportionately fast expansion of the 
working-age population,5 bringing the rate of real capital formation per person of 
working age down to 36 percent of the G-7 average; and the rate of capital formation 
per labour force participant has been lower still. Italy's investment gap is concentrated in 
the South, where public investment programmes have failed to overcome the structural 
deficit in private investment. 
3 As a matter of fact, the recent structural changes in the economic system have widened the time gaps 
between employment and economic cycles. For istance, in the last period of economic recession, while 
the industrial sector faces reduction in production from the second quarter of 1991 to the second quarter 
of 1994, and the national GNP declines for a more shorter period, from the second quarter of 1992 to the 
third quarter of 1993, the employment recession is much longer, lasting from the third quarter of 1992 
to the fourth quarter of 1995. 
4 OECD, Economic Outlook, various years. 
5 OECD.Historical Labour Force Statistics reports average yearly growth of 0.45% in the Italian 
population aged 15-64, which is above 50 percent of the G-7 average. 
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4. Wage and salary trends 
Wages and salaries in Italy have traditionally depended on two main factors: cost-
of-living indexation and productivity. The scala mobile cost-of-living allowance long had 
a central role in determining the course of Italian wage growth. 
In 1969, in response to the high profits of the '60s, unions won wage increases 
and terms that exerted their influence throughout the labour market during the '70s. The 
oil crisis in 1973 and 1974 triggered a leap in inflation from 5.6% to 10.4% and then to 
19.4%. Combined with the indexation mechanism, this touched off a price-wage spiral 
driving labour costs up. 
In 1982 government, business and labour initialed a broad agreement in an effort 
to break this spiral, instituting a programmed or target inflation rate that would 
determine the number of scala mobile steps for the year. The impact on inflation was 
remarkable. The rate fell from 15% in 1983 to 10.6% in 1984 and 4.6% in 1987. Since 
then annual price increases have fluctuated between a high of 6.6% and a low of 3.9% in 
1994 (Graph 1.10). 
Further tripartite agreements were signed in July 1992 and July 1993, establishing 
very significant guidelines for incomes policy and collective bargaining: 
• all wage indexation was finally abolished; 
• the bargaining system was reformed, with the national, industry-wide contracts to be 
complemented by bargaining at company level; the contracts now run four years, with 
renegotiation of the wage portion every two years; 
• new, more flexible methods of work force utilization were allowed for. 
As regards wages in particular, the change from the old three-year contracts 
makes for more frequent bargaining and more effective monitoring of wages trends with 
respect to the cost of living. Generally speaking, the 1993 accord specifies that industry-
wide wage increases be held to the government's target inflation rates, with possible 
catch-up increments to reflect any disparity between target and actual inflation to be 
bargained over in the last two years of the contract. 
The concession of supplementary wage increases at the firm level on the basis of 
productivity growth reflects a recognition of the differing impact of international 
competition on the various sectors and branches of the economy, which has had a 
notable effect on the overall trend of labour costs (Table 1.9). 
However, the benefits of productivity gains have not always been equitably 
shared between workers, enterprises, and industries. In combination with other factors, 
this has produced additional inequalities in the economy. 
In practice, since the tum of the '80s Italian firms operating in competitive sectors 
have regularly concluded wage agreements that kept the real increase in labour costs 
below the gains in productivity. In the sheltered sectors, by contrast, this constraint was 
inoperative and labour costs outstripped productivity increases. 
From 1979 to 1995, average annual productivity gains came to 3% in agriculture, 
industry, transport and communications. The rate of real wage increase in agriculture and 
industry was substantially lower, at 0.5%. Even so, these workers achieved the largest 
wage increases within the economy. 
The sectors not threatened by international competition registered much more 
modest productivity gains, so that the wage increases in those sectors, while smaller than 
in industry and agriculture, were larger than productivity increases. In fact, these 
increments appear to depend on the overall enhancement of productivity for the economy 
11 
as a whole. Rising labour costs in these sectors led to increasing costs of services, 
including services to goods producers. This undermined the competitiveness of farms and 
manfuacturers in the world market. Rates of productivity increase have varied 
considerably in the '70s, '80s and '90s (Table 1.10). 
In the early '70s real per capita wages regularly outpaced productivity growth in 
all sectors. This reflected the collective bargaining agreements of the late '60s, achieved 
in conditions of sharp industrial conflict, which only recouped, in part, earlier 
productivity gains. 
The largest wage increases were awarded in 1974 and 1977, when the main 
industry-wide contracts were renewed. From 1980 to 1986, by contrast, real wages 
always lagged behind productivity. Some recovery was detectable from 1987 to 1991. 
In the entire decade of the '80s, the average annual rate of increase in real wages 
in manufacturing industry was 1.4%, compared with average productivity growth of 
4.3%. Wage bargaining in 1990 and 1991 clearly reflected this past pattern, as increases 
on that occasion substantially exceeded inflation. In September 1992 economic recession, 
a runaway budget deficit and an unmanageable exchange rate led to the devaluation of 
the lira. Yet, under the impact of economic crisis, wages declined, even beyond the 
provision of the agreements of 1992 and 1993, favouring Italian competitiveness. This 
led to considerable profit increases for Italian exporters. 
The fact that wage increases have not kept pace either with inflation or with 
productivity (a gap of 2 percentage points in 1992-1993, more than 3 points between 
1994 and 1995) has altered the distribution of income in favour of employers (Table 
1.11). This disparity was criticized by the Governor of the Bank of Italy in the course of 
his remarks to the central bank's general meeting on 31 May 1996. In the last year the 
gap between productivity and real labour costs per worker was the widest ever, at 3.1 
percentage points, while real per capita wages declined by 1%. 
The OECD's evaluation of total factor productivity by sector shows an average 
annual gain of 0.9% between 1979 and 1995. This resulted from a significant increase in 
labour productivity (1.8%), rather than from capital productivity which actually declined 
by an annual rate of 0.9%. The decline in capital productivity, steeper than in the other 
European countries, signals a broadening technology gap with Italy's main competitors 
and undermines the achievements in terms of labour productivity. 
In order to allow wages to increase in line with labour productivity, the 1992 and 
1993 agreements provide for decentralized bargaining at the company and district level, 
to avoid the rigidity inherent in determining wage increases by reference to a single, 
average rate of productivity growth. Individual firms can decide wage rates in 
differential, responsive fashion, on the basis of assessment of actual productivity. 
This wage-setting provision had the effect of moderating contractual minimums 
and increasing the incidence of the flexible portion of total wages. Companies have 
gained the power to differentiate wages for individual workers and thus bring earnings 
more closely in line with particular production requirements. In the four years from 1992 
through 1995 the new bargaining procedures, the continuing recession and the fear of 
inflation (now universally viewed as the main economic enemy), effectively curbed 
contractual raises. Compared with average contractual increases of around 6% in the late 
'80s and that of 9.9% in 1991, the contractual raises agreed to in industry from 1993 to 
1995 were less than 3.6% (Table 1.12). 
Moreover, since 1991 actual per capita earnings have grown practically in line 
with the contractual minimums, whereas in earlier years the former had generally 
outpaced the latter by about 1.5 percentage points. 
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In 1993-95 individual gross wage rates increased just 0.4% more than the 
contractual minimums. In other words, owing to disinflation and recession, company-
level agreements in the last few years have not resulted in any general rise in earnings 
levels. So, after the agreements of 1992 and 1993, decentralized company- or district-
level bargaining has led to a moderation of wage increases, compared with the growth 
registered during the previous years. In short, wages have been determined on the basis 
of the industry-wide agreements. 
As a consequence of the tripartite agreements, moderation in social contribution 
increases should have favoured the second-level bargaining results. Instead, during the 
last three years the increase in contributions outpaced contractual minimums by 1.4%, 
while the differential observed in the course of the previous three years was just 0.9%. 
Strict control on social contribution costs is impeded by several factors. The 
objectives set, in fact, appear to be contradictory; it is very hard to programme wage 
increase without causing a growth in contributions and labour costs; the urgent need to 
redress the public finances makes this target even more elusive. 
If we look at recent trends in wage dispersion, we find a growing 
differentiation according to skill levels, with white-collar workers obtaining larger 
increases than blue-collar workers. In industry, from 1990 to 1994 white-collar 
employees' earnings rose 0.8 points per year more than blue-collar workers'. 
During these same years, increases have also been differentiated according to firm 
size. Average per capita earnings in industrial firms with over 50 employees have risen 
0.6 or 0.7 points per year more than in those with fewer than 20 workers. All in all, then, 
white-collar workers in medium-to-large industrial firms have gained more than 1 
percentage point a year as compared with blue-collar workers in small firms. After the 
egalitarian policies followed during the '70s, if such trends continue in the future wages 
and salaries could quickly return to being quite sharply differentiated. 
The remarkable increase in gross operating profit has been the result of this type 
of anti-inflation policy, which caused a substantial rise in profit margins. From 1993 to 
1995 gross operating profit showed yearly increases of 4, 7.4 and 10.6 percentage 
points, far outstripping labour costs (including employers' social contributions), which 
grew by just 1%,1.4% and 4.4% respectively in the three years. 
Italian adjustment measures have so far produced a differential between profit 
and labour income growth averaging 5 percentage points a year. In the same period 
720,000 jobs have been lost; savings on labour costs have not been reinvested in job 
creation; rather, they have gone to swell employers' profits (Table 1.13), even if a modest 
increase in employment (0.2%-0.3%) has been detected at the beginning of 1996. 
5. The main causes of the rise in unemployment since 1980 
Demographic aspects 
To understand Italian unemployment, the starting point is demographics. The 
substantial growth of working age population in Italy has not been been accompanied by 
a comparable expansion of employment. In a very long run perspective (1961-1995) the 
performance of the Italian labour market can only be judged as unsatisfactory in the 
extreme, as the present level of employment is actually well below that of 1961. Three 
main phases characterize this period. 
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1. From 1961 to 1972, still boom years, employment contracted by almost 1.5 million, 
as the growth of the industrial and tertiary sectors was insufficient to fully 
compensate for the fall in agricultural employment. 
2. Over the next 20 years, the period of tertiarization, employment grew rather steadily, 
at an average of 125,000 jobs a year. 
3. During the '90s the Italian labour market has suffered the most severe employment 
crisis since the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, with the loss of nearly 
1.5 million jobs in just three years. 
In all three periods the labour force has moved in the same direction as 
employment. However, when employment has declined labour force has declined more 
modestly, and when employment has increased the labour force has grown more rapidly. 
As a result unemployment has increased in each of the three periods; it has now reached 
a level once unimaginable, even in the most pessimistic forecasting scenarios. 
Considering the main labour market indicators (Graph 1.11 and Table 1.14) 
different patterns emerge for men and women. The male employment rate has declined 
continuously, dropping more than 21 percentage points (from 83.8% in 1961 to 62.1% 
in 1995); the participation rate also displays a downward trend, but not as steep, so that 
the gap between the two has increased constantly. The female employment and 
participation rates both registered their low point in 1972 and increased quite 
substantially in the following 20 years; during the recent crisis the women's employment 
rate went down, but the participation rate continued to climb. For women too the 
unemployment rate has risen throughout the period considered. Overall, the employment 
rate for the entire economy has lost more than 10 percentage points, the participation 
rate than 4.5; and the unemployment rate has nearly trebled. 
The dynamic underlying these phenomena can be better understood by analysing 
the generational turnover in the labour force and in employment (Table 1.15). Between 
1966 and 1991 the labour force expanded by 3,536,000, the net result of 15,736,000 
generational entries and 12,200,000 generational exits. Of the exits, 2 million were due 
to death. In the same time interval employment increased by only 2,312,000 (14,322,000 
generational entries and 12,010,000 exits). Therefore additional demand (i.e. net job 
creation) explains only 16.1% of entries, while the remaining 83.9% are accounted for by 
generational exits6. The role of additional demand has therefore been modest indeed, 
except in 1976-81 and 1986-91. However, while men have entered employment only 
through substitutive demand (i.e replacing workers who retired), 42.6% of female 
entries are explained by additional demand. 
Qualitative aspects 
Over the entire period the Italian labour market has been further marked by a series 
of qualitative developments, proceeding at variable pace, but consistently in the same 
direction: tertiarization, feminization, concentration of employment in the middle age 
groups, and geographical polarization. 
Tertiarization - At the beginning of the '60s farm jobs accounted for 30% of total 
employment, while industry and services shared the rest (Table 1.16 and Graph 1.12). In 
the three decades that followed, the incidence of the primary sector (agriculture) 
declined uninterruptedly, to 7.4%; the share of the secondary sector, industry, enjoyed a 
6 Sad to say, death has provided almost as many jobs to young people as has the expansion of output and 
economic activity. 
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period of expansion that lasted until the start of the '70s, and then also turned 
downward; the tertiary or service sector expanded continuosly, reaching a share of 
almost 60%. During the '90s, while agriculture continued to shrink, we register for the 
first time a contraction of the incidence of the service sector, where employment has 
been hit by the economic slump even harder than industry. However in 1995 both shares 
have reached values higher than in 1991. 
In this case, again, generational labour demand in teims of flow (Table 1.17) is a 
very powerful tool for understanding the relative role of the sectors. During the 1966-71 
period, 56.2% of entries into employment were accounted for by industry. Starting with 
the following five-year period, the service sector becomes the main job provider to new 
entrants, its share increasing from 42.0% in 1966-71 to 75.7% in 1981-86. It then 
dropped to 64.3% in 1986-9f 
In short, the period of pronounced tertiarization that has brought the sector's 
employment share to a level of 59.4% in 1994 seems to be at an end; the most likely 
prospect is for the employment structure by sector to remain relatively stable in the near 
future. 
Feminization - One of the most striking traits of the Italian labour market is the 
gradual feminization of all its main components in the last 20 years. At present women 
account for 38.2% of the labour force, 35.4% of employment and 53.4% of 
unemployment (Table 1.18). 
During the '60s the presence of women in the labour market was sharply curtailed 
by the decline of agriculture, but in the subsequent decades this trend was more than 
offset by the tertiarization of the economy, which took the form both of growth of the 
service sector itself, and of expanding white-collar occupations and professions within 
agriculture and industry. 
The feminization process is even more evident in flow data, showing for instance 
a rise in women's share of employment inflows (labour demand) from less than 30% in 
the late '60s to 39.5% at the end of the '80s. The same data also show that the time 
pattern of female entries has substantially changed, increasingly resembling that of men, 
i.e. early entry and an interrupted presence until retirement age. 
Employment age concentration - One of most striking phenomena of the last 30 
years is the progressive concentration of employment in the middle age-groups. 
In the mid-'60s the pattern of employment by age differed radically as between men 
and women (Graph. 1.14). For men there was virtually full employment for the 
population aged 30-55; the employment rate for the youngest age-group (teenagers) 
was around 45%, and that for men aged 65-69 was around 30%. 
Female employment rates, by contrast, peaked in correspondence with the 20-24 
age-group and declined regularly above that age, with the exception of the 30-44 age 
group, whose somewhat higher employment rate indicated some return to the labour 
market on the part of women whose children were now of school age. Overtime the 
pattern of the female employment rate by age has drawn steadily closer to that of men, 
although at a lower level. Essentially, the explanation is that the new cohorts entering 
the labour market have increasingly behaved like men, remaining in the labour market 
even after marriage. This attitude has presumably been prompted by the fact that these 
women, better educated, tended much more to be engaged in tertiary activities, which 
are less demanding in terms of physical effort and psychological stress, and which were 
also perceived as more in tune with the image of working women coming from middle-
class families. 
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At the same time, male employment rates have declined all across the age 
spectrum, the difference from the previous level widening as the distance from the central 
age-group increases. 
What the overall employment rates show, then, is the increasing concentration of 
employment in the 30-55 age-group. Given the stagnant or declining level of 
employment, this has resulted in lower employment rates for the younger and older 
cohorts. 
This phenomenon is more clearly highlighted by what we term weighted 
employment ratios, calculated by dividing the proportion of total jobs assigned to each 
age-group by that group's relative weight in the population (Table 1.19). In 1966 young 
people had a share of jobs just a little larger than their demographic weight so that their 
weighted employment ratio was 104, a value that does not compare too badly with the 
value of 118 for the central age-group. The value for young women was higher (130) 
than for men and also higher than that of the central age-group. In 1995 the weighted 
employment ratio for the 30-49 age group peaked at 147.3, while the corresponding 
values for the first age-group had declined to 77.9 and that for the older group to 64.5. 
This phenomenon is even more pronounced for women, whose weighted rates have 
progressively assumed the same pattern as men's. 
The features of unemployment in Italy 
In 1995, 2,724,000 people, representing 12% of the labour force, were estimated 
to be in search of a job. However, this figure reflects the introduction in 1992 of the 
Eurostat definition. Going by the old definition for the sake of comparability with 
previous periods, we have an estimate of 3.72 million, corresponding to an 
unemployment rate of 15.7%, which gives us a better appreciation of how seriously the 
state of the Italian labour market has deteriorated. 
Not only has unemployment expanded; its main structural characteristics have 
also undergone notable changes. 
In Italy unemployment has always involved mainly youth. Table 1.20 shows two 
aspects of this phenomenon that warrant reflection. The unemployment rate of the 14-29 
age-group has steadily increased, the group's share of all unemployed people has 
decreased until the beginning of the '90s to come back during the recession period 
almost to the 1977 value: this obviously implies that unemployment remains mainly a 
youth problem (seven out of every ten unemployed), and it tends to expand more rapidly 
among older people, during "normal" economic phases. 
Another characterstic of the Italian labour market - to which we will give special 
attention in discussing the causes of unemployment - is the special role played by first-job 
seekers (Table 1.21). This category reached its largest share of total unemployment at 
the beginning of the '80s (52.2%) and has declined progressively since then, bringing its 
weight down to 46.9% for men and 38.7% for women. This result is consistent with the 
diminished weight of young people in overall unemployment. 
A rise in unemployment can be caused by a lengthening in the average duration of 
unemployment, increasing turnover, or both. From 1978 to 1995 the incidence of the 
long-term unemployed (Table 1.22) rose from 32.1% to 68.4%, women's situation being 
only slightly worse than men's (69.8% as against 66.8%). The key factor in long-term 
unemployment, however, is the status of the job seeker. Almost four-fifths of first-job 
seekers have been in this condition more than one year. The situation is only a little 
better for "other job seekers", sex playing here a major role (the values for men and 
women are respectively 46.1% and 70.9%). Work experience also appears to be an 
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important element, in that the percentage of long-term unemployed among "unemployed 
workers" (those having lost a previous job) is "only" 57.7%. Since unemployment entries 
have also grown strongly, both duration and turnover have contributed to the increase in 
unemployment. 
In 1995 30% almost one third of the working age population (WAP) had no 
more than an elementary school certificate (Table 1.23); however, this proportion has 
been declining sharply (it had been 57.8% in 1978), and will continue to do so, given that 
the new entry cohorts have more education than the exit cohorts. 
Men typically have more education than women. This gap, however, is gradually 
narrowing, due to the fact that among the younger age-groups women's level of 
education is on average higher than men's. 
Educational attainment has always had a strong influence on labour force 
participation, especially for women (Table 1.24). In general we observe that participation 
rates rise with education. In 1995 the participation rate of persons with no more than 
primary schooling was 34.9%, while for university graduates it was 86.6%. The rates for 
lower secondary and upper secondary graduates were 59% and 65.6% respectively. The 
strength of this correlation is due primarily to the behaviour of women, whose rates of 
participation by educational level vary more widely and correlate very closely. Moreover, 
the decline in male participation is almost entirely "explained" by the reduction in 
participation by men with low educational level. The same phenomenon can be observed 
for women, although their participation rate has increased significantly since 1978. And 
disparities between men and women in the overall pattern of labour market participation 
narrow as educational level rises. 
For both men and women, unemployment rates increase with education until the 
upper secondary level, while university graduates have the lowest rate. Since 1978 
unemployment has increased more sharply for those with less schooling and especially 
for those with no more than elementary schooling, whose unemployment rate nearly 
trebled, from 4.2% to 13%. This phenomenon is particularly evident for men. 
To determine whether holding particular educational credentials prompts entry 
into the labour force and especially whether it facilitates finding a job, we have computed 
indices relating the percentage of employed and labour force holding each type of 
diploma to that group's share of the WAP and the percentage of unemployed to labour 
force share. 
The main finding confirms previous observations: the probability of being in the 
labour force and that of being employed increase with educational level. The probability 
of a university graduate's being employed is 1.7 times greater than that of a person with 
the lowest level of schooling for men and 4 times greater for women. Most striking is 
that the probability of unemployment, for labour force participants, also increases with 
education, with the exception of university graduates, whose unemployment probability 
is about half the overall average. Lower and upper secondary school graduates have the 
greatest probability of being unemployed. 
Regional differences 
Perhaps the most salient feature of the Italian economy and of its employment 
pattern is the enormous, and increasing, regional disparity. In a word, with the notable 
exception of Liguria, the employment rate declines regularly as one moves from 
Northern to Southern regions, and the gap between the South and the Centre-North of 
the country is very wide indeed (Graph 1.15). 
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The behaviour of labour demand corresponds very closely to the total level of 
unemployment and to the employment and unemployment rates of young people and of 
women. In substance what we want to stress is: 
• the strong direct correlation between total employment and the employment 
level of young people and of women; 
• the strong inverse correlation between the level of total labour demand and of 
total excess supply of young people and of women. 
The present dramatic situation is the result of the progressive deterioration of the 
labour market in the South, reflecting a structural incapacity to create jobs while 
demographic pressures are much greater than in the North. 
As Table 1.25 shows, during the '80s the rate of growth of the working age 
population was twice as high in the South as in the North. Moreover, whereas northern 
population growth stems mainly from immigration, reflecting a demand-pull for labour, 
in the South the natural balance explains almost all WAP growth. At the same time, 
southern employment expanded by just 17,000 jobs a year, against labour force growth 
of 93,000; the corresponding figures in the North were 58,000 and 60,000. 
While in the North the expansion of labour demand has been sufficent not only to 
employ the local labour force but also to draw in a substantial flow of immigration, in the 
South there has been a labour glut, affecting chiefly women and young people. The 
women's unemployment rate has risen by 11.2 pecentage points and that of young 
people by 12.8 (Table 1.26). In both cases the differential with the North is dramatic 
(21.4 and 27.7 points respectively). 
Italian and European unemployment trends 
The evolution of unemployment in Italy can be usefully seen against the backdrop 
of trends in other European countries. 
The oil crisis of 1974 and the recession of 1981 shook the economies of the 
European Community member states with a violence that caused some observers to refer 
to the Depression of the '30s, when almost no one was spared at least the risk of 
joblessness. Job creation stagnated just as, for demographic reasons, the labour force 
was growing strongly (0.7% per year). The result was a sharply climbing unemployment 
rate, from an average of 3% in 1974 to a peak of 10.9% in 1985 for the European 
Community as a whole (Table 1.27). 
Italy represents a singular case, differentiating itself to some degree from the 
performance of its EC partners. Adjustment to the supply-side shocks of the early '70s 
was quicker and less costly in terms of output, investment and employment (Giavazzi 
and Spaventa, 1990). 
Over this same period, Italy's relative position, internationally, was reconsidered 
and revalued; there was a statistical revaluation of output, highlighting the gains made in 
the course of three decades of growth second, among the industrial countries, only to 
that registered by Japan. However, these same years witnessed an unprecedently rapid 
rise in the public debt in order to cover state spending which, through the redistributive 
channels of social protection, sustained demand and the growth of employment in the 
services and the sheltered sectors (Brunetta and Tronti, 1993). 
In 1989 and 1990, the structural adjustment and policy reform conducted since 
the start of the '80s visibly bore fruit. The Community achieved rapid growth (3.2% per 
year). Though slower than in the '60s, this growth was nonetheless sufficient to produce 
a sharp rise in employment, which expanded by 1.3% per year, while the unemployment 
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rate dropped from 10.8% in 1986 to 8.7% in 1990 (Table 1.28). Italy followed the 
European trend, with what can only be called an employment boom in 1990-91, with the 
creation of some 600,000 jobs. 
The cyclical upturn thus revitalized the labour market. Job destruction slowed, 
especially in industry, and hiring resumed. Moreover, the unemployed whose 
geographical location, training, or age made them more desirable regained active status. 
As an effect of past recessions and persistent unemployment in many regions, the 
working of the member state economies and labour markets underwent far-reaching 
ttansformation. Unemployment was most severe among the less skilled and, in general, 
the poorer classes of society, playing a significant role in the emergence of new forms of 
social exclusion. Whereas through the mid-'80s youth employment was the salient feature 
of the labour market, since then the most alarming problem has been the growth of long-
term unemployment (Table 1.29). Unemployment turned upward again in 1991 and 
soared with the employment contraction of 1992-94 (Tables 1.30, 1.31). 
As regards the unemployment rate, Italy's performance improved thanks to 
smaller WAP entry cohorts (the end of the baby boom) and, at least at first, the country 
retained its relative advantage. This is cited as the reason why the employment recession 
began later here than in most other industrial economies. 
Closer inspection clearly reveals the inherent weakness of a system plagued by 
continuing structural problems (severe geographical disparties, youth unemployment, 
etc.), especially in the face of the end of the buffer function performed in the past by the 
tertiary sector, traditionally characterized by slow productivity growth and labour 
intensiveness (Table 1.32). 
The role of compensating for redundancies in manufacturing and agriculture that 
the services had played in previous cyclical downturns depended on that sector's being 
relatively sheltered from competition, enabling it to manage prices in such a way as to 
ensure profit, to the advantage of employment but to the detriment of the inflation 
picture and the competitiveness of firms exposed to international competition. 
This advantage for the services sector was further sustained by the rapid rise in 
public deficit spending. Most lately, with the country engaged in a programme of severe 
financial and structural economic adjustment, the mechanisms that once enabled the 
services to more than offset the job losses in industry and agriculture have simply 
jammed. 
The causes of unemployment 
The stagnation of employment has now become the dominant long-term 
characteristic of the Italian labour market. The expansion of the working age population, 
with the consequent growth of the labour force, has therefore brought a steady decline in 
the employment rate and a rise in unemployment. 
The importance of demographics in the long-run trend of unemployment can be 
seen in a simple analytical framework. We classify the possible states of the labour 
market, on the basis of employment and unemployment trends (Table 1.33). The possible 
combinations of expansion and contraction produce four distinct states: a) attraction; b) 
complementarity 1, or tight labour market; c) complementarity 2, or slack market; d) 
discouragement. 
Examination of the empirical data on the cyclical trends in employment and 
participation (Table 1.34) shows that the seemingly paradoxical possibilities set forth, 
theoretically, in Table 1.33 have actually profoundly marked the Italian labour market. 
The cycle of the '60s (1959-1972) was a period of discouragement, in which the 
19 
unemployment rate did not rise but fell because the number of unemployed declined 
faster than the number employed. More significantly, the subsequent employment cycle, 
from 1972 to 1991, was one of powerful employment growth and attraction (additional 
participation), with a rise rather than a fall in the unemployment rate (the number of job 
seekers grew much faster than the number of persons employed). 
The causes of these "strange" labour market trends consist first in the secular rise 
in female participation and second in the demographic shock constituted by the entry of 
the baby boom generation into the labour market (Bruni, 1988). These overriding 
phenomena mean that the "overall" rate of unemployment, while unquestionably still a 
fundamental sign of social malaise, is basically not suitable as an indicator of the real 
state of strain in the labour market. 
The increasing imbalance between between labour supply and demand can thus 
be ascribed to the fact that the long-term growth of output has been totally accounted for 
by technological progress; or, to put it in another way, that the average growth of 
investment has not been sufficient to increase labour demand at the rate needed to keep 
pace with demographic tendencies. 
Yet demographic trends can be said to be a cause of unemployment only in that 
they constitute a challenge, a condition for unemployment that could be countered and 
eliminated by economic growth and appropriate economic policies. In the long run, the 
size of the labour supply must be taken as a given; and an easily foreseeable one at that, 
given its strong correlation with working age population, which itself can be projected 
well in advance from perfectly known factors (the number of births 20 years previous 
and actuarial mortality rates). In Italy, moreover, the growth of the working age 
population has been rather modest and is slowing down. 
Technological progress must be considered as a necessary, natural element of an 
economy operating in a context of globalization and ever-sharpening competition. It is 
unrealistic to imagine that the rate of growth of the Italian economy could have been 
consistent with any greater elasticity of employment with respect to output. 
Finally, the literature has not as yet offered any persuasive evidence of the 
existence in Italy of the wage-employment relationship postulated by neoclassical 
economics. 
In conclusion the chief cause of unemployment in Italy is the inadequacy of long-
term economic growth. 
Turning to the structure of unemployment, we have shown that the lack of job 
opportunities has affected the various categories within the labour force differentially and 
disproportionately. Institutional factors and qualitative mismatching are the main factors 
explaining the features of Italian unemployment, which involves mostly women and 
young people of intermediate educational attainments seeking their first job. 
The Italian social and economic system rests solidly on the economic role of 
family and on a set of values expressed in rules, unwritten norms and the behaviour of 
individuals and social actors. For mature men, work is both a right and a duty. The 
allocation mechanism is therefore such as to ensure full employment to men in the central 
age-groups; the same age-based criterion is also increasingly true for women, whose 
labour market behaviour in Northern regions is coming resemble that of men, although at 
a lower level. 
The conclusion is that, at present, for men and women alike there is increasing 
concentration of jobs in the central age-groups. For men this is merely the accentuation 
of a historical tendency; for women, a structural change that has taken place in the last 
twenty years. It is evident that this pattern, given a constant number of job opportunities 
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and an expanding labour supply, has entailed increasing difficulties for young people of 
both sexes to enter employment, while the probability of entering employment increases 
with age up to the 35-39 age bracket. 
The increase in average household income is at the origin of the progressively 
higher educational level of the incoming cohorts. The occupational mix of demand has 
not evolved in an analogous way. Technological progress seems, on the contrary, to be 
provoking a polarization of the skill mix. 
Also in this case prices cannot be expected to act as an equilibrating mechanism 
because of technological rigidities on the demand side, the lack of downward flexibility 
of the more educated, the length of the interval between market signals and school 
leaving by the relevant cohorts. 
The behavioral model we have presented implies a worsening of the situation of 
the young and of women as the imbalance between demand and supply worsens, and is 
therefore consistent with the regional pattern of unemployment we have previously 
described. The lack of labour demand in the Southern regions has now gotten so acute 
that job opportunities no longer suffice even to satisfy all the men in the central age-
group. Accordingly, even this group is beginning to display significant unemployment, a 
new phenomenon for the Italian labour market and a rupture with the social and 
economic model that at least until now has succeeded in keeping social tension relatively 
defused despite extremely high levels of unemployment. 
6. Macroeconomic policies and forecasts 
After years of sluggish growth or stagnation, owing to the international business 
cycle and to domestic political instability, economic indicators now show the Italian 
economy as in less critical condition. 
In 1994 GDP resumed growth with a gain of 2.2%. The recovery was 
consolidated in 1995 with a further growth in output of 3%. Encouraging signs have 
come not so much from the expansion of consumer spending, which has been more 
sluggish than in past upturns, with an overall increase of 2.6% during the two years, as 
from the surge in exports, which have continued growing at a pace of nearly 10% a year, 
as in 1993 (Table 1.35). 
Though not in compliance with the Maastricht standards, the public finances are 
responding to tough deficit-reduction measures, and the public debt appears to have 
peaked in relation to GDP. The exchange rate too is returning to values more consistent 
with the economic fundamentals. 
Unfortunately these financial improvements have not benefited the labour market. 
The number of persons employed in 1995 was under 20 million, down more than a 
million since 1992; the overall employment rate remains steady at 35%, 10 points lower 
than the European average. The jobless still number more than 2.7 million, 400,000 more 
than in 1993, with an average unemployment rate of over 12%. The situation in the 
South is dramatic indeed; the labour market crisis there is reflected in average 
unemployment rates of more than 20% in the regions of Campania, Sicily and Calabria. 
The average naturally conceals even higher peaks in such cities as Naples and Palermo, 
and in the weaker segments of the labour force (women, youths, etc.), where the rate 
goes as high as 30% or 35%. 
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Compared with the turn of the decade, then, the economy is in a substantially 
different situation. Despite the disequilibria in the labour market, the financial variables -
both the public accounts and inflation - have improved. This should perhaps not come as 
any great surprise, given that the recent performance of the Italian economy reflects the 
decision by policy-makers to concentrate above all on devising financial solutions to the 
monetary turmoil of 1992 and overcoming the country's budgetary difficulties enough to 
qualify for European monetary union. What is surprising, though, is the success of the 
strategy adopted. Setting monetary matters aside and concentrating on the structural 
aspects of the macroeconomic strategy adopted by successive governments in the past 
three years, the economic adjustment has been pursued mainly in two ways: countering 
inflation through an incomes policy aimed chiefly at tighter control over wage growth; 
and reducing the government deficit by spending cuts and tax increases. 
That this policy approach would succeed in controlling a highly instable 
macroeconomic framework such as that faced in 1992 could certainly not be taken for 
granted. Actually, the policies adopted have proved capable of positively influencing the 
equilibria of the economy, avoiding the risk of inflation connected with devaluation and 
improving expectations regarding the public finances. One fact stands out. Since 1992, 
one of the patterns that long characterized Italy, namely the pass-through from 
depreciation of the currency to domestic prices, has apparently become inoperative. The 
sharp depreciation of the lira in 1992 and 1993 produced no increment in the rate of 
inflation. Instead, from 1993 on inflation actually slowed, with convergence towards the 
European average. 
In short, the system drew lasting benefit from the gain in competitiveness due to 
the currency float, maintaining the positive trend in export markets and quite swiftly 
reversing the sharp recession of 1993. At the same time simultaneous action on inflation 
and the budget proved capable of significantly influencing interest rates, easing the 
burden of public debt service. 
Two questions need to be clarified in assessing recent economic policy. 
The first concerns the reasons for its success. Three years ago, in fact, there was 
nothing to guarantee that the economic policy mix adopted would achieve its objectives. 
Yet the recipe worked: a structural change prevented inflation from driving interest rates 
and the deficit up and thereby wiping out the gain in competitiveness. 
The second involves the assessment of the way in which these dynamics weighed 
on the real economy, and the labour market in particular. First of all, the employment 
impact of the recent macroeconomic policies can be traced to four main areas: the 
devaluation-related export boom; the negative effect of public spending cuts; the 
structural adjustment and the policy of disinflation, which have influenced expectations 
and investment; and the government tax measures that have altered labour market 
equilibria. 
Italian economic policy in the first half of the '90s: paradigms and instruments 
In September 1992 the European Exchange Rate Mechanism was hit by a 
financial thunderstorm. The shock was particularly severe for Italy. The overvaluation of 
the lira and the mounting disequilibrium of the public finances concentrated speculation 
on the Italian currency, and in the space of just a few weeks the government was forced 
to withdraw from the ERM. Free to float, the lira depreciated, ultimately stabilizing at 
about 30% below the exchange rate against the Ecu that had prevailed in the early '90s. 
The situation threatened to seriously jeopardize the stability of the system. For 
years, in a situation dominated by severe public financial disequilibria, the enormous 
burden of interest on the public debt and the effects of indexation, the paradigm 
underlying government economic policy had assigned exchange rate stability (with its 
beneficial impact on prices) the central role in achieving the public financial adjustment 
required by the convergence criteria for monetary union. 
Now, however, the economic policy approach based on the fixed exchange rate, 
designed to narrow the differential between domestic and international interest rates, was 
untenable. In the short run central bank intervention to stabilize the exchange rate simply 
resulted in soaring interest rates. 
Moreover, the depreciation threatened a rekindling of inflation, putting the public 
finances still further out of control. The devaluation of the currency might be expected to 
boost exports, of course, but at the same time it threatened to trigger an inflationary 
spiral like those of the late '70s and early '80s7. 
The role of concertation 
Inflationary expectations were totally dashed as early as 1993, as in connection 
with the tripartite agreement on incomes policy sponsored by the government, price rises 
actually tended to slow down. Under the agreement, business and labour organizations 
gave up automatic wage indexation and formally recognized that collective bargaining 
was the normal mode of wage determination. In the Italian experience, the wage 
determination mechanism had been based on past inflation, which entailed deleterious 
momentum effects, prolonging inflation even in periods of fundamental disinflation, i.e. 
when economic conditions demanded a sudden reduction in the rate of price increases. 
The abolition of wage indexation thus shifts the whole system from reference to 
past inflation to forecasts of future inflation, as estimated by the bargaining parties. 
In addition the new straggered negotiation schedule, with regulatory provisions 
revised every four years and economic clauses renegotiated every two years, relieves the 
normative portion of labour agreements of the excessive load of barganing issues and 
tension that has marked Italian practices in this sphere until now. With the new rules, the 
two sides may be more selective as regards the matters for negotiation upon contract 
expiry, allowing the kind of innovative specialization that has been repeatedly called for 
but never achieved (Brunetta and Tronti, 1995). 
To be sure, it cannot yet be determined closely enough how much these successes 
actually depended on concertation and how much the absence of any inflationary surge 
reflected slack domestic and international demand.8. 
In any case, many contributions have shown that the choice made in 1992 and 
1993 to act on the indexation machinery by means of an incomes policy agreed on 
through concertation with business and labour organizations produced a structural break 
in the processes by which macroeconomic equilibria were formed.9 This certainly does 
not mean that the risk of inflation in Italy has vanished; but it has modified the risk 
differential with other countries. Today, unlike the past, the inflationary risks to which 
the Italian economy is exposed are comparable to those of its European partners10. 
The imbalance in the public accounts remained unresolved. While the absence of 
a step-up in price inflation prevented the upward adjustment of nominal interest rates, 
7 See Amitrano, De Grauwe and Tullio (1995). 
s For a review of the various positions see Jacobelli (1994). In particular, advocates of this thesis include 
A. Graziani, A. Amato, S. Ricossa. 
9 They include I. Cipolletta, C. Imbriani, P. Sylos Labini. 
10 See Modigliani, Baldassarri and Castiglionesi (1996). 
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withdrawal from the EMS exchange rate mechanism vitiated the gradual whittling away 
of rates over the years that had been pursued through the policy of fixed exchange rates. 
In this situation the only way to foster adjustment and international realignment 
was to intervene on the budget imbalance, thus sending a signal of economic 
governability to the financial markets, in hopes that this would suffice to move interest 
rates downwards as desired. 
Budget policy 
Action in this sphere was severe but effective (Table 1.36). In the two years from 
1991 to 1993 Italy achieved the most substantial structural financial adjustment of all the 
OECD countries. In 1993 the budget deficit was 1.6 percentage points lower than in 
1992, in proportion to GDP, and 3.6 points lower than in 1989. For the first time in 20 
years the primary budget balance (net of interest expenditure) was in surplus, equivalent 
to 4% of GDP. 
The 1992 budget passed at the end of 1991 envisaged a state-sector deficit of 
127.8 trillion lire. In March the government issued a revised estimate of 160 trillion, and 
another in July of 180 trillion. During the summer, in honouring commitments to the 
European Commission, the Italian Government adopted urgent measures to increase tax 
revenue by 30 trillion, cutting the estimated deficit for the year to 150 trillion, or 156 
trillion under a new definition of the public sector (Table 1.37). 
A few weeks later the deficit target for 1993 was set at 143 trillion, 83 trillion 
less than the deficit projected on a current programmes basis. To achieve the target, 
substantial measures on both the revenue and the expenditure sides were indispensable. 
Under a special enabling act, the Government implemented a number of structural 
measures to cut expenditure in the areas of public employment, pensions, the health care 
system, and local government. The cuts were estimated at 29 trillion lire. The 
uncontrolled growth of public spending was halted, and though the debt still increased, it 
did so at a slower rate (6.3%, as against 10% in 1992). 
The Government persevered with its rigorous budget policy. The outturn for 
1993 put the deficit at 154.4 trillion, overshooting the target by 10 trillion. The target for 
1994 was set at 144.2 trillion (viewed from another perspective, this represented a one-
year deferral of the target date), a reduction of 10 trillion by comparison with 1993 and 
of 38.5 trillion against the projection on a current programmes basis. The line of action 
taken by the Government emphasized severe new spending cuts, totalling about 26 
trillion lire. The main measures were: cuts in public investments and transfers to local 
authorities and state enterprises (12.9 trilbon); cuts in retirement outlays to be achieved 
by equalization between the private and public sectors (2.2 trillion); reorganization of 
local government spending and improvement of public contracting procedures (4.4 
Uillion); cuts in health expenditure deriving from a new drug distribution system (4 
trillion); a lower wage bill in the public sector (2.5 trillion). 
The budget forecasts soon proved to be unrealistic, however. In just six months 
trends in the public finances indicated a final deficit of nearly 160 trillion. In July the 
government was obliged to enact an additional budget package consisting essentially of 
cuts in transfers and one-time-only measures. The original target was nevertheless not 
met, and the projection was for a final deficit of 154 trillion lire. 
In the years that followed public financial adjustment continued to be the main 
objective of government economic policy. 
In September 1994 forecasts for 1995 put the current-programmes deficit at 
more than 180 trillion lire; the government set a target of 136.8 trillion. A correction 
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worth 48 trillion was thus required. Of this amount, 27 trillion would come from cuts in 
spending (transfers for pension outlays, health care, public sector hiring, etc.) and 21 
from revenue increases (social security and tax condonations, cuts in tax exemptions and 
deductions). 
By early 1995 it was already apparent that the estimates had been overoptimistic. 
The decline in interest rates that the government had counted on was not taking place. A 
climate of heavy political uncertainty focused speculative pressures on the lira. Interest 
rates rose, and with them government debt service charges. In February the government 
was forced to announce another supplementary budget package worth 21.5 trillion lire 
(5.5 trillion in spending cuts and 16 trillion in additional indirect tax revenues). 
This time, at least, the target was achieved, and the 1995 deficit came to just 130 
trillion lire. The accounts were thus moving progressively towards greater structural 
balance. 
For 1996, with a target deficit of 109 trillion lire, the current-programmes 
projection was 143.5 trillion. A package of 34 trillion was accordingly needed. This was 
done through a series of current spending cuts (reduced transfers to the regions, in 
particular) and tax increases. A major role was also played by the pension reform enacted 
in the summer of 1995, most especially the freeze on long-service pensions. 
Yet again, however, the budget forecasts proved not to be correct. A slowdown 
in economic growth, higher-than-expected interest rates and several unexpected events 
drove the state sector borrowing requirement estimate for 1996 to 130 trillion lire, an 
overshoot of 21 trillion. Hence another adjustment package, adopted in the spring, worth 
16 trillion lire for the current year. This was designed to bring the 1996 deficit down to 
113 trillion, basically in line with the planning target. 
As for 1997, the Economic and Financial Planning Document put the current-
programmes deficit at 121 trillion lire. This contrasts with the Maastricht convergence 
requirement for monetary union membership of 88 trillion. Hence, savings of 32 trillion 
lire to be enacted in the Finance Law for 1997. This is to consist of 16.5 trillion lire in 
additional revenue and 21.2 trillion in spending reductions. Among the areas slated for 
rationalization by the government are public sector procurement, personnel costs, 
welfare, relations with public service agencies and firms, export and import insurance and 
guarantees, defense, education, and incentives to firms. 
Economic policy choices and real economic growth 
The foregoing can be considered a serviceable, if brief, description of the reasons 
for Italy's economic policy choices in the early '90s and the methods of implementation. 
We now need to see how those choices have affected the real economy, and in particular 
the labour market variables. 
In the first half of the '90s several events have had a decisive impact on the world 
economy. Following the Gulf War and the political upheaval in central and eastern 
Europe, the international economy went into recession. This meant reduced demand for 
Italian exports, with recession in all the export-oriented industries. Also, starting with the 
first judicial inquiries into political corruption in 1992, Italy moved into a touchy period 
of political and institutional transition, with repercussions that threw the public works 
sector into severe crisis. During these same years, changes in the fiscal and social 
security system appear to have produced major alterations in the choices and conduct of 
employers and the labour force. 
A lively debate is under way on these themes. So far, no unanimous conclusions 
have been reached. In any event the various theses upheld have many points of 
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convergence; they are the point of departure for an initial reflection on the impact of 
recent macroeconomic policy choices. 
This macroeconomic view of Italian output and employment trends will be 
complemented by discussion of a number of themes (still of a general nature) relating to 
two especially important elements in interpreting the employment crisis of 1992-1994: 
• the precipitous drop in public investment spending and its impact on the construction 
industry; 
• the effects on the labour market of the tax and social security reforms enacted during 
the period. 
Incomes policy, budget policy, trends in output and employment: a quantitative 
assessment of the "virtuous circle" 
Following the acute crisis of early 1993, with a simultaneous fall in GDP, 
consumption and investment, the next year already displayed signs of recovery. The 
balance of trade, which had turned positive in 1992 thanks to the competitive advantage 
of devaluation, brought in its wake a surplus in the balance of payments on current 
account, so that within a few months Italy's foreign debt was brought back under control. 
On the wage front, the 1993 agreement stabilized the rise in nominal wages; real wages 
declined by 1.3% in 1993 and 1.2% in 1994. 
Finally, domestic demand also turned upward, hesitantly at first and then more 
and more decisively, and together with a rapid rise in productivity this widened profit 
margins, which returned to the levels registered in the late '80s. 
Two factors in particular marked the process of adjustment following the 
devaluation of the lira in 1992:non the one hand the immediate improvement in the 
balance of payments on current account, on the other the continuing disinflationary 
tendency. 
The former phenomenon, even within just weeks of the devaluation, showed the 
falseness of forecasts of an unavoidable "J-curve" in the country's external accounts. 
Devaluation almost always brings a transitory worsening of the balance of payments. 
This is explained (Gandolfo, 1989) by drawing a distinction between adjustment trends in 
three successive intervals: the currency contract period, the pass-through period and the 
volume adjustment period. 
The first of these is defined as the period during which contracts signed before 
the devaluation fall due. During this time prices and volumes are pre-established. Given 
the devaluation, and given that the contracts are denominated largely in foreign 
currencies, the balance of payments in domestic currency can only deteriorate. 
The second period is that in which prices are free to move but volumes remain 
fixed owing to the rigidity of demand and supply in imports and exports. Here again, the 
balance of payments (in domestic currency) will deteriorate. 
In the third period both prices and volumes can vary. Still, as volumes do not 
adjust instantly but with a lag (owing to friction, for instance), there may be a still further 
deterioration before the improvement takes effect. 
In our specific case, however, trade volumes showed an almost immediate 
improvement. Exporters elected not to take full advantage of the profit opportunities 
inherent in the sizable devaluation of the lira. Instead they opted to raise prices by less 
than the depreciation. At the same time foreign producers, partly because of the sluggish 
world economy, partly because of declining demand and moderate price increases in 
11 For a detailed analysis, see Modigliani, Baldassarri and Castiglianesi, op. cit. 
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Italy, decided to pass only part of the devaluation of the lira through to their prices, in an 
effort to defend their market shares by narrowing their profit margins. 
The combined result was that the Italian balance of trade responded immediately 
and in positive fashion, with a considerable improvement as early as the closing months 
of 1992. 
The second phenomenon of interest is the country's success at "devaluation 
without inflation". Despite the sharp devaluation of the lira, the pace of price increases 
actually slowed down further in 1993 and 1994. Repeatedly, in the course of past 
decades, Italy had used exchange rate movements to spur international competitiveness. 
These operations had always had negative results, however. The country's explicit and 
implicit mechanisms of indexation eventually fueled dangerous "vicious circles", or wage 
price spirals that quickly undid the advantages gained and further aggravated the 
structural budget deficit.12. 
This time, however, this did not happen, and the crisis was overcome thanks to a 
"virtuous circle" which first consolidated substantial gains in competitiveness and then a 
gradual recovery in output levels, led by the expansion of demand. 
Various interpretations have been given of the "happy coincidence" of 
devaluation with incomes and economic policy measures taken before, during and 
immediately after the foreign exchange crisis of September 1992. A summary of the 
findings of the works examined is given in Table 1.38. 
The analysis suggested by Locarno and Rossi (1995) is based on contrafactual 
simulations. They propose to test the thesis that the devaluation had negligible effects on 
prices and major effects on the balance of trade. Their results, obtained by projecting the 
performance of the economy had there been no exchange crisis, are held to demonstrate 
the contrary: a powerful inflationary impact and only a minimal contribution to the 
improvement in the trade balance. Here, the decisive factors in explaining the fall in 
domestic demand in 1993 and the beneficial effects of devaluation (on prices and the 
external accounts) are said to have been the changed behaviour of consumers and 
investors (albeit at the cost of the sharpest recession since the Second World War) and 
the role of foreign demand. 
A second model is that of Centro Europa Ricerche (CER, 1995). This study 
examines what might have happened had the crisis of September 1992 resulted in a single 
realignment, without Italy's withdrawal from the EMS and the free float of the lira. This 
12 "Vicious circle" refers to a situation in which the international depreciation of the currency generates 
domestic inflation rapid enough to annul the hoped-for advantage of the devaluation (gains in 
competitiveness and the restoration of balance in the country's external payments on current account), 
necessitating renewed devaluation. Various theoretical explanations of the phenomenon have been 
offered. Basevi and De Grauwe (1977) argue that the explanation lies in the fact that prices are sticky 
downward. In the wake of an initial monetary shock, the currency depreciates, assuming more reactive 
financial than real markets, by more than would be consistent with the long-term equilibrium 
(overshooting). This is followed by price rises, whose downside stickiness or rigidity renders restrictive 
monetary policy vain. The monetary tightening then causes revaluation of the currency, but this is not 
followed by price declines. Hence the persistent balance-of-payments deficits, the gradual devaluation of 
the currency, further impulse to inflation, etc. The indicated therapy is exchange market intervention to 
ensure that the exchange rate does not diverge too far from its long-term equilibrium value. Other 
analysts (Modigliani and Padoa-Schioppa, 1977) explain the vicious circle using a model in which 
prices are determined as a mark-up over costs and wages are indexed to prices. Here, devaluation entails 
an increase in production costs (owing to higher prices of imported inputs) and thus in prices. This is 
followed by an increase in wages, hence in costs. The circuit closes with a new increase in prices. The 
loss of competitiveness thus generated produces a balance-of-payments deficit. This necessitates renewed 
devaluation, setting off the price-wage spiral. The only therapy is to interrupt the circle by acting on the 
cost of labour. For a review of the main theoretical positions, see Gandolfo (1989). 
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scenario posits a situation in which wage growth is fixed according to the agreement of 
July 1993. The results indicate that continued participation in the ERM would have had 
positive effects on prices. Even with a sharply devalued lira, the decision to continue to 
apply the Exchange Rate Mechanism would have induced more pronounced convergence 
towards the average European rate of inflation, with benefits for the entire productive 
economy. 
Finally, the estimates effected by Modigliani, Baldassari and Castiglionesi (1996) 
assess the impact of each individual economic policy measure. Reconstructing a scenario 
"adjusted" for the effects of the incomes policy agreement and the budget cuts of the 
Amato government, the authors "quantify" the effects of these two factors. The exercise 
confirms the thesis that the combined effect of the two was very substantial in terms of 
lower inflation and higher employment.13. In these analysts' view, had these two 
measures not been taken the Italian economy would have quickly degenerated into an 
"explosive" spiral. The inflationary rebound would have triggered a price-wage spiral 
fueled by further devaluation of the lira. And the public finances would have rapidly 
degenerated into a solvency crisis. Both pressures would have been amplified in a 
perverse feedback mechanism. 
The public works crisis 
Public investment expenditure slowed sharply in the first half of the '90s (Table 
1.39). After a dip of about 1 trillion lire in 1992, there was a severe slowdown in the next 
two years, with a reduction of more than 7 trillion lire from 45.5 trillion in 1992 to just 
over 38 trillion in 1994. A slight recovery was staged in 1995, with real growth of 1.4% 
to over 40 trillion lire. Overall, the reduction in investment expenditure between 1991 
and 1995 came to more than 13%. This is all the more serious in real terms: adjusted for 
inflation, the fall in spending amounted to 38%. 
This meant a considerable diminution in the share of income going to expand and 
improve the country's infrastructure and fixed capital. In 1985 3.7% of GDP had been 
allocated to this purpose, compared with 2.3% today. The sector has thus suffered a 
much sharper slump than most other parts of the economy. 
Nor is this an isolated case. In most EU countries the need to adjust the public 
finances has brought severe difficulties for this sector. Nevertheless, the extent of the 
crisis in Italy is such that the economic downturn alone cannot explain it. There would 
appear to be contributory causes, some strictly economic, others institutional: 
a) the particular cyclical conditions and the absolute necessity (especially beginning in 
1992) to curb public spending in order to comply with the constraints of the future 
monetary union; 
b) the reform of the Southern Italy Development Fund; 
c) the outbreak of corruption scandals and the effect of judicial action on the conduct of 
government departments. 
Moreover, the early part of the '90s also witnessed a negative trend in investment 
by agencies in the enlarged public sector and by formerly state-controlled corporations. 
Often a change in the legal form of a company and its impending privatization induced a 
13 For instance, they estimate that in 1993 the household consumption deflator would have risen 7.5%, 
or more than 2 points more than that actually recorded. This is due mainly to the labour cost agreement 
(2.4 points) and only marginally (0.3 points) to the Amato budget package. Aside from the combined 
effects, these results usefully isolate the differing impact of the two actions: unlike that of the incomes 
policy agreement, the hypothetical elimination of the fiscal policy package has no decisive effect on 
inflation; its effects are more significant on the real economy. 
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period of reorganization and balance-sheet adjustment. Major, strategic investment 
projects were thus shelved; the solutions chosen were less burdensome in terms of 
corporate indebtedness and less risky in terms of solvency. 
A significant factor in the sectoral crisis was the contraction of expenditure on 
the part of ANAS, the national highway agency, especially in the last two years. The 
agency has had operational difficulties consequent upon its conversion into a 
public corporation. In 1994 and 1995 total expenditure dropped by more than 35%. 
Equally important has been the role of investment by local authorities, financed 
by the Deposits and Loans Fund (and other credit institutions) with loans at least 
partially repayable by the central government. Such loans were cut by more than half 
between 1989 and 1994, from 11.89 trillion to 5.58 trillion lire. Again, the figures for 
1995 suggest some slight recovery, with total lending to local authories of more than 6 
trillion. 
Given these tight budget constraints, European Union support (especially funding 
for the development of the disadvantaged areas under Objectives 1, 2 and 5b) might have 
served to attenuate the investment downturn. But Italy's utilization of the structural 
funds has so far proven highly unsatisfactory. The figures for the first Community 
Support Framework show that as of the end of 1993 30% of the available resources had 
yet to be disbursed. The indications of the CSF of 1994-1999 are similar. Again, the 
resources made available by the Union have been deployed with alarming delays and with 
great difficulty. 
Nor have the streamlining and speeding of procedures promoted in recent years 
had any considerable effect. Generally, however, these legislative changes and procedural 
streamlining have not been intended for immediate, cyclical benefits but have been seen 
as the occasion for reforming the methods of making and implementing planning choices. 
The key development here has been the new legislation governing the planning system, 
with the rationalization of the procedures and forums for so-called negotiated planning: 
the planning understanding, the planning agreement, the planning contract, the territorial 
pact. 
Of equally little countercyclical impact have been the efforts to launch plans and 
projects for the realization of large-scale infrastructure. These have been impeded by the 
inability of most spending bodies to develop, quickly, clear, consistent sectoral and 
territorial plans for long-term actions that do not change with every change in the 
political picture. 
An initial indication of the impact of the public investment crisis on labour market 
equilibria comes from the national accounts. Between 1993 and 1995 the number of 
salaried labour units in the sector dropped about 10%, or from 1,135,000 to scarcely 
1,000,000 in just three years. This contraction of employment is about twice as severe as 
that registered in the rest of the economy. Its effects on the social equilibrium of the 
country were aggravated by the poor performance of the independent construction 
sector, a traditional "buffer" for the industry, allowing payroll workers to migrate into 
self-employment. 
Fiscal adjustment, social security reform, and labour market behavior 
Some reflection is certainly required concerning the implications of economic 
policy actions on labour market equilibria with reference to the highly singular 
employment developments of 1992 and 1993. The severe drop in employment and the 
structural break it indicates are subject to two interpretations. The events of 1992-93 
could be seen as the start of a new labour market growth path. Alternatively, the 
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employment crisis of those years can be thought of as a singular event, a sudden 
adjustment, in a compressed interval, due to the combination and overlapping of a variety 
of causes, but which will quickly fade as soon as new points of equilibrium are 
established. 
Undeniably, there was the severe slump in output involving a number of sectors 
that were traditionally sources of job growth, adversely affecting the number of 
unemployed and the balance of the labour market. Yet, leaving aside the problem of the 
modification of the labour force survey, the extent of the employment decline during the 
two years, especially as regards the employment aggregate, was such as to suggest that it 
must have been at least partly due to particular events. 
The first thing to bear in mind in considering these surprising changes in labour 
market variables is the tax changes enacted at the end of 1992, and specifically the 
introduction of a minimum tax to combat tax evasion and avoidance. Three years after 
the introduction of this mechanism, the effects are still controversial. The fiscal impact 
appears to have been positive, with an increase in average declared income for those 
affected and hence in the average tax revenue. When one turns from average tax revenue 
to the number of taxpayers, however (i.e., the impact on employment), the results are 
much less encouraging. The labour force survey found that during 1993, while total 
employment declined by 2.6%, self-employment contracted by 3.2%; the fall was 
concentrated mainly among part-time self-employed workers (Tables 1.40, 1.41). 
Much of this change, of course, must be ascribed to the shake-out of marginal 
enterprises due to recession. Yet the fact that the shake-out hit both farming and services 
hard, was more severe in the South, and disproportionately involved the youngest and 
oldest age-groups suggests the possibility (though not necessarily the probability) that 
the survey results depend at least in part on more widespread reluctance to state publicly 
that one is employed, when this threatens to bring new fiscal liabilities. 
The second element to consider is the changes in the pension system beginning in 
the autumn of 1992. Detailed data on retirements are not available. But we do know that 
in 1992 the number of new INPS pensions jumped from a trend of around 280,000 a year 
to 455,000. And the labour force survey's breakdown of the work force by age shows 
that beginning in 1992 and continuing through 1993, generational exits from employment 
(the withdrawal of the oldest cohorts from the labour market) abruptly accelerated. 
Here too, the phenomenon could be attributed to the asymmetric impact of the 
recession on work force segments. But can we really rule out the possibility that a part of 
the drop in employment was induced by the effect of the new rules (and the resulting 
change in expectations) on workers' choices between working and retirement? 
There are reasonable grounds, therefore, for maintaining that the labour market 
developments of 1992 and 1993 are not the pure result of the contraction of output but 
the product of a combination of cyclical and structural factors. The cyclical factors were 
economic performance itself and the government's policy measures concerning public 
spending; the structural ones, only partially connected with the immediate state of the 
economy, involved unexpected modifications in the institutional and normative 
arrangements governing employment relations, which affected individual choices 
between work and leisure. 
A confirmation of this point comes from the observation of the trend and cyclical 
changes in unemployment rates, in the different areas of the country (Graph 1.16). The 
aggregate trend changes (calculated as the differences with respect to the values of the 
corresponding quarters one year before) continued to be positive and noticeable up to 
the third quarter of 1995, falling afterwards around zero. This feature signals the 
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countinuing growth in the unemployment rate, even if cyclical changes could sometimes 
be negative. Positive aggregate changes reflected those in the Center and Southern 
regions, as in the North trend changes were negative from the second quarter of 1995 
onward. 
After the last quarter of 1995, the negative values showed by cyclical changes 
signal possible future negative values in trend changes too. The reduction in 
unemployment rates, though, is expected only in the Northern and Central regions, while 
in the South one could expect only a gradual stabilization around values slightly higher 
than the present one. 
Conclusions, forecasts, proposals 
We have seen that Italy's macroeconomic performance has demonstrated that the 
economic policy choices of recent years have succeeded, in spite of all the difficulties, in 
moving the country towards economic and financial adjustment. 
The inflationary surge of 1995, the uncertainties over economic adjustment and 
the recent slowdown in growth nevertheless present the risk of compromising the efforts 
of the last three years and above all cloud the prospects for quickly overcoming the 
employment crisis. 
Table 1.42 sets forth the projections by leading Italian and international 
forecasting agencies of the main economic variables for 1996-1998. There is general 
agreement on the progressive, albeit modest, improvement in the macroeconomic 
picture, and the labour market in particular, denoting the definitive end of the crisis of 
1992-95. 
For 1996 the forecasts of GDP growth are not unanimous, ranging from 0.7% 
(Confindustria) to 2.2% (OECD), but for 1997 a consensus value of around 2.0% 
emerges, which would set the stage for a gradual acceleration of growth in 1998. 
Forecasts of household consumption are for a continuing slowdown in 1996, with 
some slight upturn only starting in 1997. 
The adjustment of the public finances will benefit from the further damping of 
inflationary tendencies. Forecasts are for a perceptible slowdown in the rate of price rises 
(as gauged by the household consumption deflator) of nearly 2 percentage points by the 
end of 1997. this will be followed by a decline to an average of 2.5% in 1998. 
Employment should begin to recover noticeably by the end of 1996 and to 
consolidate the upturn over the next two years. Estimates are for employment growth of 
0.4% in 1997 and 0.7% in 1998. 
However, the expansion of employment is not expected to be accompanied by an 
improvement in the unemployment picture. Comparing the employment forecasts with 
the latest labour force projections effected by the Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini, which 
simulate labour market trends until 2001 on employment growth hypotheses of 0.4% and 
0.8% annually, we find that the growth in employment will not be enough to lower the 
overall unemployment rate (Tables 1.43, 1.44). 
The forecasting exercise projects the continuing marked dichotomy of the labour 
market in both regional and gender terms. 
Geographically, the southern regions will remain far behind, failing to share in the 
gains registered at the national level. For the entire period considered the employment 
rate in the South will be a striking 10 percengage points below the national average and 
the unemployment rate will be about twice as high. 
By gender, the trends are divergent. The employment rate for men, though still 
much higher than that for women (an overall average of 60.1% as against 33.8%) will 
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decline progressively to about 2 points lower than in the base year of 1995; meanwhile, 
the women's rate is projected to rise by more than 1 point. 
Interestingly, the projections are for a rise in the female rather than the male 
employment rate in the South but not in the Centre and North, testifying to the 
increasing feminization of the southern economy from its traditionally very low levels. 
Thus, although the forecast is for a general improvement in 1997 and 1998, the 
expected rate of employment expansion will not be sufficient to bring the overall 
unemployment rate down to its 1995 level. 
In conclusion, while on the one hand the inflation figures confirm the efficacy of 
Italian policy measures in containing prices, the economic slowdown and its adverse 
impact on the public finances confront policymakers with the difficult problem of finding 
a way not to abandon the adjustment path on which the country has embarked, which 
would raise the danger of failure to comply with the Maastricht standards and relegate 
Italy to the group of second-class countries, outside the monetary union. 
Naturally, in the light of these developments, attention once again turns to the 
idea of another round of concertation, prompting unions and employers to continue the 
policy of predetermination of nominal wages, which has been the key pillar of stability 
since 1992. 
This is the thesis put forward by Franco Modigliani,14 who argues that the likely 
resurgence of a wage-price spiral and the reasonable doubt over the possibility of 
reducing the public debt require a courageous incomes policy "with target inflation rates 
of zero" and a concomitant further public financial adjustment package. 
Only a drastic slowdown in the rate of price increases, in fact, will make the 
structural adjustment achieved in recent years fully perceptible. Government interest 
expenditure is now more than 200 trillion lire annually. Actually, this outlay is partially 
offset by an invisible benefit, namely the inflation-induced reduction of some 110 trillion 
in the real value of the public debt (which Modigliani terms the "inflation tax" levied on 
holders of the public debt). 
The "true" interest on the debt thus amounts to some 90 trillion lire. But this does 
not emerge from the present accounts, as there is no revenue item in the accounts 
reflecting the diminished value of the debt. Hence, the need for further disinflation to 
bring out, in accounting terms as well, the substantial balance already achieved by the 
public finances. 
This, in the briefest possible summary, is the substance of the proposal. Its 
adoption would enable Italy, within two years, to sharply reduce the "country risk" 
universally recognized as responsible for impeding the full use of the monetary and fiscal 
policy levers and compromising the country's medium- and long-term growth prospects. 
14 Modigliani, Baldassarri and Castiglionesi, op. cit. 
32 
Graph. 1.1 - Births, deaths and natural balance; 1961-1995 
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Table 1.1 - Total population by regions and main age groups 
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Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 





























































Graph 1.2 ­ Total employment (indices) 
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Graph 1.3 ­ Employment by gender (indices) 
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Graph 1.6 ­ Total employment by sector 
(indices) 
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Table 1.3 - Employment position by type, branch and status 
(1995: in thousands) 
Employees 
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Source: ISTAT, 1996. 
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Table 1.4 - Population aged 15 and over by education, age-group, employment status - April 1996 
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Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX: ITALIAN LABOUR FORCE (in thousands) 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ISTAT, Quarterly labour force survey. 
** Participation and employment rates for population aged 15-70. 
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Source: ISTAT, Quarterly labour force survey. 
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Source: ISTAT, Quarterly labour force survey. 
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Graph 1.9 - Volume of output, productivity per worker, labour units 




Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
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(*) Value added at factor cost at constant prices, net of building rentals. 
(**) Output per worker. 
Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
Table 1.6a - Total labour units. Annual percentage changes 
SECTOR 
Total labour units 
Agriculture 
Industry 
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Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
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Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
Table 1.6c - Self-employed labour units. Annual percentage changes 
SECTORS 
Self-employed labour units 
Agriculture 
Industry 
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Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
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Source: FGB, based on INPS data. 
















































































Source: FGB, based on INPS data. 


























































































Source: FGB, based on INPS data. 
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Graph 1.10 ­ Cost of labour, wages and prices, 1971­1995 
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Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
Table 1.10 - Increases in productivity and real gross earnings per employee, 
1970-1995 (average annual % growth) 
Years Productivity (*) Real gross earnings 








































(*) Value added at factor cost, constant prices, net of building rentals. 
(**) Deflated using CPI for production and clerical workers households. 
Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
Table 1.11 - Average annual percentage change in productivity (P) and real gross per employee (R), 
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Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
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Table 1.12 - Earnings and cost of labour industry 






































































Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data 
Table 1.13 - Cross operating profit, labour income and payroll employment 


























































Source: FGB. based on ISTAT data 
46 
Tab. 1.14 - Employment, unemployment, labour force, working age population and 


























































































































Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
Graph. 1.11 - Rates of activty, employment and unemployment; 
males females and total; 1961-1995 
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Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
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Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
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Source: FGB, based on ISTAT 
Graph. 1.12 - Total employment by sector; 1961-95 
D Agriculture Ώ Industry ■ Services 
Source: FGB. based on ISTAT oa:.i 
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25.7 1 46.4 ! 39.5 
Source: FGB. based on [STAT data. 
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Graph. 1.13 - Feminization rates; 1961-95 
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Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 





































Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
Tab 1.21 - Percentage distribution of unemployment by type; 1961-1995 
Men 
First-time jobseekers 




























































Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 























































Source: FGB. based on ISTAT data. 
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Table 1.23 - Employed, unemployed, labour force and working age population 
by schooling: percentage composition and relative wei 
Men 


















































































































































Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
Table 1.24 - Rates of employment, participation and unemployment by sex and schooling; 
1978 and 1994 
Men 



















































































































Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
53 
Graph 1.15 - Labour market indicators in Nothern and Southern Italy (1991) 
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Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
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Table 1.25 - Working age population, employment, unemployment: 









































Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
Table 1.26 - North and South: main labour market indicators 
rate of employment (15-69) 
rate of employment (women) 
rate of employment (15-29) 
rate of unemployment (15-69) 
rate of unemployment (women) 
































































































































* As a percentage of Labour force. 
Source: OECD. 1994. 































































* Annual rale oí growth 
Source: FGB. based on OECD 11994) dau. 
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* Percentage of total unemployment. 
Source: OECD, 1996. 








































































* As a percentage of labour force. 
** Projections. 
Source: OECD, 1996. 
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Table 1.31 - Unemployment in the EU: two recessions 
1980s 1990s 
GROUPS AFFECTED 
Unemployment its the weakest groups ¡n society (women and the unskilled). 
At the turn of the decade, the salient feature is youth unemployment. 
Towards mid-decade there is a growth in long-term unemployment (from 
45% of the total in 1983 to 55% in 1988, when over half of all unemployed 
had been out of work for 12 months or more). 
Growing unemployment in the traditionally weak segments of the economically 
active population. 
Together with components of structural unemployment (young people, the 
"chronically" jobless), "new" jobless now emerge (male breadwinners), in part 
because youth unemployment is curbed by the declining birth rate. 
Unemployment begins to affect the more highly skilled (white-collar workers 
and managers). 
AREAS AND SECTORS 
The slowdown 'in output aggravates regional disparities. 
By sector, the crisis mainly affects industry. But the massive redundacies in 
that sector are more than offset by the growth of service jobs. 
The effects of the downturn are more "equitably" distributed than in the '80s 
with a diminution in regional disparities (Italy is an exception to this rule). 
The recession affects the entire economy, and the services no longer function as 
an employment buffer. 
The crisis is longer than the previous ones. 
CAUSES 
Labour -saving restructuring to increase flexibility and competitiveness. Restructuring now seen as the "normal" mode of operation of enterprises faced with global competition. 
Source: FGB. 
Table 1.32 - Unemployment in Italy: two recessions 
1980s 1990s 
GROUPS AFFECTED 
Unemployment affects young people (especially in the South: waiting for a 
good job, a hight reservation wage), women, and the unskilled. 
Redundancies almost exclusively among factor workers. 
Total employment does not contract, but the number of unemployed rises as 
baby-boom children reach working age. 
Youth unemployment remain hight, but labour policies are no longer strictly 
youth-oriented (end of baby boom). 
The economy remains less "feminized" than other countries. 
The "classical" weak segments are joined by unemployed workers in their 
prime, who have troubled finding alternative jobs. 
Unemployment now also affects the more highly skilled (skilled workers, 
managers and technicians). 
AREAS AND SECTORS 
Regional disparities are aggravated, with a dicholomous labour market. 
Unemployment affects the major industrial districts of the Centre and North, 
due to restructuring, which affects industry only. 
The sharp contraction of industrial employment is counterbalaced by growing 
employment ín the services, public and private, which are sheltered from 
international competition. Second jobs contribute to the income of the already 
employed. 
At first, an attenuation of regional disparities, as the cyclical downturn hits the 
entire economy. 
Starting at the end of 1990, the employment decline in industry is not offset by 
public employment, much less in the private sector. 
Employment in the services holds up poorly, owing chiefly to greater openness 
to international competition. 
Unemployment remains exstremely hight in the South due to structural as well 
as cyclical factors. 
Source: FGB. 
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Source: FGB, 1995. 
Table 1.34 - Labour market cycles and states in Italy, 1959-1994 















































Average annual absolute change. 
* The extreme case of discuragement. with the unemployment rate going down because unemployment falls faster than employment 
The extreme case of attraction, with the unemployment rate rising because unemployment increases faster than employment. 
" Data for 1992-1994 are consistent, prior to the revision of April 1995. 
5 New series. 
Source: FGB. based on ISTAT, Quarterly labour force survey. 
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Table 1.35 - Macroeconomic performance of Italy since devaluation (percentage 
GDP 
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 
CROSS FIXED INVESTMENT 
EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICF:S 
GDP DEFLATOR 
CONSUMPTION DEFLATOR 
LNDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION (a) 
CAPACITY UTILIZATION (a) (b) 
EARNINGS PER EMPLOYEE LABOUR UNIT (a) 
UNIT LABOUR COST (a) 
BALANCE OF TRADE (c) 


























































('a) Industry excluding construction, (b) Level, (c) Billions of lire. 
Source: Banca d'Italia, 1996. 
Table 1.36 - Main indicators of general government accounts 
(percentage of GDP) 
Revenues (a) 









































(a) Gross of revenue on capital account. 
(b) Net of revenue on capital account. 
(c) Under definition given in EC Regulation 3605/93. 
Source: Ministero del bilancio e della programmazione economica, 1996. 
Table 1.37 - State sector borrowing requirement: Economic and Financial Planning Document targets and outturns 
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Table 1.39 - Public investment spending, 1990-94 (trillions of lire) 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
a) GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 
b) AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES 
- Anas 
- Forests 
c) OTHER CENTRAL GOVT AGENCIES 
LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
a) REGIONS 
b) PROVINCES AND MUNICIPALITIES 
c) HOSPITALS AND USL* 
d) OTHER LOCAL AGENCIES 






















































































* Local Health Units. 
Sources: Ministero del bilancio e della programmazione economica. 1996; Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 1995. 








































Source: ISTAT. 1994. 








































Source: ISTAT. 1994. 
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Sources: (a) Centro Studi Confindustria, 1996 - (b) CER, 1996/b - (c) Ministero del bilancio e della programmazione economica, 1996, 
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II. LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS 
1. Public institutions 
The public institutions entrusted with the task of regulating the Italian labour 
market are: 
1. the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, both through its central administration 
and its local offices; 
2. the National Economic and Labour Council (CNEL); 
3. the Institute for Workers' Training and Guidance (ISFOL); 
4. the specialized offices of local authorities (regional, provincial and municipal 
governments). 
In what follows we offer a brief description of their respective characteristics, 
powers and jurisdictions. 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security (Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza 
Sociale) 
The Ministry of Labour and Social Security has overall responsibility for drafting, 
applying and monitoring labour legislation. Structurally it consists in the central 
administration plus regional, provincial and local district labour offices. 
/. Central administration 
The central administration has three decision-making levels: 
The Minister 
The Minister of Labour has the fundamental role of coordinating the Ministry and 
reporting to the Prime Minister, the cabinet, and the two houses of the Parliament, and in 
particular to their Labour Committees. 
To perform this role the Minister personally takes care of political direction, 
setting objectives, establishing programmes to be implemented and evaluating the 
correspondence of results with the general directives. In any case, the powers reserved to 
the Minister include: nomination, appointment, annulment, revocation and dissolution of 
administrative and control bodies, technical committees, special commissioners, 
commissioners assigned to liquidate cooperatives, and managers of agencies subject to 
ministerial supervision and protection. 
Other matters under the Minister's direct authority are: 
1. matters under the jurisdiction of the Directorate-General for Social Security and 
Social Assistance, the Directorate-Generale for Cooperatives, and the Central 
Office for vocational training; 
2. standards for the award of contracts to perform studies, research, etc., with 
research institutes and agencies; 
3. standards for the award of grants, subsidies, competition prizes and stipends. 
The Minister maintains relations with international bodies, dealing with issues 
concerning the world of work. He/she is in contact in particular with the ILO, the 
Council of Ministers of Social Affairs, the European Commission, the Statistics Office of 
the European Union and the European Parliament. He/she also participates in the 
meetings of the OECD and the Council of Europe. The cabinet of the Minister of Labour 
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has a special office responsible for external relations which co-ordinates the activities of 
the Directorates-General in the international domain. 
The undersecretaries 
In the present Cabinet, the Minister of Labour is assisted by three 
undersecretaries, whose areas of responsibility, as the Minister's proxies, are divided 
as follows: 
1. One is assigned the matters under the jurisdiction of the Directorate-General for 
Labour Relations, with special emphasis on application of rules on occupational safety 
and health. In addition, this undersecretary has the following responsibilities: 
a) chairmanship of the regional committees for employment of Abruzzo, Calabria, 
Emilia-Romagna, Marche, Sardinia and Valle d'Aosta; 
b) chairmanship of the Cental Commission for regulations governing domestic work, 
the Cenü'al Commission on work at home, the the Permanent Advisory Committee 
on accident prevention and hygiene at the workplace. 
2. A second undersecretary is assigned the matters under the authority of the 
Directorate-General for Employment and of that for the Labour Market Observatory. 
He/she is also chairman of the Central Commission for Employment and the regional 
commissions for employment of Basilicata, Latium, Molise, Piedmont, Tuscany and 
Veneto. 
3. The third undersecretary sees to the tasks of the Directorate-General for General 
Affairs and Personnel (including staff training, computerization and the reorganization 
of the Ministry). Additional responsibilities include: 
• setting guidelines and organizing the work of the labour inspectors; 
• planning and execution of projects for socially useful work, relations with the 
ministries and governmental bodies and departments involved in such projects; 
• the stipulation and application of territorial agreements in the depressed parts of 
the country and questions inherent in EC Objectives 1, 2 and 3; 
• chairmanship of the regional commissions for employment of Campania, Friuli-
Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Lombardy, Apulia and Umbria; 
• questions concerning the application of the agreement of 23 July 1993 as fai' as it 
bears on trade union rights and representation. 
The Directors General 
The Ministry's central administration is run by seven Directors General. Their 
tasks are organized as follows: 
A. Directorate-General for General Affairs and Personnel 
This Directorate is responsible for the organization of the offices, staff 
recruitment and training. Two services fall within its ambit: the Central Labour 
Inspectorate, and the Central Service of the Labour Offices. They deal with personnel 
matters and the organization and operation of the Labour Inspectorate and Labour 
Offices; they also supervise and monitor those offices. 
B. Directorate-General for Labour Relations 
This Directorate is responsible for: international labour problems and relations 
with international bodies concerned with labour problems; labour supervision and 
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labour legislation; health and safety at work; employees' family problems; trade 
unions; collective bargaining agreements; employment contracts and labour disputes. 
C Directorate-General for Employment 
This Directorate is mainly responsible for: employment promotion measures; 
monitoring the examination and approval of ffainee contract projects and solidarity 
contracts financed by the Employment Fund, relations with the central and regional 
employment commissions, the employment agencies; unemployment, internal and 
international migration; special and ordinary placement; compulsory hiring of special 
categories of workers; free movement of workers within the EU; emigration; 
international workers' exchange; assistance to repatriated and emigrating workers and 
their families. 
I). Directorate-General for Social Security and Social Assistance 
This Directorate is in charge of: international problems of social security and 
welfare assistance; control and administrative supervision of social security bodies and 
remuneration of their staff; problems of financing social security; general compulsory 
social insurance; wage supplementation funds; wage compensation; family allowances 
and social assistance; 
E. Directorate-General for Cooperatives 
This Directorate deals with: economic problems of cooperatives, development 
and promotion of the cooperative movement; maintaining a general file on 
cooperatives; legal recognition of national associations and consortia of cooperatives; 
supervision of the management of cooperatives, consortia and associations; 
dissolution of cooperatives and compulsory liquidation. 
F. Directorate-General for the Labour Market Observatory 
This Directorate is responsible for general surveys on the employment situation, 
flows and quantitative and qualitative requirements; employment forecasts; studies on 
labour market trends; co-ordination of investigations and surveys carried out at the 
various local levels. It keeps relations with the Regional bodies for monitoring the 
labour market. The Directorate also acts as technical secretariat for the Central 
Employment Commission (see below). 
G. Central Office for Vocational Guidance and Training 
This office deals with: international issues involved in workers' vocational 
guidance and training; vocational guidance: the European Social Fund; relations with 
the regions as regards vocational training; and setting up and financing vocational 
training courses abroad. 
Central Employment Commission (Commissione Centrale per l'impiego) 
According to the mies, this Commission should establish the national criteria for 
implementing general and active employment policy in accordance with economic 
planning guidelines and EU orientations. In view of labour market trends in both 
quantitative and qualitative tenns and the economic reference framework of regional 
vocational training policy, by 30 July each year the Commission should lay down the 
guidelines for employment policy and the development of workers' earnings. To this end 
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it should commission and organize studies and systematic statistical surveys of the 
national labour market and its evolution. 
The Commission is chaired by the Minister of Labour and consists of: 
• ten trade union representatives, six employer representatives, one of staff, three of 
self-employed workers and one representative of the cooperative movement; 
• four Directors-General of the Ministry of Labour; 
• five representatives of the Regions; 
• one equal opportunity counsellor. 
Depending on the agenda, representatives of the administrations concerned will 
also attend the Commission's meetings. The Commission has its own technical 
secretariat. Its members have a term of office of three years. 
II. Regional, Provincial and Local District Labour Offices 
Regional Labour and Employment Offices (Uffici Regionali del Lavoro e della Massima 
Occupazione) 
The functions of these offices include guidance, stimulation, planning and 
monitoring of Labour Minisüy activities concerning employment policy, industrial 
relations, labour disputes and co-operation. They co-ordinate the activities of the 
Provincial Labour Offices and work in cooperation with the Employment Agencies. 
The organizational structure of the URLMO is as follows: 
Area I: Monitoring the labour market; co-operation; 
Area II: Matching labour supply and demand; social services; 
Area III: Industrial relations; mobility. 
Area IV: General services; organization and planning; 
Area V: Telecommunication services and data processing centres. 
Quite recently these offices have gotten involved in new engagements concerning 
the regulation of Regional employment services through the signing of agreements with 
Regional governments. Regional Employment Agencies, local offices of the Minisüy of 
Education, etc. 
Regional Employment Commissions (Commissioni Regionali per l'Impiego) 
CRIs were instituted by Law 675/1977 to foster labour mobility in accordance 
with the requirements arising from industrial restructurings and conversions. They were 
subsequently reformed as to their tasks and composition as follows: 
• the Minister of Labour or an undersecretary delegated by him, as chairman; 
• one member of the Regional government as deputy chairman; 
• two members designated by the Regional Council; 
• four representatives designated by employers' organizations; 
• six members designated by the trade unions; 
• two members designated by non-industrial employers' organizations and organizations 
of self-employed workers; 
• one equal opportunity counsellor; 
• the Directors of the Regional Employment Agencies and of the Regional Labour 
Office, both without voting right. 
The tasks of the Regional Employment Commissions were redefined by Law 
56/1987, which defines them as bodies for planning, implementing and monitoring 
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active labour policy. Their tasks were extended by Law 223/1991. They now have the 
following functions: 
• within their own geographical area, they cany out the tasks of the Central 
Employment Commission; 
• they give recommendations on the vocational framing programmes drawn up by the 
regional administration, and propose the implementation of vocational training and 
retraining programmes; 
• they can prepare programmes for the integration of hard-to-place workers; 
• they can decide on various methods of registration on the placement lists; 
• they approve lists of redundant workers (mobility lists) and take initiatives to promote 
their reintegration, working in collaboration with the employment office; 
• they can propose reserving a proportion of up to 20% of all hirings for the most 
disadvantaged groups, which are also defined according to regional demands; 
• they can make special agreements with firms with reference to hirings, particularly in 
the case of disadvantaged groups (experimenting new kinds of mandatory placement). 
The members of the Regional Commission remain in office for three years. 
Employment Agencies (Agenzie per l'impiego) 
Employment Agencies are set up by the Minisüy of Labour in each region (Fig. 
2.1). They usually work together with the national and regional bodies that monitor the 
labour market and with the services competent for vocational training. Their technical 
function is to implement the guidelines issued by the Regional Employment 
Commissions. In particular they promote initiatives aimed at creating jobs, encourage the 
placement of the weakest groups on the labour market and draw up proposals and 
programmes for active labour policy. In this area they are usually involved in managing 
the mobility lists (monitoring the workers enrolled, proposing individual and collective 
solutions, programming socially useful jobs for mobility workers, etc.). They also 
conduct labour market studies and surveys at regional level. 
Provincial Labour and Employment Offices (Uffici Provinciali del Lavoro e della 
Massima Occupazione ) 
Provincial Labour and Employment Offices are the bodies which manage, plan 
and control the activities of the administtations associated with setting up employment 
services, promotional management of industrial relations, the settlement of labour 
disputes, management and development of measures aimed at promoting co-operation. 
They also co-ordinate active labour policy measures and put the guidelines and directives 
of the Centtal Administration into concrete form, as well as those emerging from the co-
ordination activities of the Regional Labour Office. The provincial offices are organized 
as follows: 
Area I: Monitoring the labour market and dynamic employment factors; co-operation; 
Area II: Employment services; social services; 
Area III: Industrial relations; mobility; 
Area IV: General matters, organization and planning; 
Area V: Management of finances and state assets. 
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Figure 2.1 - The Regional Labour Agency 
(Law 56/1987 and implementing decrees) 
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Conversion to part-time. 
* The Director of the Provincial Labour Office nominates a Grade 9 officer for approval by the 
Minister of Labour. If such officer cannot be found, a Grade 6 or 7 officer may be named, provided 
he/has directed a municipal labour agency section. 
Source: Ministero del Lavoro, 1988. 
Local District Employment Offices (Sezioni Circoscrizionali per l'Impiego e per il 
Collocamento agricolo) 
The Local District Employment Offices and those for Placement in Agriculture 
are local branches of the Provincial Labour Offices, to which they report directly, and are 
defined by geographical area based on the local characteristics of the labour market, the 
stmcture of other administrative bodies and geographical distance. These offices are the 
main instrument for implementing active employment policies and mobility policy. 
The District Offices also perform other tasks: surveys of data and information on 
the labour market, participation in initiatives to promote new employment opportunities, 
supply of information to workers on employment options and working conditions, 
communication of information on measures to support initiatives to set up new firms 
advice and support for both employers and employees to promote labour market 
integration, and pre-screening of job-seekers. This last task relates primarily to difficult-
to-place job-seekers and young people looking for their first job. 
These local offices are structured as follows: 
Service I: Information and promotion; 
Service II: Employment; 
Service III: Placement in agriculture; 
Service IV: Delegated and decentralized activities; 
Service V: Administration and organization. 
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The Local District Employment Offices are also involved in the creation of local 
information systems on the labour market, often in co-operation with other public bodies 
active at the local level (Regional Employment Agencies, Regional Governments, etc.). 
Placement and employment services: the debate on the new organizational 
arrangements 
The services directed to ensuring efficient allocation of labour resources 
(guidance, placement, vocational training) are increasingly strategic in a framework of 
ever-increasing labour mobility and flexibility in modes and forms of utilization. 
Unfortunately, the greatest weakness of Italian labour market regulations is the lack of 
efficient services in this area. 
In part, Italy's backwardness in this sphere can be ascribed to the traditional 
conception of worker protection in exclusively defensive terms, with the institution of 
constraints on socially dangerous action by employers or pure and simple economic 
compensation for difficulties (income supports). 
Typical in the first regard is the state employment service, which until recently 
was structured in utterly bureaucratic terms. As for the second aspect, let us recall the 
countless bitter experiences with repeated extensions of special short-time wage 
compensation even when there was no real prospect of the workers' return to active 
servcie. 
Over the past three years a number of innovations have been made in the 
placement service in the effort to achieve a more modem and efficient set of 
"employment services". A decree law, several times reiterated, most recently by the 
present government, institutes a notable advance over the previous situation. 
The old public placement system exercised a passive bureaucratic distributive 
function and simple checking on the employers' compliance with mies implying some 
interference, varying in severity, with their freedom of choice in hiring ("mandatory rank-
order placement"). 
The government of Carlo Azeglio Ciampi altered these arrangements by 
abolishing the requirement of authorization by the competent public authorities, putting 
into practice a major principle of administrative simplification. 
However, the replacement of the request for official referral with a simple ex-post 
notification of the disüïct office leaves a good deal of room for improper practices by 
employers (off-the-books work).1 
In reiterating the decree the government of Lamberto Dini, while confirming this 
orientation, in line with the generalization of the principle of individual rather than rank-
order hiring enshrined in Law 223/1991, Article 25, introduced three important changes. 
1. It laid down that with the final abolition of the authorization process, direct hiring was 
not merely a prerogative of the employer in alternative to the request for referral and 
the administtative authorization, but the only effective hiring procedure. 
2. It shortened the deadline for employer notification to 5 days and also recognized 
simplified procedures, such as the possibility of effecting notification through their 
own employers' associations. 
1 The requirement only of notification, and leisurely notification at that (10 days) made it easy for 
employers to justify any failure to register workers in case of inspection by saying that the deadline had 
not yet expired. 
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3. It emphasized action to counter elusion and off-the-books work both with mies for 
greater transparency2 and through tougher sanctions; inspection was assigned a 
preventive function in this sphere. 
In short, the District offices were no longer called on to provide merely passive 
authorization but to perform an active function of promotion, serving the matching of 
labour demand and supply. 
However, it must be noted that the new mies, while disactivating and underming 
the old system of constraints, do not appear to be capable of creating a new system 
expressly based on the modem "service" function. The current debate on labour market 
organization, apart from treating the theme of the public monopoly on mediation 
between demand3 and supply of labour appears to be focused on a fundamental problem, 
namely the organizational arrangements of public agencies. The realization that efficient 
service depends on synergy with the local community and conditions makes the necessity 
of thorough reorganization self-evident. 
The incomes policy agreement of 23 July 1993 pledged the government to 
reorganize the local offices of the Labour Ministry to achieve more effective labour 
policy through synergy between regional administrations and the social partners. 
A ministerial committee instituted by Gino Giugni and chaired by Tiziano Treu 
had drafted a bill enacting the creation of a national public body (a National Agency for 
Employment) that would be independent of the ministry, strongly decentralized through 
regional agencies for employment, and mn by a three-way management (social partners, 
central government, regions). Along the lines of similar agencies in other countries,4 this 
structure would have safeguarded the national body by redefining tasks and 
decentralizing by transferring responsibilities to more local bodies, exploiting existing 
resources and stimulating cooperation and coordination. 
So far the bill has been blocked by the regions' demands for adminisu-ative 
independence in employment and active labour policies. A compromise solution is under 
study to ensure uniform national conditions while taking adequate account of the ideas 
and needs of the regional administtations. 
All the same, although so far the government has failed to get a reform measure 
through Parliament, some decentralization, especially in the areas of information, 
assistance for the transition from school to work, and guidance, is being enacted in some 
regions through conventions among the various public bodies involved (provincial and 
regional labour offices, labour agencies, school distticts, etc.), pursuant to the 
recommendations of Decree Law 181/1996. 
The National Economic and Labour Council (CNEL) 
At the central level, an important role is played by the National Economic and 
Labour Council. It consists of representatives of the social forces (employers, employees, 
self-employed workers) plus experts, and acts mainly as an advisory institution for the 
Government and as a regulating body for industrial relations. 
" It required the employer, upon hiring a worker, to provide the worker with an attestation giving the 
details of registration of the hiring and information on the terms of the employment relation, in line 
with Directive 91/533). 
As what is now required is services to facilitate the encounter between workers and employers, no 
longer bureaucratic rulings (i.e. authorization for hiring), it is reasonable to expect the entry of private 
agencies in Italy, as in many other European countries. 
4 Such as ANPE in France and the Federal Labour Institute in Germany. 
76 
The CNEL was set up under Article 99 of the Constitution, and reformed by Law 
936/1986. It is a particularly important advisory body; it is empowered to submit bills 
in the field of economics and labour, and it takes part in drafting economic and social 
legislation. 
Decision-making bodies 
A Chairman; two Deputy Chairmen; an Assembly; commissions and committees; 
a Secretary-General; a Secretariat. 
The Chairman represents CNEL and maintains contacts with Parliament, the 
government and the regions. He/she calls the Assembly, presides over its sessions, 
decides on its agenda and defines and co-ordinates the activities of the commissions 
and committees. 
Organization 
The CNEL is composed of representatives from the goods and services 
producing sectors, as well as of experts. There are 111 members in all, besides the 
Chairman. The breakdown of membership is as follows: 
• 12 economic, social science and legal experts, eight appointed by the President of the 
Republic and four nominated by the Prime Minister. 
• 99 representatives of the goods and services producing sectors, public and private; 44 
of them represent wage and salary earners, 18 represent the self-employed, and 37 
represent employers. 
Members are appointed by decree of the President of the Republic on the 
proposal of the Prime Minister, following consultation with the Council of Ministers. 
Members have a five-year temi of office. 
The working of this institution is mainly based on the activities of its several 
commissions, the most important of which is the Information Commission, responsible 
for keeping a data bank on the labour market and mnning a monitoring unit on collective 
bargaining agreements at all levels (national, industrial, local, company). 
A new field of activity recently introduced, still within the overall tripartite 
orientation, is the promotion of local concertation aimed at creating new infrastructures 
and enterprises (Territorial Pacts). 
Institute for Workers' Vocational Training and Guidance (Istituto per lo Sviluppo 
della Formazione Professionale dei Lavoratori) 
The training institute is a public law institution that works in close cooperation 
with the Minisüy of Labour and with other government departments and regional 
governments to stimulate the development of vocational training and guidance. Its 
mandated purposes are: 
• research on innovations and skills required by trends in labour demand and supply; 
• technical assistance in planning Gaining activities and projects; 
• didactic experimentation and multimedia programmes; 
• documentation on employment policies and training and guidance methodology. 
The main philosophy now guiding ISFOL is to bring the Italian training system 
closer to European standards. On the basis of the technical assistance missions assigned 
to it by the ministry, the institute is elaborating such standards in cooperation with the 
ministry itself and the regions and social partners. 
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ISFOL also has a strong tradition of research for system innovation. Combined 
with its technical assistance programmes, this makes ISFOL the only public agency for 
research and technical assistance in vocational training. The Board of Directors includes 
representatives of ministries, regions, and worker and employer organizations. 
The Institute's organs are: a Chairman, a Board of Directors (with, as noted 
representatives of the Minisüy of Labour, the regional authorities, and employer and 
union organizations), the Executive Committee and the Board of Auditors. The folowing 
areas of research are operative: technical assistance, documentation, labour policies and 
industrial relations, Community funding, labour market and vocational training, 
occupations, experimental Gaining methods and production of didactic software, 
institutional and legal studies. 
Local authorities 
While the Minisüy of Labour has the greatest responsibilities for regulating the 
labour market, even at the local level (through its local offices), regional governments 
have a fundamental role in the organization of vocational training and guidance. Law 
845/1978 determined the spheres of competence of the central and regional 
governments, specifying their respective functions and regulating the con*esponding 
methods of financing. 
In particular, the regions regulate the following areas through their own laws: 
• planning, setting up and financing vocational training activities; 
• vocational qualification of the disabled and people who are unfit for work; 
• training and refraining of training personnel; 
• organization of socially useful projects, both within the region and among different 
regions. 
The Ministry of Labour (through the Central Office for Vocational Guidance and 
Training) has retained responsibility for relations with the European Social Fund and the 
European Community, as well for the European harmonization of training standards, 
qualifications and quality assessment. 
Thanks to the extensive organizational autonomy that the regions enjoy, 
vocational Gaining differs so greatly from region to region that it is more realistic to talk 
of multiple systems. In many areas, regions can also delegate their powers to lower level 
local governments (provinces and municipalities). This happens with reference to training 
and to guidance and assistance to the unemployed and to the disabled. Provinces and 
municipalities are also responsible for the preparation of projects for utilizing redundant 
workers and the long-term unemployed on socially useful projects. 
As noted, local governments are expected to enjoy growing power in the 
management of the labour market through the delegation by the central government of 
full responsibility for active labour policies. Experiments in this direction have already 
taken place with piecemeal agreements to improve centre-periphery cooperation and 
develop local synergies among various local agents (public, private and non-profit alike) 
in the regulation of local labour markets. 
Labour market observatories 
These monitoring units are set up by each region. They plan and organize local 
surveys of the employment situation, conduct specific studies, make estimates and 
forecasts of labour market trends. In some regions they are organized on the provincial 
level, and they offer guidance services. 
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2. The system of industrial relations and collective wage negotiations 
Labour relations 
Employer-employee relationships in Italy are subject to a substantial body of 
legislation relating to social security and labour regulations. 
The employment relationship is subject to: 
• the Civil Code; 
• pertinent laws on employment; 
• collective bargaining agreements: 
• individual employment contracts; 
• custom and practice. 
The fundamental rights of workers are laid down by Law 300/1970, the Labour 
Rights Act. Among these are freedom of opinion, union rights, protection against 
disciplinary actions, reinstatement in case of dismissal without just cause. 
Collective bargaining agreements may be nationwide and cover an entire sector 
(manufacturing) or, more often, a single industry (e.g. textiles); they may also be local 
(disü'ict, firm or plant level). The four main categories of employees considered by 
collective agreements are executives, middle managers and technicians, clerical workers, 
and production workers. Executives have separate, interindustrial contracts, while other 
workers' conditions are regulated by collective agreements (industty or local), and 
clerical workers share a unique ranking scale with production workers. 
The distinction is particularly important, as the category in which an employee is 
classed determines, through collective bargaining, such matters as employer and 
employee social security contributions, seniority benefits, vacation entitlement, notice 
for termination or dismissal, and retirement and death benefits. Collectivfe bargaining 
agreements also set minimum wage levels for each grade level. By law, collective 
bargaing agreements apply only to the members of the unions party to the contracts. The 
wage provisions, however, are applied to all employees, as the courts have generally 
ruled that the contractual minimums must be complied with in conformity with the 
Constitutional right to "sufficient compensation". 
Trade union freedom is guaranteed by Article 39 of the Constitution. The 
protection accorded to the weaker party in the labour market (i. e. the worker) extends 
to the constitutional guarantee of the right to strike, which is widely recognized and 
recently has been regulated by law in the area of the public services. Furthermore, a 
special procedure against anti-union conduct on the part of employers is provided for 
(Article 28, Labour Rights Act). Trade union freedom was powerfully boosted by the 
Labour Rights Act, which established the right of the most representative unions to have 
company-level representatives. In view of the possible inconsistency between local and 
national representativeness, some limits to this right have been set in the wake of a 
nationwide referendum held in 1995. These will be discussed further on. 
Employers' organizations 
Employers are represented by three main organizations: the Confederation of 
Italian Industry (Confindustria), the Confederation of Commerce (Conficommercio), and 
the Confederation of Agriculture (Confiagricoltura). 
79 
Trade unions 
The trade union movement is strong, in spite of recent, noticeable 
transformations. Union membership is not obligatory. The major national trade union 
confederations and their political orientations are: CISL (centre), CGIL (left), UIL 
(centre-left), and CISNAL (right wing). 
The three most representative organizations (CGIL, CISL, UIL) are involved in a 
difficult process of convergence into a single confederation, to work for common 
objectives in the interests of all working people. There are unions at the industry, sector 
and company level. Unions at every level have the right to call strikes. The largest and 
most powerful industrial unions are those of the metalworkers and of the chemical 
workers. 
During the last few years, many unions not affiliated with the main confederations 
have greatly increased their bargaining power, mainly in such key public service sectors 
as health, transportation, and education. Thanks to the explicit constitutional protection 
of the right to strike, these organizations have sometimes caused inconvenience to the 
general public. 
The 1980s brought significant difficulties for unionization, in Italy as in other 
countries. This may be considered, in a sense, part of the ordinary, cyclical nature of 
unionization, with waves of new union membership alternating with periods of 
contraction. In any case, comparing the degree of unionization in 1990 with that of the 
early '60s, the balance is not purely negative. The number of members has risen in all the 
industrial countries, though in some countries the unionization rate has gone down. In 
Italy, the unionization rate, though having dropped from 31.4% in 1976 to 23.2% in 
1990 (La Valle, 1994), remains higher than in 1960. Thus despite its current difficulties, 
organized labour in Italy has remained stronger than before the last wave of expansion. 
In considering the decline in membership it must be borne in mind that one of the 
key factors in unionization is changes in the composition of the work force. Historically, 
rising unionization rates have found fertile terrain in the declining incidence of farm work 
and the growth of industry. Unions took root mainly among the male production workers 
of mass manufacturing industry. They have had much greater difficulty in extending their 
influence to technicians, white-collar employees, professionals, and workers in small, 
fragmented firms. 
Traditionally, that is, organized labour has had its main strongholds in the 
industries and segments that are suffering employment contraction and whose 
quantitative incidence on the economy appear due to diminish. The prospects for union 
expansion are thus not good. 
The total membership of CGIL, CSIL and UIL rose by more than 1.5 million,, or 
17.64%, between 1980 and 1993 (Table 2.1). The largest gain was scored by th4e CISL 
(+707,397), followed by CGIL (+637,521) and UIL (+24f547). Since 1992, for the first 
time since the founding of CISL and UIL, CGIL membership has gone below 50% of the 
total membership of the three confederations. From 1950 to 1991, the CGIL had always 
had more members (counting active workers, unemployed, and pensioners) than the 
other two confederations combined. 
Another significant milestone is the fact that in 1993, for the first time, pensioners 
outnumbered active workers among CGIL members (2,666,463 as against 2,540,437). 
The pensioners federation now accounts for 50.92% of the confederation's total 
membership of 5,236,571. The fact that of all the categories the only one registering 
substantial growth is that of pensioners is especially eloquent; given the unlikeliness of an 
upturn in unionization among active workers, the trend is bound to continue. 
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The number of payroll employees belonging to CGIL, CISL and UIL fell by 
20.69% between 1980 and 1993, from 7,135,555 to 5,660,956 (Table 2.2). Again, the 
sharpest loss was suffered by the CGIL (-27.42%), followed by CISL (-19.96%) and 
UIL (which shrank by less than 2%). 
Accordingly, there has been a significant decline in unionization rates. It is worth 
noting, however, that while the unionization rate remains an important indicator of union 
representativeness, it is not the only one. In 1992 the overall rate of unionization rose, 
thanks to a gain in industry. In 1993 it fell (Table 2.3), despite a gain of over 6 points in 
agriculture (from 87.60 to 93.69), owing to decreases of 0.47 points (or 1.10%) in 
industry, 0.40 points (1.72%) in the market services and 1.72 points (3.52%) in the non-
market services. On the basis of these data, then, the sharpest recent loss in 
representativeness for the major confederations has come in the public services. This 
presumably depends on the freeze on contract renewals and the resistance of many public 
employees to the so-called "privatization" of the public employment relation. 
The "southern" orientation of CGIL, CISL and UIL membership, especially 
among active workers, is perceptible (Table 2.4). Whereas 28.82% of all Italian payroll 
employees were located in the South in 1993, the southern share of the three 
confederations' membership was 33.91%. The increasing överrepresentation of the South 
corresponds to an underrepresentation of the Northwest, which accounted for 30.46% of 
total employees and only 26.08% of union membership. 
Collective bargaining 
All employees in Italy are entitled, by collective agreements, to an additional 
month's remuneration (the so-called "thirteenth month") payable in December. Some 
agreements provide for additional payments in some industries, such as banking (sixteen 
monthly paychecks) and the petroleum industry (fifteen). In commerce, a fourteenth 
salary is paid in June. In addition, on leaving employment with a firm, for whatever 
reason, an employee is entitled to severance pay of about one month's wage for each year 
of service, which Italian law considers as a form of deferred remuneration. This 
severance pay is increasingly utilized by collective agreements as a way of funding 
supplementary, company-based pension plans. 
Overtime work is remunerated at a higher rate than normal hours. The amount of 
the increment is set by collective bargaining and generally varies with the type of 
overtime (daytime, night, holiday), itself defined by collective agreement. 
From 1975 until December 1991, there was automatic inflation indexing for all 
wages and salaries, in the form of a cost-of-living escalator or "scala mobile". The scala 
mobile was suspended by the tripartite agreement of 31 July 1992 between government 
and business and labour organizations. Wage increases are thus to be determined solely 
by collective bargaining, in the framework of a specified bargaining procedure. 
In 1993, Legislative Decree 29 enacted the reform of employment relations in the 
public sector, to improve human resources management and improve efficiency and 
productivity. 
A second tripartite agreement was signed a year later, on 23 July 1993. The 
most important changes embodied in it were: 
• an agreement in principle on incomes policy; 
• the definitive abrogation of the scala mobile and the introduction of partial cost-of-
living coverage during intervals between the expiry of one contract and the signing of 
the next; 
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• complete separation between two different levels of negotiation, mied by a "no-
oveiiap principle"; 
• the institution of wage bargaining every two years at the national, industry-wide level 
(while the legal and work mies portions of the contracts mn for the full four-year 
term); 
• new matters for local bargaining (at company or territorial level) every four years, 
focusing on forms of profit-sharing or gain-sharing. 
The rationalization of the bargaining system was complemented, in the July 
agreement, by provisions for the formation of a unified body for worker representation at 
the company level. The members of this representative council are mostly elected, and in 
smaller part are designated by the trade unions themselves. The council has powers to 
conduct company-level collective bargaining. 
The agreement also instituted formal concertation arrangements, in which 
business and labour representatives meet with the government, in two important annual 
economic policy "sessions". 
1. The May/June session. Prior to the presentation of its three-year Economic and 
Financial Planning Document, the government undertakes to disclose its budgetary 
objectives for the period. The purpose of the session is to develop jointly agreed targets 
for inflation, GDP growth and employment. 
2. The September session. This session forms part of the budget process, and its 
conclusions are to be transposed into the annual Finance Bill. 
The government further undertakes, in the course of the two sessions, to set out 
the ways, means and timetable for swift corrective action to modify conduct inconsistent 
with incomes policy, notably through fiscal and parafiscal measures, with special 
reference to levies that affect the cost of labour (tax-based incomes policies). 
With regard to bargaining arrangements, in the analysis of Giugni (1993), the two 
July agreements have done away with automatic indexation and formally recognized the 
central role of collective bargaining, which if not compulsory (which it is not) is at least 
the normal mode of wage determination; and the consequent normalization of contract 
negotiation and renewal procedures. 
Obviously, these elements are logically interrelated. In practice, all respond to the 
need to simplify wage mies and avoid overlapping between contract and bargaining 
levels. 
A significant provision in this regard is the new, staggered negotiation schedule, 
with regulatory provisions revised in the contract renewal every four years and the 
economic clauses renegotiated every two years. This should relieve the normative 
portion of labour agreements of the excessive load of bargaining issues and tension that 
has marked Italian practices in this sphere until now (Treu, 1993). 
This is the standpoint from which to examine the relationship between national 
and decenttalized bargaining levels. Essentially, there are two mechanisms by which the 
higher level might dominate the lower: a referral clause obliging the parties to restrict 
decentralized agreements to matters and within limits specified by the national contract; 
and the specialization principle, by which local bargaining can only deal with matters not 
settled at the centtal level. 
The solution enacted with the 23 July agreement combines the two. It establishes 
that the items provided for in decentralized agreements must be different, not repetitive 
of national contract items, and it further specifies that company-level wage items must be 
related to productivity and the economic performance of the firm. 
A particularly interesting feature is the new relationship between wages and 
inflation. First-level bargaining takes as its point of reference the government's inflation 
target, with a clause permitting the recouping, after two years, of any differential (above 
a "deductible" of 0.5 percentage points a year) between actual and target inflation. 
Second-level bargaing at the company or district level is conducted with reference to 
productivity or profits. For this reason, given the no-overlap clause, if productivity 
improves total earnings (first- plus second-level) remain tied to company performaqnce, 
eliminating the inflationary potential of wage increases. This advantage is reinforced by 
the fact that this way of determining wages helps to limit the distribution of productivity 
gains between dynamic and stagnant companies, producing better balanced growth as 
between industries exposed to international competition and those sheltered from it 
(Brunettaetal., 1994). 
Another innovation is the commitment to assure differential treatment of 
company-level paycheck elements in regard to social security levies. Demanded 
insistently by the employers' side, this provision is explained by the particularly heavy 
incidence of social security taxes in Italy. Up to now, the provisions on this point are 
limited to Decree Law 295/1996, which exempts second-level increments from income 
and social security taxes, up to 1% of total contractual earnings (a figure that may 
subsequently be raised to 3%). Second-level wages nevertheless remain subject to a 10% 
employer contribution to compulsory pension funds. 
Employee representation at company level 
Trade union representation within the company is provided for under Article 19 
et seqq. of the Labour Rights Act. It can be implemented at the initiative of the workers 
in each production unit if it is associated with: 
a) one or more associations affiliated to one of the confederations that are most 
representative at the national level; 
b) one or more trade union associations which, though not affiliated to those 
confederations, are signatories of national and provincial collective labour agreements 
applied by the company. 
In the companies with several production units, the trade union representatives 
can set up co-ordinating bodies. 
This provision applies to industrial and commercial firms employing more than 15 
people and to agricultural firms employing more than 5. 
In response, in part, to the trend to deunionization, there have been efforts to 
revise the entire system of labour relations. In particular, a referendum campaign was 
launched to overthrow the principle of presumed representativeness for certain unions 
(though this representativeness was in fact evident) not based on standard procedures 
defined by law. As a consequence of the referendum, Article 19(a) of the Labour Rights 
Act was abrogated and Article 19 (b) was transformed into the statement that in any case 
a union signatory to a contract applied in a given company shall be considered 
representative. In this way, and against the intentions of the referendum's own 
promoters, representativeness comes to be determined by employers. For this reason, 
among others, the drive for a further redefinition of company-level trade union 
representative bodies remains strong. 
As regards public employment, a major mies change enacted in 1993 as part of 
the rationalization of the civil service for greater efficiency provides that public 
employees shall be subject to the same mies as private-sector employees and accorded 















































































































































































































































































































































• for UIL, the figure for 1993 excludes 13,038 employees of Rnecal non engaged in work activity but that have retained membership at specially reduced dues. 
" Based on the following sources for toial payrolls: ISTAT, Labour force survey, average for the year 1992; Relazione Generale sulla situazione economica del Poe se 1994 (draft) 
for column Β; and National Accounts data. 
· " The rate for 1993 is not comparable with previous years due to changes in the procedures of the quarterly labour force survey. 
Source: Ccsos, 1995. 
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"for CGIL, estimated figures, as lhe agriculture and food-processin g union (Rai) no longer gives lhe breakdown between faim workers (es-Federbracäanti) 
and food processing (ex-Filzial). 
"* Based on total employees in sector taken from Islat, Occupazione e redditi da lavoro dipendente anni 1980-93 (1994). 
"'•Includes unemployed for CGIL, unemployed and youths for CISL, and for UIL lhe workers cited in note to Table 2.2. 
Source: Ccsos, 1995. 

















































"Figures for UIL and total include the workers died in nole to Table 2.2. 
Source: Cesos, 1995. 
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III. LABOUR MARKET LEGISLATION 
1. General Labour Policy of the Government 
Between October 1992 and January 1995 about 1,000,000 jobs were lost, with 
very substantial repercussions on the unemployment rate. The trend was particularly 
adverse for young people, many of whom elected to stay at home with their parents for 
lack of job opportunities. The labour market policy debate in Italy has accordingly 
centred on measures to increase the flexibility of the labour market by changing working 
time regulations, increasing occupational mobility and rendering labour deployment 
within firms more flexible. Production structures, it was argued, have to become more 
elastic in view of technological and organizational change. 
The debate was relaunched at the end of 1993 with the publication of the 
European Commission's White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment. The 
Italian Minisüy of Labour responded immediately with its own document, "Obiettivo 
occupazione: una strategia di medio periodo per il mercato del lavoro italiano" 
(Objective Employment: A medium-term strategy for the Italian labour market). 
According to this document the Italian labour market is characterized by the slow 
expansion of both female and youth employment, and by education rates far below the 
European average. With respect to European convergence, therefore, Italy is at a 
disadvantage not so much in its high unemployment rate as in its low employment rate. 
In this respect, there still remains much to do to put into full operation the 
provisions of the agreement of 23 July 1993 regarding vocational training, human capital, 
research and development, and "regulated flexibility" in employment relations. 
In order to achieve these results, it is necessary: 
• to increase economic growth to around 3% annually; 
• to promote the development of human capital, raising the school-leaving age to 16 or 
preferably 18 (compulsory schooling now ends at 14), and to increase the number of 
employed with upper secondary or university education; 
• to increase "regulated flexibility" of employment relations so as to uncover 
"underground" workers and an increase in part-time work to reach European levels. 
Consequently, the main labour policy initiatives of recent years have been in three 
directions. First, that of increasing labour market flexibility, through the introduction of 
new regulations on atypical work and hiring procedures. Other innovations have then 
been made in the field of employment incentives, through general reductions in corporate 
taxes depending on additional employment, as well as cuts in wage costs and social 
insurance contributions for various regions and economic sectors. These last efforts have 
proven quite unsuccessful, as the actual growth of social contributions has continued to 
outpace inflation. The last line of initiative has been that of the integration or 
reintegration of disadvantaged groups into working life: women, young people, workers 
on short-time compensation and on the mobility rolls, drug abusers, etc.). 
More recently, in accordance with the agreements reached by the EU Member 
States in Essen in December 1994 and confirmed in Cannes in June 1995, like the other 
members Italy has prepared a Multiannual Programme for Employment (1995). In this 
framework, the Italian Government's initiatives are based on the following priority 
objectives: 
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• to increase the rate of employment, especially in southern Italy; 
• to invest in human resources, current and future, and implement the principle of equal 
opportunities; 
• to broaden the production base and sustain its growth; 
• to ensure the effective operation of the labour market, by encouraging flexibility; 
• to offer a variety of services to workers and businesses: accurate signals, information, 
individual guidance, training, etc; 
• to guarantee, on certain conditions and through integrated management of incentives 
and social shock absorbers, financial protection for unemployed people actively 
seeking work. 
The Programme highlights the current situation, the policy objectives and the 
reform initiatives being prepared by the Government in the areas of training deficit and 
employment policies. 
As to the first point, the document clarifies that while the stock of Italy's labour 
force is in general undertrained, this is not the case for the flow of new entrants, whose 
education and training level is relatively good. 
The present situation presents, anyway, other areas in which policy actions 
are needed, such as the high dropout rate, the shortness of compulsory schooling, the 
reform of the training system (especially creating an efficient continuing training system, 
virtually from scratch) and, finally, the development of good quality post-secondary 
training as an alternative to university education. 
As to employment policies, the Programme states that the antidote to 
unemployment is a coordinated set of policies, which combines at least three general 
elements: 
• selective investment, particularly in infrastructures and new labour-intensive 
sectors; 
• measures designed to increase labour market flexibility; 
• investment in education, Gaining and research, in order to maximize the quality of 
human resources. 
As a methodological point, efforts need to be concentrated largely in the weak 
areas of the country, almost all of which are in the South. The Government's 
initiatives are presented as a response to the five policy areas identified at Essen as the 
macro-objectives for the convergence of employment policies; as such, they involve: 
• promotion of investment in vocational training; 
• increasing the employment benefits of growth; 
• reducing ancillary labour costs to encourage employment; 
• increasing the effectiveness of employment policy; 
• measures in favour of groups particularly hard-hit by unemployment. 
Lastly, looking at the figures on public expenditure in labour market programmes 
(Table 3.1), Italy's basket appeai-s to be quite small, below 2% of GDP (close to the UK, 
but well below France, Spain and Germany), and particularly biased toward youth 
measures, reflecting large outlays for trainee contracts (0.55% of GDP in 1992). 
Atypical employment arrangements 
An important aspect of the flexibility of the labour market is the menu of 
available employment arrangements. While the full-time, open-ended contract has 
historically been the norm in most European countries, during the 1980s a number of 
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more flexible contractual fornis were developed, such as fixed-term and part-time work, 
temporary work, overtime and work-sharing. 
Italy has been slower than most other EU countries in moving in this direction. 
Law 230/1962, still in force, restricts the freedom to enter into "flexible" work 
arrangements (Casavola, 1993). Moreover, during the 1970s, the unions were successful 
in limiting recourse to such arrangements, as well as to overtime work. In the 1980s, 
partly due to a reduction in union bargaining power, piecemeal liberalization was 
promulgated as regards fixed-term and part-time contracts and work-sharing "solidarity" 
contracts; and limits on overtime were relaxed. 
Fixed-term arrangements were liberalized with Law 56/1987. In spite of many 
further, unsuccessful attempts at reforming the matter, the rules nevertheless remain 
restrictive by comparison with other major EU countries, most significantly as regards 
the maximum allowable duration of contract, the range of cases in which fixed-term 
work is allowed, and the heavy penalty imposed on violators (typically requiring such 
employers to convert the fixed-term contract into an open-ended one). Furthermore, 
private placement agencies - a common way of arranging temporary fixed-term work -
have not yet been authorized to operate in Italy. Partly as a result of these restrictions, 
the share of temporary and fixed-termto total employment in Italy is one of the lowest in 
Europe, and consists in any case mainly of seasonal work in agriculture (Graphs 3.1 a-b). 
Part-time work is currently regulated by Law 863/1984, which partly liberalized 
previous rules. However, important restrictions remain, and the share of part-time to 
total employment in Italy is one of the lowest in Europe (Graphs 3.2 a-b). Part-time 
workers cannot work overtime, and working hours must be set precisely in advance. 
Employers argue that the current regulation of part-time work makes the employment of 
two half-time workers more costly than that of one full-time worker (Confindustria, 
1993). 
The low share of fixed-term and part-time employment may also be explained by 
the fact that a certain degree of labour market flexibility has been attained by other 
means, notably self- employment (Graph 3.3), subsidized trainee contracts, overtime, and 
the prevalence of small firms, many of which are able to evade regulations. 
Temporary employment through the operation of labour intermediary agencies is 
outlawed under a 1969 law. This type of atypical arrangement is now the focus of legal, 
political and social debate. Given the profoundly different current economic situation, the 
risks that the law was designed to guard against no longer subsist. The retention of the 
ban is unwarranted, outdated, especially by comparison with the principles governing the 
single market, i.e "freedom of establishment" for all EU firms and "mutual recognition" 
of national laws. 
The arguments in favour of introducing such "labour leasing" arrangements in 
Italy rest mainly on the potential for finding job opportunities that would otherwise be 
lost or absorbed by informal, underground employment. 
For firms, the benefits would consist in the prompt availability of selected 
manpower that can fit immediately into active service. For workers, the main advantage 
is that temporary work may be a means of access to stable employment, as well as 
encouraging the emersion of underground employment, which can only be described as 
now at pathological levels. 
Since the early '80s there have been a number of initiatives designed to introduce 
"labour leasing". The various bills submitted to Parliament reflect an orientation towards 
the French model of labour leasing, i.e. they provide for equal treatment of temporary 
workers with regular staff performing the same duties. 
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2. Employment protection schemes 
As regards individual dismissals, Italian rules have traditionally been more 
restrictive than those of other major EU countries. Table 3.2 presents a summary 
comparison of the main aspects of regulations governing individual dismissals in France, 
Germany, the UK and Italy. The severance pay and notice requirements in Italy are 
stricter than in the other countries; the acceptable causes are somewhat loosely worded 
in the law (redundancy is not explicitly mentioned), making dismissal decisions by firms 
more easily contestable; and "just cause" for summary dismissals is more stringent, 
rendering it less usable. The severance pay is paid to all workers, in any case of 
separation, and is notably hire than in other European countries as it is considered by 
Italian legislation like a the ferred pay, rather than a help for re-employment. The benefit 
for employment termination (Trattamento di fine rapporto) is, thus, the major cause for 
the Italian differencial in the tax wedge on wages. Perhaps the most important restriction, 
however, is the heavy penalty levied on the employer if a dismissal is judged "unfair": 
economic compensation and also mandatory re-hiring. Together with the favourable 
rulings traditionally handed down by the courts to workers appealing dismissals, this has 
made outright dismissal very infrequent as an instrument of adjusting the size of the work 
force (Emerson, 1988a and 1988b). 
Rules for collective dismissals typically stipulate longer advance notice and -
often - consultations with union representatives and the Government. At the same time, 
however, large-scale restructuring of the work force (including firm closures) is 
acknowledged as a prerogative of the employer. In Italy, the law requires consultations 
lasting up to 75 days. If agreement is not reached during this period, the dismissals may 
take place (with severance pay). However, dismissed workers can appeal to the courts, 
and juridical doctrine has always been that a worker fired following a decision to reduce 
the work force is entitled to appeal as if in a case of individual dismissal (Treu et al., 
1993). Thus, given that redundancy is not explicitly mentioned as an acceptable cause for 
dismissal, collective dismissals are at least as difficult to justify in court as individual 
ones. 
The Government has taken steps to attenuate the stringency of these regulations. 
Exemptions from the most onerous regulations have been granted to small firms: those 
employing fewer than 15 employees (six in farming) are not subject to heavy penalties for 
"unfair" dismissals; for firms with under 35 employees, the courts may order 
compensation only if the employer refuses to re-hire the dismissed worker. As in the case 
of hiring restrictions, this has probably affected Italy's overall industrial structure. 
The main employment protection instruments in Italy are described below. 
Regular short-time earnings compensation benefits (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, 
Ordinaria - CIGO) 
The purpose of the short-time compensation fund is to guarantee industrial 
workers' in case of lay-off or a reduction in the company's activity due to temporary 
events not attributable to the employer or to the employees, or which are caused by the 
economic situation. 
The following types of employee are eligible for regular benefits: production and 
clerical workers and middle-level management and technicians who have been 
temporarily laid off or are working reduced hours in industrial firms, with the exception 
of certain specified sectors. 
In addition, the regular CIG compensation covers: 
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• members and employees of producers' and workers' cooperatives; 
• workers of other sectors depending on industrial finns, if they are working on 
secondary tasks directly linked with the activity of these firms; 
• seasonal workers and workers who are subject to seasonal unemployment or are 
regularly laid off. 
Regular CIG compensation is fixed at 80% of the gross wage for the hours not 
worked, from 0 up to the contractual maximum, but never more than 40 hours a week. 
The compensation is paid over a continuous period of at most three months, which may 
be extended quarter by quarter in exceptional cases, up to a maximum of 12 months 
during a given 2-year period. A company that has benefited from the wage compensation 
for 12 consecutive months can reapply only after at least 52 weeks of normal operation. 
The benefits are paid by the employer to the entitled workers at the end of each 
pay period, and the employer is then reimbursed by the social security administration 
(Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale - INPS) according to specific rules. Special 
regulations apply to the agricultural sector. 
The short-time compensation fund is financed by employers' contributions of 
2.20% of the wage bill subject to the INPS employees' pension fund. The percentage is 
reduced to 1.9% for companies with under 50 employees. 
Firms benefiting from the CIG have to pay an additional contribution of 8% of 
the wage compensation paid to their employees (4% for companies employing smaller 
than 50 employees). 
INPS manages the Fund. In compliance with specific rules, the company submits 
a claim to the INPS provincial office; in particular it must follow the procedures the law 
lays down for consultation with the trade unions. 
The decision to grant regular- compensation is taken by the provincial office, after 
consulting a Provincial Commission, appointed by order of the director of the Regional 
Labour Office and composed of the director of the Provincial Labour Office (who chairs 
it), an official from the Provincial Labour Inspectorate, employer and employee 
representatives from the industry concerned, designated by the most representative union 
organizations at provincial level. 
Applications for extensions are also submitted to the Provincial Commission. 
Special short-time earnings compensation (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, 
Straordinari - CIGS) 
The purpose of the special short-time compensation programme (CIGS) is not 
only income maintenance but also employment safeguards for the workers, once 
productive activity in a company has resumed following restructuring, reorganization or 
conversion. 
Special benefits can be provided in the following cases: 
1. company restructuring, reorganization or conversion; 
2. crisis situation within a company; 
3. bankruptcy; 
4. compulsory liquidation by administrative order; 
5. special administration of a company in which economic activity is terminated; 
6. existence of a work-sharing agreement (see below). 
Eligibility is open to: 
• industrial firms (including construction and related firms) which in the six months 
prior to application employed, on average, more than 15 workers (including trainees); 
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• cooperatives and their members processing, transporting or marketing animal or plant 
products; 
• transport and haulage firms, travel agents and ttavel companies, firms in the trade 
sector with more than 50 employees; 
• artisanal firms with more than 15 employees; 
• leased canteen-operating firms and cleaning firms suffering from economic crisis in the 
leasing firms; 
• fums in the railway support sector, securities firms, private radio and television 
companies and those linked to them in functional terms. 
The benefits are available to the following groups of persons: 
1. production workers and the like and "intermediate-category" employees; 
2. clerical and white-collar staff (including travelling sales persons); 
3. managerial staff employed by the aforementioned companies. 
Workers made redundant lose their entitlement to earnings compensation if they 
refuse to attend a vocational training or retraining course, or engage in self-employment 
or salaried employment while drawing benefits. 
The special compensation benefit amounts to 80% of the pay the workers would 
otherwise have earned, up to a gross monthly ceiling that in 1996 was 1,340,000 lire 
(for workers earning up to 2.9 million lire gross). For those earning more, the benefit is 
raised to 1,613,000 lire. 
Like regular- benefits, special benefits are administered by INPS. Companies must 
apply to their local Regional or Provincial Employment Office. The application must 
specify, in addition to the reason for the layoffs, their nature and duration, the criteria for 
the selection of the employees to be laid off, and the procedure for rotation. 
Enterprises that consider that they will not be in a position to re-employ the 
redundant employees subsequently may proceed according to the regulations governing 
redundancies. The workers affected are placed on the mobility rolls to facilitate their 
reintegration into the labour market. 
The contributions that finance special short-time compensation are as follows: 
1. a general contribution of 0.9% of the earnings subject to social security contributions, 
of which 0.6% is paid by the employer and 0.3% by the employee; 
2. an additional contribution of 3% for firms actually benefiting from CIGS with 15 to 
50 employees, and of 4.5% for larger firms. 
In the case of a crisis within the enterprise, the benefits last 12 months. This is 
extended to 24 months for firms undergoing restructuring, reorganization or conversion. 
Exemptions from the 12-month limit may be granted by the Ministry of Labour 
for particularly complex programmes, in consideration of the technical characteristics of 
the manufacturing processes, the employment effects of the restructuring or 
reorganization measures, etc. 
Work-sharing agreements (Solidarity contracts) 
Solidarity contracts are work-sharing agreements stipulated in order to prevent 
labour shedding and collective redundancies during the course of the procedure for 
granting special short-time compensation or inclusion on the mobility rolls. The two 
sides reach collective agreements providing for reduced working time with a 
corresponding cut in collectively agreed wages. The reduction in hours may be 
"horizontal" (daily) or "vertical" (monthly, weekly, yearly). In both cases the 
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Government provides a quarterly allowance that is divided between the firm and the 
workers. The size of the allowance, under Law 236/1993, is variable: 
• if a working time reduction of more than 20% is agreed, employers are entitled to a 
25% reduction of their social insurance contributions. This rate rises to 30% for 
companies operating in the areas listed under Objectives 1 and 2 of EC Directive 
2052/88; 
• if the working time reduction is more than 30%, the contribution relief amounts to 35% 
or 40%, respectively. 
The wage compensation provided for in solidarity contracts is paid from a special 
fund under special CIG. Under Legislative Decree 39/1996 it comes to 50% (60% in 
Objective 1 districts). The compensation can last up to 24 months, extendable to 48 (and 
to 60 in Objective 1 districts). 
Firms interested in the allowance - which can be extended to a maximum of two 
years - apply to the Provincial Employment Office, which passes it on to the Directorate 
General for Labour Relations, which verifies it and, where appropriate, issues a 
certificate of approval. The allowance is then paid out by INPS. 
3. Regulation of working time 
Full-time 
Under a 1923 law, the maximum allowable working time in industrial and 
commercial firms is 8 hours a day, or 48 hours a week, plus up to 12 hours of overtime 
under an agreement between employers and unions. This legal working week, however, 
has been gradually supplanted by a contractual week, generally a 40-hour, 5-day week 
that is now universal. The conttactual working week thus determines the normal duration 
of labour services without affecting the maximum. 
Legal holidays are now 15 yearly. Under the Constitution, vacation days are not 
renounceable, paid, and enjoyed over a continuous period of time. The number of days is 
fixed by collective bargaining; most current contracts call for around 26 days a year. 
The National Economic and Labour Council (CNEL) has recently been working 
on a draft bill on working time and flexible hours, but it has not found a broad consensus. 
CNEL's interest in contributing actively to reforming Italy's outdated legislation in this 
sphere stems in part from the agreement of 23 July 1993 but above all from EC stimulus. 
In September 1993 the EU Council adopted Directive 93/104/EC, which the member 
states were to transpose into domestic legislation within two years, as provided by 
Article 118 of the Treaty. Over the yearsw Community institutions have enacted a 
number of provisions concerning working time, calling on national authorities, employers 
and unions, without prejudice to the principle of subsidiarity, to conduct themselves in 
accordance with Community indications. 
In its legislative initiative, CNEL had the following purposes in mind: 
• modernizing Italian legislation to adapt it to European decisions and trends in our 
direct competitors and to make it serve employment growth and corporate 
competitiveness; 
• taking full advantage of the gains instituted by collective bargaining and sustaining 
their further development, with safeguards to the fundamental right to safety and 
security, to permit effective contractual management of working time and flexibility 
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in such a way as to produce equitable distribution of the benefits among the 
individual and collective contracting parties; 
• conüibuting to produce rules that can satisfy individual needs for flexibility. 
The CNEL draft provides for flexible, personalized working hours. There is no 
reason why ü"uly bargained regulations on working time have to produce work schedules 
that are inconvenient and disliked by the workers. Flexible hours could permit a better 
distribution of activities and workers over time and within the organization of the 
company, with more rational and balanced use of all productive factors. 
As regards the work week, the draft incorporates the Community directive on 
working hours and sets the average work week at 48 hours, including overtime. 
Another innovative feature of Directive 93/104, though one already present in 
Italian law (albeit only for farm workers and other exceptional cases) is the provision for 
a refernce period during which the average number of weekly hours must be calculated; 
the Directive sets this period at 4 months. This will require amendment of the Italian law, 
which sets only a maximum work week, which collective bargaining can naturally 
shorten by agreement of the two parties. 
Overtime 
The aim of overtime regulation is to limit overtime working in industrial 
enterprises, so as to promote employment. Under the present law, overtime is defined as 
those hours worked over and above legal working time. It is counted separately and paid 
at least 10% more than the normal rate. 
The rate is fixed by collective agreement, depending on category of overtime: day 
or night work, working days or holidays, etc. 
As a general mie, the law prohibits the indiscriminate use of overtime and 
specifies the cases in which it is admissible. 
Overtime that is not purely occasional is prohibited in industrial firms, except in 
exceptional cases required by production and technical constraints where averaging work 
time over a given period is impossible. 
In non-indusüial firms, the use of overtime is permitted if there is an agreement 
between the two parties; however, it may not exceed two hours a day and 12 hours per 
week, or an equivalent average duration during a set period. 
The Labour Inspectorate has to be informed of overtime and is empowered to 
stop or restrict it. 
Part-time work 
Part-time employment contracts are designed to enable workers who wish to do 
so to work fewer hours than those provided for in collective bargaining agreements, or-
to work for predetermined periods of time in the course of a week, a month or a year. 
Workers willing to work reduced hours can ask to be registered on a special 
placement list. Such registration does not preclude registration with the ordinary 
placement list as well. Part-time contracts must be written, specifying the functions and 
the organization of working hours. 
A worker may therefore request that his/her full-time contract be converted to 
part-time. 
Workers with a part-time contract have priority when full-time personnel is 
recruited. 
A worker employed for 20 hours a week may remain registered in the first 
category on the ordinary placement lists, therefore still applying for full-time jobs. 
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In order to promote part-time work, the Ministry of Labour may partially exempt 
companies from the general compulsory disability, old-age and survivors' insurance for 
part-time employment contracts which, in order to expand the workforce or on the basis 
of collective bargaining agreements relating to the decree on excess manning levels, 
convert full-time into pait-time employment. 
Flexible hours 
Flexible hours have been regulated with increasing care since the early '80s both 
in collective bargaining agreements and in legislation (mainly using social shock 
absorbers). However, the tendency to abandon standard criteria in fixing the quality and 
quantity of work in favour of a broader, more varied range of times, modes and models 
(multi-period schedules, annual calendar, functional and internal flexibility, part-time) has 
not been adequately sustained by legislation. 
in any case, work time flexbility does not relate only to troubled firms; it must be 
based on a solidly participatory, non-conflictual approach, as is specified in the 23 July 
1993 agreement. If hourly flexibility is not to be limited to crisis situations, we need a 
more ample tool kit that can satisfy not only needs relating to plant utilization in 
traditional industry but also production and distribution of goods and services, in 
industry, the services, public and private alike. CNEL's draft bill emphasizes the need for 
decentralization and experimentation, taking account of the requests for flexibility raised 
by workers themselves. Work schedules must take account of the propensity to 
bargained regulation of hours, with differentiation in reference to both short and long 
intervals. 
Major innovations in this regard are contained in the textiles industry contract 
signed in July 1995. Without prejudice to possibilities already present, the agreement 
includes specific rules on fixed-term contracts, part-time work, leave, absence and 
schooling. With regard to flexible hours in particular, the agreement highlights the special 
features of the industry and the objective of limiting recourse to overtime, short-time 
compensation, and anomalous decentralization. 
The main innovation is peimission for firms to deal with variations in production 
needs by establishing different schedules in particular times of year, with up to 96 hours a 
year of overtime (above 40 hours but never more than 48 hours in a week). 
The hours worked above the contractual maximum of 40 per week will be 
compensated during the year, in periods of less intensive production demand, by an equal 
decrease in weekly working hours. The workers will receive the regular weekly pay both 
during overtime and short weeks. Work above the contractual hours will be paid a 
premium of 12% for the first 48 hours and 15% for the next 48 hours, due immediately. 
The agreement stipulates that ordinarily management will communicate to the 
company works council the hours plan and the divisions involved in overtime and short-
time, and how many hours. The procedures for assigning overtime and utilizing the hours 
reductions, consistent with company needs, will be set jointly in advance by management 
and works council. 
Fixed-term employment contracts 
The fixed-term contract is authorized in the following cases: 
• when the duration is limited by the nature of the work (seasonal work), including in 
commerce and tourism; 
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• for the temporary replacement of an absent worker (who retains the right to his/her 
job); 
• for carrying out a specific task or service predetermined in time and of an 
exttaordinary or occasional nature; 
• for tasks or series of tasks which require workers with skills which differ from those 
normally used in the firm, provided that these tasks are limited to complementary or 
additional work, for which there is no employment continuity in the firm; 
• for the recruitment of personnel related to specific shows or to specific radio and 
television programmes. 
Furthermore, fixed-term employment contracts can be used in the cases laid 
down in collective bargaining agreements. Such agreements stipulate the percentage of 
overall staff that can be hired on a fixed-term basis. 
Fixing the duration of employment is not valid if it is not the result of a written 
document. 
In specific cases workers who have been hired under a fixed-term contract for a 
seasonal job have priority for recruitment by the same company with the same status. 
Workers who have been hired under a fixed-term contract for less than four 
months in the calendar year, remain registered and retain their ranking on the public 
employment service placement lists. 
Early retirement 
In Italy, early retirement programmes have sought both to make possible a 
shorter duration of working careers and to safeguard the income of workers in troubled 
or restructuring firms and industries. Lacking any universal legislation, these programmes 
have been governed by a series of temporary measures designed for individual sectors. 
Originally conceived as a benefit for older workers in industry who had lost their 
jobs as the result of sectoral or local crises or corporate restructuring and reorganization 
(Law 1115/1968), the early retiiment programme assumed its current configuration in a 
series of sectoral measures enacted during the'80s. The main features were the early 
award of the old age pension to workers meeting certain age and contribution 
requirements who had been dismissed from crisis-ridden or restructuring firms. To this 
end they were credited with imputed contributions up to the minimum age required, 
giving them pensions equal to what they would have had at the regular retiiment age. 
The benefit was often predicated on special short-time compensation, as two alternative 
modes of handling redundancies. 
A new phase in the programme was opened by Law 223/1991, which 
significantly amended the previous mies: 
• it extended early seniority pensions to sectors where the programme had always been 
based on old age pensions;1 
• it mandated the Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning to check early 
retirement eligibility, in an effort to make the programme independent from the short-
time compensation programme.2 
1 There was also provision for rhe old age pension. Conditional upon the existence of a collective 
bargaining agreement, the latter was nevertheless assigned a decidedly secondary role. 
"Early retirement was made available to the employees of firms deemed "of interest to the nation" that 
had drafted "adequate programmes of growth and investment" and had submitted a restructuring or 
reorganization plan to the Committee. 
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The latest measures on early retirement in industry were enacted by Law 
451/1994, authorizing retirement plans (approved by the Ministry of Labour for up to a 
maximum of 8,500 workers) for employees transferred to the mobility rolls in the course 
of restructuring programmes agreed to with trade unions and such as to have a 
substantial impact on employment, owing to the size and geographical distribution of the 
fnm. Eligible workers are those who were dismissed in 1994, who are in the group of 
"hard-to-place" workers, and who would have been eligible for extended mobility 
benefits, i.e. benefits up to retirmeent age. 
Despite certain changes, however, the legislative attitude has not really changed 
in the '90s. Rather than institute a universal approach, the law retains the original sectoral 
approach, with recourse to successive extensions and sUatifications (Fondazione G. 
Brodolini, 1995). Actually, especially in the face of the recent recession, this was a 
conscious choice, designed to "rationalize" the use of the programme. The recent 
tendency to curb use of early retirement must necessarily be viewed in connection with 
the fact that it is unquestionably the most costly form of social shock absorption. 
Finally, let us examine early retirement in the light of the changing exigencies of 
the labour market. Shortening work careers, as it does, the programme would not appear 
to be in line with the emerging tendencies towards a gradual raising of the retirement age 
and the contribution requirements for pension entitlement, as confirmed by Law 
335/1995 reforming the entire pension system. 
Flexible retirement 
Flexible retirement was introduced by Law 863/1984, Article 2, which provides 
for early retirement combined with part-time work (no more than half the normal 
working hours of the firm). This possibility is open to workers in firms that have signed 
"external" solidarity contracts who are no more than 24 months away from the standard 
retirement age and who meet the minimum contribution requirements. 
The early retirement benefit depends on conversion from full-time to part-time 
within a year of the date of the solidarity contract and on a clause providing for a further 
increase in employment in exchange for the additional reduction in hours. Thus this sort 
of phased retirement should result in a redistribution of existing jobs, with the adverse 
economic effects offset by early enjoyment of the pension benefit.3 
Early retirement is available to workers who are no more than 60 months away 
from the standard retirement age and who have at least 15 years of contributions. To 
take advantage of the programme the must agree with the employer, pursuant to a 
collective bargaining agreement, to convert from full-time to part-time but no less than 
18 hours a week. 
Those taking advantage of the phased retirement plan enjoy cumulability of 
earned income with the old age pension, up to the amount corresponding to the hours by 
which the employment contract is shortened. 
'Unlike the straight early retirement programme, whose benefits are solely economic, the flexible 
retirement provisions also provide an employment gain. 
97 
4. Contractual minimums 
The question of earnings and of labour costs in general is highly complex. There 
is no unifoim referent but a multiplicity of notions of earnings, both legal and 
contractual. 
Legally compulsory definitions of earnings, which by this fact are binding on 
collective bargaining agreements as well, are those concerning: 
• severance pay; 
• notice indemnities; 
• the "thirteenth month"; 
• sick pay; 
• vacations. 
There are no legal minimum wages covering all sectors; instead, every contract 
establishes differential contractual minimums according to grade and skill. A further 
complicating element is the fragmentation of earnings into a large number of separate 
items. 
The various components account for varying proportions of the total. Thus the 
structure of individual earnings depends on the imbalance between automatic and non-
automatic items and between direct, indirect and deferred wages. 
The contractual minimum does not actually form part of the pay packet, because 
it is formally distinct from contractual earnings and from de facto earnings. Nevertheless, 
the concept plays an important role in incomes policy. Unlike such counüies as France, 
Spain, and the Netherlands in which the government sets a minimum wage, in Italy 
workers have no economy-wide minimum. They do enjoy a Constitutional guarantee 
(Article 36), but this is not limited to subsistence wages but calls for equitable 
compensation in proportion to the quantity and quality of work. 
However, since the Italian legal system does not provide for the extension of 
collective bargaining agreements to all workers or for any universally applicable 
intersectoral minimums, in legal actions reference to the earnings set by collective 
bargaining is optional, not obligatory. And even when court action is warranted by the 
need to provide for consistent efficacy of the collective contract, jurisprudence finds 
considerable difficulty in defining the criteria of fair compensation. 
Accordingly, the tendency is to narrow the range of elements to be taken into 
account under Article 36. Contractual minimum wages are now considered to comprise: 
• contractual minimums at each grade; 
• the cost-of-living increments incorporated into base pay under the old scala mobile; 
• any non-wage items covered by general agreements; 
• seniority increments; 
• other elements of base pay. 
The minimum earnings so defined were found in 1991 to average 76% of 
employees' actual earnings. The grade minimums accounted for just 30%, while 
automatic elements accounted for the rest: cost-of-living increments for 40% and 
seniority raises for 6% (Carinci, 1991). 
The need to curb these automatic mechanisms and institute greater wage 
flexibility was recognized in the agreement of 31 July 1992, which abolished the scala 
mobile after 46 years of operation, and that of 23 July 1993, which introduced the two-
level collective bargaining system: a 4-year national industry-wide contract, with 
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renegotiation of the wage provisions every two years consistent with the target inflation 
rates, supplemented by company-level agreements based on productivity and profits. 
Wage growth 
In 1995, while consistent with the wage moderation enshrined in the 1992 and 
1993 incomes policy pacts, the cost of labour was affected by the increase in output, via 
an increase in the number of hours of overtime. 
Wage moderation, together with the sharp contraction of the employment base 
during the recession and the considerable rise in overtime during the recovery, resulted in 
a pattern of income distribution that disadvantages the most consumption-inclined 
groups. At the same time, many self-employed workers have been hit by recession, 
especially micro-enterprises in the service sector. 
In 1995, gross per capita earnings increased by an average of 4.3% (1 point more 
than 1994); inter-sectoral variations were very considerable (Table 3.3). Effective 
nominal wages were sustained by company-level bargaining, with raises based on 
profitability, pursuant to the 1993 agreement. Contractual rninimums also accelerated 
from 1994, especially in the market services sector. Their twelve-month increase for the 
entire economy was 3.3% in August, as against 2.6% in January and 2.8% in August 
1994. This step-up was due essentially to contract renewals in 1994, especially in the 
service sector, which went into effect in 1995. 
T a b l e 3.1 - P u b l i c expend it 
as a per cent of GDP 
PROGRAMMES 
CATEGORIES 
1. Public employment services 
and administration 
2. Labour market training 
a) Training for unemployed adults and 
those at nsk 
b) Training for employed adults 
3. Youth measures 
a) Measures for unemployed and 
disadvantaged youth 
b) Support of apprenticeship and related 
forms of general youth training 
4. Su b i tlised employment 
a) Subsidies to regular employment in lhe 
private sector 
b) Support of unemployed persons 
starting enterprises 
c ) Direct job creauon (public or non-
profit) 
5. Measures for the disabled 
a) Vocauonal rehabilitation 
b> Work for the disabled 
6. Unemployment compensation 
7. Early retirement for labour 
market reasons 
TOTAL 
Active measures (1-5) 
Passive measures (6 and 7) 
ure in labour market programs in some EU countries 
1991 
0,13 
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Graph 3.1a ­ Temporary employees in Member States ­ Men, 1987 and 1994* 
* Excludes A S 1993. 
Source: European Commission D­G V, (1995). 
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Table 3.2 - Regulations on individual dismissal 











Penalty for unfair 
dismissal 
FRANCE 
Limited applicability to 
firms with less than 11 
employees, and for 
workers with less than 2 
years of service 
Ineptitude; redundancy 
(but the firm is obliged to 
offer 5 months' retraining) 
One to two months for 
workers with at least 2 
years of service 
Union representatives; 
pregnant workers or 
workers on maternity 




Equal to one-tenth of a 
months' pay for each year 
of service for workers with 
at least 2 years of service 
(except in cases of 
summary dismissal) for 
companies with more than 
10 employees; additional 
pay in lieu of notification 
available 
Rehiring, with payment of 
due wages, or at least 6 
months pay; applies to 
companies with more than 
11 employees 
GERMANY 
Not applicable to firm 
with less than 6 
employees; limited 





(but the firm is obliged to 
take into account "social" 
criteria in choosing 
redundant workers); firm 
is also obliged to offer, if 
possible, alternative 
employment 
4 weeks to 7 months, 
depending on length of 








No legislated severance 
pay, but firm is obliged to 
pay to the workers its 
contribution to his or her 
retirement plan 
Rehiring, with payment 
of due wages or 
compensation equal to 12 
months pay in firms with 
more than 5 employees 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Not applicable for 
workers with less 




1 week per year of 




workers or workers 
on maternity leave 







0.5-1.5 weeks pay for 
each year of service 
for workers with at 
least 2 years of 
service (for redundant 
workers only); 
additional pay in lieu 
of notification 
available 
Rehiring (payment of 
due wages), or 
compensation equal 
to regular redundancy 
payment 
ITALY 
Not applicable for fixed-term 
workers 
Serious ineptitude; economic 
motives (no specific mention 
of redundancy) 
2 weeks to 4 months 
Union representatives; 
pregnant workers, nursing 
mothers; workers on military 
service 
Employer 
Interruption of relation of 
"trust"(e.g. criminal act) 
Equal to 12 months pay 
divided by 13.5 for each year 
of service, payable in all 
cases of individual dismissal 
Firms with more than 15 
employees: rehiring and 
compensation equal to at 
least 5 months pay; firms 
with up to 15 employees; 
rehiring or compensation 
equal to 2.5-14 months pay 
(depending on length of 
service) 
* In all countries, the notification requirement may be modified by collective aggreements. 
Source: Demekas D.G. (1995). 
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Table 3.3 - Cost of labour, contractual wages and actual wages per capita 
(average annual changes) 
1985-1992 1992-95 1995 
Agriculture 
A) Cost of labour 
B) Actual wages 











A) Cost of labour 
B) Actual wages 











A) Cost of labour 
B) Actual wages 











A) Cost of labour 
B) Actual wages 










A) Labour income per standard labour unit. 
B) Gross earnings per standard labour unit. 
C) Contractual wages per employee (production and clerical workers). 




Labour market Institutions and Flexibility in Italy, in "Labour", no. 1. 
CasavolaP. (1993), 
La regolamentazione del mercato del lavoro, in Rossi S., (ed.) Competere in Europa, 
Bologna, Il Mulino. 
CNEL (1995), 
Tempo di lavoro e flessibilità dell'orario. Volume II, in Documenti CNEL, Rome. 
Confindustria (1993), 
"Previsioni dell'economia italana ", no. 2. 
Emerson M.(1988a), 
"Regulation or Deregulation of the Labour Market", European Economie Review, no. 
3 2 / 
Emerson M.(1988b), 
What Model for Europe?, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. 
European Commission (1995), 
Employment in Europe, Luxembourg. 
European Commission (1996), 
The 1995 Multiannual Programmes for Employment of the EU Member States. 
European Commission (1995), 
Employment Obsen>atoty. Basic Information Report. Italy, Luxembourg. 
Fondazione G. Brodolini (1995), 
Ammortizzatori sociali, shocks ciclici ed efficienza della spesa, FGB Ricerche no. 
110/96, Rome. 
Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, 
Labour and Employment Policies in Italy, Poligrafico dello Stato, Rome, years 1987-
1994. 
Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale (1994), 
Obiettivo occupazione: una strategia di medio periodo per il mercato del lavoro 
italiano, Rome. 
OECD (1996), 
Employment Outlook, Paris. 
Renga S. (1996), 
Mercato del lavoro e diritto. Franco Angeli, Milan. 
104 
Treu T., Geroldi G. and Maiello M. (1993), 
Italy: Labour Relations, in Hartog, J. and Theeuwes (eds.). Labour Market Contracts 
and Institutions, Amsterdam, Elsevier Publishers. 
105 

IV. LABOUR POLICIES 
This chapter examines the effects of Italy's labour market programmes, in both 
qualitative and quantitative terms. On the one hand we look at income support 
instruments, or passive labour policy measures, and on the other we assess active policy 
programmes intended to foster an enlargement of the employment base; this provides an 
overall picture of the strategies adopted in Italy to deal with unemployment, in terms 
both of budget allocations and number of persons affected. 
The drastic repercussions on the labour market of the economic crisis and 
recession of the early 1990s prompted legislators both to adjust existing income-support 
programmes (short-time earnings compensation and unemployment benefits) and to 
broaden the range of income supports available to workers excluded from the productive 
process or formally unemployed. The most significant of these recent programmes are 
the mobility allowance, early retirement, and solidarity contracts. 
All these programmes, however, operate to safeguard those who are employed; 
the officially jobless are much less well protected. 
In the sphere of labour supply recent years have produced little in the way of 
innovation. Legislation has sought to contain rapidly rising youth unemployment more by 
adjusting existing laws (trainee contracts) than by introducing totally new programmes. 
Aside from work integration plans (basically trainee contracts, in any case), the main 
programmes are for internal flexibility (via temporary work and job sharing), and the bill 
incorporating these measures has yet to be approved by Parliament. In what follows we 
look first at income support programmes and then at the set of active labour policy 
programmes. 
1. Passive labour policies 
Income support programmes 
Commonly known as "social shock absorbers," passive labour policies aim 
exclusively or predominantly to provide income support to individual workers who have 
lost or are losing their jobs. 
Italy's procedures for managing redundancies are highly diversified in form and 
character. The consequent accentuation of labour market balkanization results in 
extremely disparate levels of protection for workers in basically the same situation. 
The government is now working on a plan to reorder programmes in this area, 
precisely in order to eliminate these great disparities of treatment. The need for a 
universal system of income protection is increasingly pressing because, for one thing, the 
budget costs of some programmes (such as early retirement) are excessive, while the 
benefits of others (unemployment benefits) are utterly inadequate. 
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The main income support programmes are the following: 
a) regulai" and special short-time earnings compensation; 
b) mobility allowance; 
c) solidarity contracts; 
d) regular unemployment benefits; 
e) early retirement. 
Let us now treat these social shock absorbers in detail. 
a) Short-time earnings compensation 
Short-time earnings compensation (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, CIG) is 
certainly the programme most commonly used by firms to cope with difficulties in an 
industry, an area or a market. Law 223/1991 was designed to return this means of 
handling redundancies to its natural and intended use as a temporary instrument, with a 
strict demaracation of time limits and characteristics in order to curb the indiscriminate 
resort to the programme in any and all moments of difficulty. 
The recession of the last four years has convinced legislators to relax these 
constraints, to enable firms to survive and workers to remain in the labour market in less 
uneasy fashion. The rules governing short-time compensation and the adjustments to 
enlarge the range of firms eligible for coverage have been described in the previous 
chapter. Continuous regulatory adjustments sought to respond to the need for flexibility, 
which had arisen with particular urgency in the Italian labour market, as the result of the 
persistence of a crisis from which the economy now appears to be emerging. 
The data highlight the rapid growth in the number of regular CIG hours 
compensated in 1991, 1992 and 1993; the trend was reversed in the first quarter of 1994, 
with a significant differentiation between regular and special compensation, and by 
December ofthat year regular benefit hours had declined by 50%, while special benefits 
had slipped by just 1%. This pattern continued in 1995 and 1996 (Table 4.1). However, 
regular short-time compensation, which had fallen first and most sharply, turned upwards 
with growth of 12.7% in the first quarter of 1996 (Table 4.2). 





as for regular benefit hours, production workers and clerical workers followed 
different trends, the former showing an increase of 15.4% for the year and the latter a 
decrease of 10.6%; 
as for special benefits the divergence is much less marked, with the overall decrease of 
42.8% reflecting drops of 45.3% for production workers and 34% for clerical 
workers; 
within the construction industry scheme, there was an increase of 6.4% for clerical 
workers in the building crafts division, while those in the stonecutters division 
continued to show an increase in benefit hours (Table 4.2). 
The progressive decrease in resort to special compensation, which is due not just 
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to the end of the recession but also to the gradual exhaustion of the eligibility period, 
entails a corresponding increase in the mobility rolls. This is because the shift from the 
status of employed (those on short-time compensation are officially employed) to that of 
unemployed requires an interim period on the mobility rolls. The latter will thus continue 
to expand, at least in the near future. 
b) Mobility 
Introduced by Law 223/1991, the mobility allowance now constitutes, together 
with short-time compensation, one of Italy's most widely used social shock absorbers. 
This programme is designed for workers who are definitively removed from production. 
It provides two advantages: first, registration in special mobility rolls, which gives them 
preferential treatment in hiring; and second, economically, the special mobility benefit. 
Eligibility depends on previous short-time compensation, while the amount and duration 
of the benefit depend essentially on age and the location of the firm (in the South, the 
duration is doubled). Duration is 12 months for workers younger than 40, 24 months for 
those aged 40 to 50, and 36 months for those over 50. 
So-called "long" mobility has taken on special importance in recent years. For 
workers put onto the mobility rolls by 31 December 1992 (a deadline that has been 
extended, however, to the end of 1994 and, in some cases, to 1995 for firms with more 
than 500 employees), the mobility benefit is extended until retirement age, provided that 
the worker is within 5 years of the retirement age and has enough contribution years (15) 
to qualify. 
The mobility rolls are still growing. On 31 December 1995 those enrolled 
numbered 316,242, an increase of 7.4% in a year (Table 4.3). It is worth noting, 
nonetheless, that this represent a veiy pronounced slowdown in the pace of growth, from 
39.9% in the previous 12 months. 
Geographically, the situation remains particularly critical in the South, where the 
rolls expanded by 23.6% in 1995, only somewhat slower than the 31.8% growth 
recorded in 1994. The state of manufacturing industry shows pronounced improvement 
in the Centre-North, where the rise of 44.8% in the number of workers on the mobility 
rolls in 1994 gave way to a decline of 1.5% in 1995. The sharpest declines came in 
regions characterized by large numbers of smaller companies, such as Veneto, Marche, 
Umbria, and Abruzzo. 
Hirings from the rolls came to 59,424 in 1995; over 54,000 of these were in the 
Centre and North, only 5,000 in the South (Table 4.4). The number of hirings continues 
to grow, albeit at a slower rate: a 27.8% increase in 1994 was followed by a 19.5% 
increase in 1995. 
While on the one hand this manifests the signs of economic recovery, on the 
other it suggests that the set of incentives to hire workers from the mobility rolls is 
insufficient to get firms to hire redundant workers. The incentives under Law 223/1991 
are similar in kind but differ in duration, depending on whether the new employment 
contract is fixed-term or open-ended. This is a factor of considerable interest. The data 
show that 48% of workers hired from the mobility rolls have been signed to open-ended 
contracts and the same percentage to fixed-term contracts. The remainder, just 1,856 
persons, have taken part-time positions (Table 4.5). The structure of incentives may be 
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influential here, in that when a contract is converted from fixed-term to open-ended, the 
employer enjoys the social security tax relief for the entire term fixed plus 12 additional 
months. 
c) Solidarity contracts 
Created by Law 863/1984, this job-sharing programme is designed to counter 
redundancies. The mechanism provides for a company agreement to reduce working 
hours (on a daily, weekly, monthly or annual basis) with a wage supplement to workers 
for the hours lost. Two types of solidarity contract are provided for: defensive, in which 
instead of redundancies there is a cut in hours for the entire work force; and offensive, in 
which new jobs are created by agreement to shorter hours. 
For each solidarity contract, the programme provides a supplement equal to 50% 
of the wages lost due to shorter hours (60% in the South). For employers, the benefits 
consist in social security relief of 25% (30% in areas of crisis) if the shortening of hours 
is greater than 20%; 35% (40% in crisis areas) if the shortening exceeds 30%. 
Despite the incentives, solidarity contracts did not achieve widespread use until 
they were made even more advantageous for employers by Law 236/1993 and Law 
451/1994. However, expansion of the programme is limited to the resources available 
from the Fund for Employment. Whereas 230 billion lire was appropriated to the 
programme in 1995, in 1996 only 36 billion was made available. 
Information on the number of workers involved is scanty. In the first six months 
of 1995 more than 700 films used solidarity contracts, involving 59,000 workers, 
compared with 780 firms and 50,000 workers in 1994. 
d) Regular unemployment benefits 
Eligibility for these benefits is open to the involuntarily unemployed whose 
employment relationships have been terminated or suspended (individual dismissal not 
for just cause or collective dismissals not subject to the mobility programme). The oldest 
Italian income support programme for the jobless, it was introduced in 1960, but it was 
set at a fixed-amount benefit of 800 lire a day, unindexed, eventually rendering it 
insignificant. 
In 1988 the benefit, like short-time compensation, was redefined as a percentage 
of the previous wage, the figure being put at 7.5%. In the '90s provision was made for its 
progressive increase in order to serve as the sole income support for the unemployed. 
Law 451/1994 raised the benefit first to 27% and then to 30%, until December 1994. 
Subsequent measures were to bring it to 40%, pursuant to the agreement of 23 July 
1993. However, Decree Law 31 of 8 February 1995 (reitereated several times, now 
designated Decree Law 300/1996) lays down that the percentage remains fixed at 30%. 
Regulai" benefits run for 180 days. Eligibility requirements are a total of 2 years of 
covered employment and 78 days worked during the previous 12 months. 
Apart from regular benefits, a programme of special unemployment benefits was 
introduced in the '60s for jobless industrial workers. This has now been supplanted by the 
mobility allowance of 80% of the last monthly wage for a total of 18 months. 
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Construction workers are currently eligible for the special unemployment benefits. 
e) Early retirement 
These programmes provide the possibility for workers to take their pensions an 
average of 5 years early, but sometimes as much as 7 or 10 years. Early retirement is 
governed by a series of different laws, reflecting separate cases and bargaining 
agreements. In particular the size of the benefit varies, and in some instances the cost is 
entirely defrayed by the government, in others shared equally by government and 
employers. Law 223/1991 sought to phase out the early retirement programme, but the 
onset of recession induced legislators to retain this income support instrument, although 
its use has been made conditional on specific provisions. 
Law 451/1994 provided for early retirement plans involving about 25,000 
workers. 
Early retirement was used massively in the '80s and it continues to be made heavy 
use of, despite perplexity over the high cost, which runs in the teeth of the objective of 
lowering pension costs pursued by the pension reform of 1995. Overall, on 31 December 
1995 the number of workers drawing early retirement benefits was 391,000. In 1994 and 
1995 alone more than 23,000 acceded to early retirement programmes; 87% were in 
industry and the remainder divided between dockers (7.5%), printing and publishing 
workers (5%), and steel (0.5%) (Table 4.6). 
Income maintenance programmes: cost analysis 
Let us now examine the cost, for the public finances, of the individual income 
support programmes for workers no longer active in production. 
In 1995, the INPS budget put total income support spending at 10.5 trillion lire, 
broken down as follows: short-time compensation, 1.8 trillion; mobility and 
unemployment benefits, 5.8 trillion; early retirement, 2.9 trillion (Table 4.7). 
The trend in outlays turned perceptibly downwards in 1994. Following steady 
growth in the first four years of the '90s in all benefit programmes (the mobility 
programme needs separate treatment) to peak in 1993, at the worst of the industrial 
recession, the situation improved notably in 1994 and 1995. 
Less massive use of the individual benefit programmes has curbed budget outlays. 
Spending overall dropped from 12.24 trillion lire in 1993 to 10.56 trillion in 1995. In the 
cost analysis that follows, we shall refer to these two dates, i.e. the years preceding and 
following the reversal of trend that occurred in 1994. 
Programme-by-programme, we can see how resort to the various benefits varies 
with market conditions. For the most distinctly cyclical programmes, adjustment is rapid 
and the budgetary impact is more variable. For others outlays are quite constant over 
time. The incidence on total spending further depends on the extent of firms' resort to a 
given programme and the number of workers involved totally (early retirement) or 
partially (short-time compensation, mobility, unemployment benefits), the benefit being 
provide for a given number of hours, days or months. 
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Short-time compensation, and especially regular compensation, is the easiest and 
quickest programme for dealing with market crises, and as such it is most powerfully 
affected by economic trends. The total number of hours compensated was virtually 
halved, from 444,951 to 224,850, between 1993 and 1995, with a savings of over 3 
trillion lire (outlays dropping from 4.8 trillion in 1993 to 1.8 trillion in 1995). Regular 
compensation showed the sharpest drop in hours (from 154,509 to 31,265) and in 
expenditure (from 1.355 trillion to 295 billion lire). 
The incidence of short-time compensation on total income maintenance spending 
accordingly dropped from 39.5% in 1993 to 17% in 1995. 
While spending on short-time compensation has always been substantial, it must 
be noted that during the '90s firms' contributions to the programme have been steadily 
raised, so that the actual cost to the budget are less than for other programmes. Indeed, 
in 1995 company contributions under this head came to 4.6 trillion lire and those of the 
government to just 1.9 trillion. For the programme as a whole, revenues exceeded benefit 
outlays by 3.4 trillion (Table 4.8). 
The mobility programme, by contrast, shows a substantial deficit of 1.9 trillion 
lire; revenues of 863 billion from companies and 705 billion from government are far 
from covering the outlays of 3.5 trillion lire in 1995 (Table 4.9). Expenditure has risen 
sharply in recent years. This in fact is the only programme whose spending did not turn 
down in 1994. This is due to the fact that the mobility rolls are the last in a series of 
redundancy programmes and as such are resorted to by firms when all other benefit 
programmes are exhausted. 
Also in deficit are the unemployment benefit and early retirement programmes 
(Table 4.10). The former had revenues of 4.1 trillion and outlays of 6.7 trillion. The latter 
is the most costly of all the programmes, accounting for 27.6% of total income 
maintenance spending in 1995. And against company contributions of 340 billion in 
1995, the programme had government contributions totalling nearly 3.0 trillion; that is, 
the government covers 89.7% of the cost of the early retirement programme (Table 
4.11). 
2. Active labour policies 
Recent legislation covering active labour policy has redefined income support 
provisions and, at the same time, continued to increase labour market flexibility by re-
regulating and extending the range of programmes designed specifically for bringing 
young people into the job market. 
The goal of expanding the employment base has been pursued not only via flexibility 
but also through incentives to businesses, to foster initiatives at the local level. The 
flexibility measures considered here comprise trainee contracts and work access plans, 
the latter designed to combat unemployment in areas of greatest social distress. In the 
area of employment policies we shall assess the impact of Law 44/1986 on youth 
entrepreneurship and all the other forms of incentives to businesses. 
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Vocational training 
Of all active labour policies, training programmes are considered the most effective 
tool for improving the functioning of the labour market. Certainly, the role of training 
changes with the frame of reference. In a cyclical downturn, the function of Gaining in 
the short term differs from the long term. The short-term role of buffer in an employment 
emergency is flanked by a strategic medium- to long-term role in requalifying the labour 
force and solving structural problems. 
In speaking of training, then, there are various aspects. We range from basic 
instruction to higher education, from ttaining programmes designed for disadvantaged 
categories to training as the instrument of transition from school to work, to ttaining as a 
social shock absorber. 
Each "type" of training poses problems of its own, with different objectives, 
beneficiaries, constraints and expectations on the part of workers and employers. 
Here, we deal specifically with vocational training as a strategy for matching 
labour demand with supply. First, let us note that the training system is still marked by 
quite a strict dichotomy between education and vocational training and that there are 
notable discrepancies within the school-training-work circuit. The fact that education and 
vocational training are on separate tracks has aggravated the employment situation by 
putting the school system at an even greater remove from the world of work. This 
creates serious problems both for job seekers and for employers. 
Many observers point to vocational training as a way of enlarging the 
employment base and improving the working of the labour market in the short-to-
medium term. The problem of investment in human resources and training quality is also 
at the centre of Italy's Multiannual Program for Employment (see III. 1). Given that the 
quality of human resources is the foundation of economic development as well as 
scientific and cultural advance, investment in human capital is simply obligatory for any 
nation's growth. 
In a highly fragmented market like Italy's, in any case, training must be directed 
to two distinct groups: 
• young people, with the development of training strategies designed for work access but 
also capable of ending the reciprocal isolation of the various segments of the training 
system and establishing ongoing relations between schooling, training and work; 
• adult workers, for whom we need training plans to maintain the human capital of the 
work force, to prevent exclusion of labour owing to obsolete skills. 
Legislation has moved recently on both planes. For young people, provision has 
been made for training and guidance stages within companies; for unemployed workers 
on short-timne compensation or mobility rolls, there are courses to upgrade human 
capital in line with the emerging needs of the economy. 
The purpose of training and guidance stages is to facilitate occupational choice 
by furthering young people's knowledge of the productive system. The formula, which 
calls for "practical training and experience" is designed to provide initial access to the 
world of work for young people who have completed their schooling. The programmes 
can be planned by universities, school districts, public schools, training and guidance 
centres, employment agencies and the local offices of the Ministry of Labour, and so on. 
113 
They are carried out through conventions between the planners and the firms that host 
the young people for a specified period of time. 
In-company training, in fact, which must not be limited to the school-leaving 
years but should be continuing through one's career, appears to be the most preferred for 
companies. 
An EU-sponsored survey of Italian firms with at least 10 employees in all 
economic sectors (except fanning and government) found that the financing and 
promotion of staff training directly by firms, with ongoing adaption of workers' skills to 
changes in productive processes, is viewed as important and likely to have an expanded 
role in the near future. In fact, the pronounced changes in production systems in the past 
decade have been accompanied by considerable improvement in skills both in terms of 
educational background and in terms of vocational training qualifications. 
The survey found that training activities effected by firms themselves (both in-
company and external) made a major contribution to this enhancement of human capital. 
In 1993, it was found, 15% of the respondent firms were providing continuing training 
for their staff. Considering training in the broad sense (continuing and initial both), the 
percentage rises to 25%, as 10.4% of the firms surveyed were engaged in the training 
activities called for by trainee or apprenticeship contracts. 
The most common form of ttaining is the programmed course (Table 4.12). On-
the-job training, with the presence of an expert-trainer, was found in 36.4% of the firms. 
In the more highly computerized companies, a new form of self-training is taking hold: 
computer-assisted on-the-job training. 
Training for newly recruited workers lasts longer than for other employees: on 
average, 121 hours as against 56 for retraining, 36 for updating, and 32 for managers' 
training. 
The training propensity of firms also varies with size and sector. The percentage 
of firms engaging in training activities rises with firm size, from 8.6% among companies 
with 10-19 employees to 89.1% among those with at least 1,000 employees. Large finns 
also sustain the largest part of expenditure on training courses, 70 of the total of 2.346 
trillion lire (Istat, La situazione del Paese nel 1995). 
Turning to formal courses in training centres given by the regions or recognized 
agencies (15,000, with 323,000 students), we see how marginal training courses are, 
especially in the South, Despite its very high levels of joblessness and unemployment, the 
South accounted for just 17.8% of all students attending such courses (Tables 4.13 and 
4.14). 
To strengthen the training system and adapt it to the needs of companies, Law 
236/1993 instituted a Fund for Vocational Training and for access to the European 
Social Fund. The fund is financed by a contribution surcharge of 0.3% on the companies 
subject to unemployment insurance contributions. Most regional vocational training 
activities are co-financed with national and Community resources (Tables 4.15, 4.16). 
Looking at the institutions that run such courses, 30% are directly publicly operated and 
64% are run under conventions with government. The plan for access to ESF 
programmes for 1994-99 calls for total spending of ECU 9.35 billion, 5.25 billion 
provided by the ESF and 4.09 billion in Italian cofinancing. A good share of the spending 
will be in the Objective 1 regions (ECU 3.96 billion, of which 2.74 billion from the ESF 
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and 1.22 billion from the national budget). 
Trainee contracts 
This programme of work access for young people was enacted as part of Law 
863/1984. Over the years it has been revised, both in terms of the tax incentives to finns 
and in terms of training requirements. 
Among the correctives, Law 451/1994 raised the age range (now 16 to 32), and 
introduced two types of trainee contract: 
1) the trainee contract aiming at the acquisition of an intermediate skill level or else a 
high skill level (maximum duration, 12 months); 
2) a contract aiming at facilitating job market access through a job experience, in which 
the U"ainee can adapt his or her vocational capabilities to the production and 
organizational environment (maximum duration, 12 months). 
Law 451 (Article 16, para. 3) permits firms to hire trainees at a lower job 
classification than that to which they are actually assigned. Paragraph 5 specifies the 
minimum amount of time that must be devoted to training activities, for each type of 
contract: 80 hours for contracts aiming at acquisition of intermediate skills, 130 hours for 
high skills, and 20 hours for job market access contracts. Paragraph 6, finally, deals with 
social contributions, providing that contracts to acquire intermediate or high skills will 
continue to enjoy the 25% contribution relief already envisaged (in the South and for 
artisanal firms, the contribution requirement for trainees is the same as for apprentices). 
For work access ttainee contracts, the contribution relief is accorded for the trainee 
period only if, on expiry, the contract is converted into a regular, open-ended position. 
There has been a good deal of discussion of the labour market impact of the 
trainee contracts, i.e. whether they really create additional jobs or whether their effect is 
primarily one of displacement. In any event, since the legislation went into effect in May 
1984, a total of 3.5 million young people have found jobs or at least gained some work 
experience under the trainee programme. 
The recession has naturally had repercussions on this work access programme. 
Looking at recourse to trainee hiring over the decade (Table 4.17), we see that after a 
halting start-up period, due largely to firms' problems in complying with the new rules, 
the trainee contract was very commonly used by firms as the primary way of recruiting 
young workers. 
In 1991, with the countiy in recession, there was a first sharp decline in trainee 
hirings; the decline continued for two years, bottoming out at 183,000 in 1993. There 
was a moderate upturn in 1994, with 221,000 trainees taken on during the year. 
The trend continued upward in 1995, with 248,000 hirings. Disaggregation by 
age reveals a changing attitude on the part of firms. Whereas until recently the bulk of 
trainee hirings were in the 19-24 age-group, in 1995 there was a 19% increase for 25-29-
year-olds and a decrease in hirings of trainees aged 15-18. 
By economic sector, the only solidly positive performance was in industry, with a 
20.5% increase in trainee hirings; in the services, recruitment by this route increased by a 
modest 5.5%. 
115 
Work access plans 
In parts of the country where unemployment rates are above the national average, 
the law provides for special work access plans to bring young people aged 19-32 into the 
work force. The age limit is extended to 35 for the long-term unemployed, i.e. those 
registered in the employment service rolls for more than two years. 
The plans can be embodied in two different types of project: 
• those providing for socially useful jobs and participation in training activities involving 
remedial education and first- and second-level vocational training; 
• those providing both training periods and work experience for professionally qualified 
persons. 
The first results of the application of this instrument will be available in 1997. 
Marginal subsidies for employment 
The measures to facilitate job access include incentives to firms that increase 
employment, known as "marginal subsidies for employment". Employment or job 
creation subsidies have seen quite heavy use since the late '80s. Nearly all these 
programmes act by reducing the cost of labour. Virtually all such incentives are accorded 
in the form of social security contribution relief to firms. 
Although such employment programmes are numerous, we have little information 
on their real effects, i.e. if and to what extent the subsidies have affected employment 
decisions of firms as intended by the legislation. That is, we do not know if these 
measures have actually created additional jobs or whether, instead, they may not have 
further aggravated disparities of treatment for some groups of unemployed workers as 
against other, less well protected jobless groups, with a pure displacement effect. 
The employment subsidies dealt with are those designed for certain 
"disadvantaged" groups of long-term unemployed or for the reintegration of workers on 
special short-time compensation or mobility. The return of these workers to active 
production has been sought through a set of tax reliefs and hiring incentives. 
a) Firms hiring workers from the mobility rolls receive the same contribution relief as for 
apprentices. The relief lasts for 12 months for an open-ended contract; for a fixed-
term contract it coincides with the contract itself. However, if the fixed-term contract 
is converted into an open-ended one, the firm is eligible for another 12 months of 
relief. If the contract is open-ended, the employer is entitled to 50% of the worker's 
residual mobility allowance. 
b) There are also incentives for the hiring of workers on unemployment or special short-
time compensation. If a firm hires workers in these situations for at least 24 months to 
open-ended contracts, it enjoys 50% social contribution relief for 36 months (100% 
relief in the South). 
c) If the worker hired has been on special short-time compensation for at least three 
months, not necessarily consecutive, in firms that have been on the programme for at 
least six months, the firm is entitled to the same contribution relief provided for 
apprentices, for a period of 12 months. The employer also receives 50% of the 
worker's mobility allowance. 
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d) Finally, if a firm hires a worker who has been on special unemployment benefits for at 
least 12 months, it is eligible for a 75% cut in social contributions for 12, 24, or 36 
months depending on the length of the worker's previous unemployment (less than 24 
months, 24 to 36 months, or over 36 months, respectively). The employer may opt for 
a smaller reduction (37.5%) for twice the standard period. 
Programmes for high-unemployment groups: socially useful projects 
Introduced to provide work for workers on special short-time compensation and 
on the mobility rolls, socially useful projects have recently enjoyed considerable success 
in achieving job market reintegration or access. These projects are characterized by their 
social purposes and by the fixed time frame in which they must be completed. 
For young people, vocational access plans call for socially useful projects as a 
means of labour market enüy. Inclusion of the long-term unemployed or other jobless 
persons does not count as official employment (for purposes of the state employment 
service rolls). Work cannot exceed 80 hours a month for a maximum of 12 months. 
The mounting number of workers on special short-time compensation and 
mobility and the inability of the public finances to defray the cost of adequate income 
supports induced government, employers and trade unions to relaunch the socially useful 
projects with an understanding (18 November 1994) making short-time and mobility 
benefits conditional upon participation in the projects. 
With this in mind, the nales governing the projects laid down in Law 451/1994 
have been reformulated and revised. To make start-up of the projects easier and more 
rapid, Decree Law 232/1995, several times reiterated and now in effect as Decree Law 
300/1996, enacting "urgent measures on socially useful projects, income support and 
social security measures", modifies the provisions both as to project sponsors and project 
approval procedures. 
Eligible project sponsors are: 
a) local authorities; 
b) government departments, except those with excess personnel; 
c) publicly controlled corporations; 
d) other institutions to be decreed by the Minister of Labour; 
e) social cooperatives as per Law 381/1991. 
Workers on short-time compensation or mobility allowance can be employed on 
the projects for no longer than their benefit period. However, the projects can continue 
to employ workers whose short-time or mobility benefits have ceased, provided that the 
project managing agency notifies the regional committee for employment and the 
regional office of the social security administration. Until completion of the project, and 
in any case for no more than 12 months from the termination of benefits, these workers 
are entitled to income support equal to 64% of their short-time compensation. 
As of February 1996, a total of 4,850 projects involving 79,820 workers had 
been presented (Table 4.18). The projects thus employ an average of 16 workers. The 
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largest projects are those in Apulia, averaging 36 workers, in Campania (22) and in 
Lazio (20); the smallest are in Emilia (3), in Liguria (6) and in Basilicata (7). 
Not all the workers provided for in the projects have actually been taken on, 
however; in fact, only 66.7% have actually worked on the socially useful projects. 
The largest numbers of projects have been submitted where joblessness and 
unemployment are most severe, with alarming social malaise: Campania (1,255 projects), 
Calabria (454), Sardinia (378) and Apulia (372). Overall, 69.7% of the projects are 
located in the South, 12.3% in the North and 18% in the Centre. Projects in the South, 
on paper, were to account for 78.2% of the workers involved; in practice, the figure 
came to 83.2%; the North accounted for just 6.6% and the Centre for 10.2%. 
The workers hired for these projects have been divided into two distinct 
caategories, in implementation of the priorities laid down by law and in effect through 
December 1995. Category A consists of workers whose short-time or mobility benefits 
were scheduled to lapse by the end of 1994; Category B, those whose benefits would 
lapse by the end of 1995. The result has been that no less than 79.2% of the workers 
taken on were in Category A (Table 4.19). 
In 1996, these categories no longer apply; the law leaves it to the regional 
commissions for employment to set parameters and priorities in keeping with the state of 
the local labour markets. 
Employment programmes: Law 44/1986 
Italian legislation aimed at expanding employment through new enterprise 
formation carries the names of De Vito (Law 44/1986) and Tremonti (Law 489/1994). 
Law 44 seeks to promote youth entrepreneurship in the South with the formation of 
businesses, including cooperatives, constituted by young people aged 18-29 and located 
and operating in the South. This legislation is a sort of hybrid between industrial policy 
and employment policy. 
The success of the measure in improving both labour markets and the local 
productive fabric persuaded Parliament both to extend its geographical ambit and to 
provide incentives for its application. This is the nature of recent legislation effecting 
significant legal and administrative reforms and substantially increasing the funds 
appropriated for its financing. 
Law 95 of 29 March 1995, enacting "urgent measures for the recovery in 
entrepreneurial activities", reforms the rules on the promotion of youth entrepreneurship 
(Article 1). The main point is the broadening of the area in which the law may be applied. 
Originally limited to the areas covered by the old Southern Italy Development Fund, it 
now extends to all depressed areas, i.e. the districts qualifying for Objective 1 
(promotion of development and structural adjustment of underdeveloped regions), 
Objective 2 (reconversion of industrially declining areas), and Objective 5B 
(development of disadvantaged rural districts). 
To make the implementing agency more flexible, the law transforms the 
Committee for the Development of New Youth Entrepreneurship" into a public limited 
company, the "Company for Youth Entrepreneurship", whose shares may be purchased 
by public bodies and other economic organizations. The mandate of the company is to 
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provide services to organizations and agencies, including local agencies, to firms and 
other economic bodies, for the purpose of creating new enterprises, supporting small and 
medium-sized enterprises formed chiefly by young people aged 18-29 or exclusively by 
those aged 18-35. 
Total appropriations for the programme (Article 1, para. 4) are set at 100 billion 
lire in 1994 and 1995 and 300 billion inÌ996. 
The effectiveness of Law 44 is demonstrated by the number of enterprises 
formed. Note that recent studies have found that more than half the enterprises so 
formed have survived longer than three years, which is generally viewed as the necessary 
running-in time to solve start-up problems and move definitively into the productive 
economy. As of 1 July 1996, 4,697 projects had been submitted and 1,083 approved. Of 
the latter, 872 actually received subsidies, at a cost of 3.1 trillion lire, or per worker 
investment of 148.5 million (Table 4.20). 
Detailed examination of the projects approved shows the employment of 28,347 
persons, including both shareholders and employees. Of the shareholders, 31.5% have 
been women. By region, the leader is Campania with 267 projects funded, followed by 
Abruzzo (155), Apulia (143) and Calabria (136). In terms of employment, the leader is 
again Campania, with 6,585 jobs, followed by Abruzzo (4,873), Apulia (3,818) and 
Calabria (3,421) (Table 4.21). By sector, manufacturing is predominant with 2,355 
projects, or 51% of the total; agriculture accounts for 28.2% and the services for 20.6% 
(Table 4.21). 
Other hiring incentives: the Tremonti Law 
Measures to expand the employment base were also taken by the government on 
8 June 1994, in the effort to foster and speed up the economic recovery and ensure that 
recovery did not take place without job creation. Parliament enacted incentives for job 
creation in the form of both self-employment and payroll employment. 
Law 489/1994, the Tremonti Law, ratifying with amendments Decree Law 
357/1994, enacts a new system of tax treatment for new enterprises started up by people 
younger than 32, by unemployed persons and the handicapped. Whereas the original 
decree specified the eligible persons but not possible sectors of activity, the final version 
of the law restricts the alternative tax treatment to specified areas of the economy. The 
alternative tax treatment is reserved to those who start up new productive activities in 
the following fields: 
a) energy efficiency and the promotion of renewable energy sources; 
b) natural, biological and biodynamic agriculture; 
c) differentia] collection of trash and garbage; 
d) water and flood control, environmental clean-up, and planning for the upgrading, 
maintenance or restoration of historic city centres; 
e) products that have been assigned the ecological quality seal pursuant to EEC 
regulation 880/1992. 
Those starting up these new enterprises can avail themselves, one time only, of 
the alternative fiscal treatment, which combines all tax liabilities relating to the enterprise 
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in a single, lump-sum tax. This amounts to 2 million lire for the first year of activity, 3 
million for the second year and 4 million for the third. It replaces the government fee for 
holding a VAT account, the municipal tax on the operation of enterprises, the municipal 
tax on real estate, the tax for the occupation of public land, the personal income tax and 
the local income tax for commercial activities, and the tax on the net worth of 
enterprises. 
However, the law sets an expenditure ceiling of 300 million lire for eligibility for 
the alternative tax. The ceiling is raised to 500 million for enterprises falling under points 
a), b), c) and e) or if the business's annual turnover exceeds 1 billion lire. More than a tax 
cut, the measure reduces operating expenses. By eliminating a whole series of taxes, it 
cuts administrative and accounting costs, which are always burdensome for a new firm. 
Article 1-bis of the law provides an incentive to workers on short-time 
compensation to start up a self-employed activity. Workers receiving this benefit who 
start up productive activities pursuant to Article 1 may, upon request, receive in advance 
and all at once, their entire short-time compensation entitlement, subject to the limits and 
criteria set by the Minister of Labour. 
As for payroll employment, the law provides a "hiring bonus" in the form of a tax 
credit equal to 25% of the labour income subject to withholding tax. The credit is 
awarded to employers who increase their permanent staff by hiring young people, the 
unemployed or the handicapped. The law specifies that the employment base also counts 
workers on short-time compensation or on the mobility rolls, apprentices and trainees. 
3. Evaluation of labour policy measures 
One of the great weaknesses of Italian labour policy is the lack of attention to 
evaluation of the effectiveness and the efficiency of programmes. This means proceeding 
practically by trial and error, trouble-shooting, tackling problems as they emerge in the 
labour market (emergency legislation), rather than using tested policy measures and 
properly designed programmes. 
The objective of active labour policies, as we know, is to improve the functioning 
of the labour market by facilitating and speeding up the matching of supply and demand. 
These actions, like income support programmes, are costly both in budgetary terms and 
in human resources, where dispersion effects are combined with substitution and 
displacement. 
Accordingly, in the advanced countries active labour policy measures are almost 
always supplemented by the appropriation of resources for evaluation of the effects. 
Evaluating a measure means examining its contribution to modifying the pre-existing 
situation in relation to its objective. The measure can be deemed efficient if the 
instrument used is the least costly for achieving the desired result. 
Evaluation of effectiveness and efficiency means looking at the relation of 
objectives to costs and results. Thus the evaluation of labour policy measures involves 
essentially three aspects: the consistency of objectives with instruments, the impact of the 
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programme, and the way in which the programme is implemented. 
In Italy, only very rarely has the need to accompany labour policies with active 
evaluation been recognized. The main instances are Law 44/1986 and the Agency for 
Employment in Trento. In recent years, however, somewhat greater attention has been 
accorded to these issues. The new organizational structure for labour market actions 
provided for in Law 56/1987 and 223/1991 comprises monitoring and evaluation of 
policy measures through the Labour Market Observatories and the agencies for 
employment. 
Programme monitoring is more common. Unlike evaluation, which uses statistical 
methods and focuses on the net results of actions, monitoring requires an essentially 
descriptive approach, with the systematic, continuous collection of the information 
needed to gauge the gross costs and gross results. 
Nevertheless, both monitoring and evaluation of active labour policy programmes 
are still inadequate. The most common approach is the legal, formalistic one. The lack of 
interest in the impact of the programmes is reflected in the highly inadequate collection 
ofinformation. Only with Law 79/1983 and Law 863/1984 was the problem of ensuring 
adequate information posed; and at first this need went unfulfilled, owing the lack of a 
specialized division within the Labour Ministry and to the lack of a statistically-oriented 
attitude. Law 56/1987 instituted the Labour Market Observatory and provided explicitly 
for monitoring of policy programmes, reflecting the increasing interest in this aspect of 
labour policy. Only since then, in fact, have labour market observations, previously 
sporadic and heterogeneous, become systematic and organic, at least as regards some 
programmes. This is the case, for instance, of the data on trainee contracts. 
Much of the evaluation effort has focused on programmes for youth employment. 
In the absence of data sufficient to assess the microeconomic impact, nearly all the 
studies performed have used administrative sources: namely, state employment service 
figures on registrations, referrals and hirings and terminations, by age. These works 
disclose a structural change in 1983, with Law 79 (followed by Law 863/1984 instituting 
trainee contracts). In that year there was a downward shift in the employment entry age, 
more pronounced for men than for women. 
The main source works are Bordignon, Schenkel and Torelli (1982) estimating 
the effects of Law 285/1977 on young people's registration with the employment service; 
Arrigo, Bruno and Guarna (1987), estimating the impact of Law 79/1983 on new hirings 
by projecting the hiring flow had the law not been passed; Brunetta and Turatto (1988), 
estimating the impact of trainee contracts under Law 79 and Law 863 on hirings 
nationwide. 
The main shortcomings of these studies lie not only in the poor quality of the data 
but in the difficulty of isolating and quantifying the real impact of the new programmes to 
bring out their specific effects. Brunetta and Turatto, for instance, estimate the 
substitution and displacement effects between age-groups by a stock-flow analysis, but 
they have to grapple with the enormous problems stemming from the need to include all 
the variables that may potentially influence the relation between the programme and the 
dependent variable. The omission of even a single significant variable will obviously 
distort the results severely. 
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Scandizzo (1991) evaluates the programme of work access for young people 
under Law 113/1986, underscoring the poor training content of these projects, their 
utilization mainly for the lower classes of unemployment and for smaller firms. 
Much broader monitoring of trainee contracts is reported in Bulgarelli and 
Giovine (ISFOL, 1988). This study, while not such as to quantify the dispersion and 
substitution effects of the programme, does at least report the characteristics of the 
young people generally taking advantage of the measure, the conversion rate (of trainee 
into permanent contracts) and the training content. The programme can thus be 
meaningfully compared with apprenticeship as a means of work access. 
Two other interesting works seek to evaluate the effects of employment subsidies 
for mature workers (either unemployed or on short-time compensation) in the province 
of Trento. Two methodologies were used. Ichino and Felli (1988) followed a virtually 
experimental approach, comparing a group of workers involved in the benefit 
programme and a control group. Samek Lodovici (1988) took a non-experimental 
approach based on interviews with the firms involved to gauge the various dispersion 
effects according to the evaluation of the employers themselves as to whether the hirings 
under the programme were additional or not. 
Studies monitoring and evaluating the labour market impact of short-time 
compensation have also been conducted. Microeconomic assessment is especially 
difficult, not just owing to the lack of data but also because the programme itself, 
designed to attenuate the cyclical variability of employment, is macroeconomic in nature. 
Tronti (1991) discusses the potential and the limitations of macroeconomic analysis of 
the impact of short-time compensation on the working of the labour market. The 
programme proves to have a significant effect in slowing down job turnover in industry 
but appears to have little effect on wage growth. 
Padoa-Schioppa (1988) is a work designed for prior evaluation of the potential 
impact of short-time compensation by comparison with the fixed-sum unemployment 
benefits commonly provided in other countries. Still other studies have monitored the 
utilization of short-time compensation in samples of firms, examining specific procedures 
and the direct effects within companies. 
Works monitoring and evaluating programmes for new enterprise formation, in 
particular Law 44/1986, are more numerous and, above all, more complete. This is 
because from the outset the law itself provided for monitoring and because data 
collection has been systematic and complete. So far, the work done has consisted chiefly 
in monitoring via prior evaluation of projects submitted and ongoing evaluation of those 
approved. Subsequent evaluation of firms having reached full autonomy should begin 
shortly. 
The most interesting of these studies are Scandizzo (1991), Comitato per lo 
sviluppo di nuova imprenditorialità giovanile (1993), and Betta and Festa (1988). The 
first simulates the effects of Law 44 on the economies of the South and the Centre-
North. The second presents the results of the programme after seven years. The third, 
finally, studies a programme of support to enterprise formation by workers receiving 
short-time or unemployment benefits for a year or more in the province of Trento. 
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Table 4.2 - Short-time compensation hours 
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Source: Ministero del Lavoro. 
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Source: Ministero del Lavoro. 
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Source: Ministero del Lavoro. 
Table 4.6 - Early retirement pensioners on 31.12.1995 by branch and year of award* 





































































































(a) Since 1/7/1984; previously, under the general industry programme. 
* Including those having in the meantime reached retirement age. 
Source: INPS. 
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SHORT-TIME EARNINGS COMPENSATION 































































































N. B. benefits net of imputed contributions. 
Source: FGB, based on INPS data. 










































































































































































































































































































































(a) Updated budget. 
Source: INPS. 
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Table 4.12 - Company training activities, 1993 





Organizational measures for 












Percentage of firms 






Source: ISTAT, Rapport Annuale 1995. 
























(a) Excluding the provinces of Padua, Siena, Rieti, Latina, Frosinone, Isemia, Campobasso, Caserta, Benevento, Avellino, 
Salerno, Bari, Potenza and Trapani. 
(b) Excluding the region of Apulia. 
Source: Censis, based on data from ISTAT, 1995. 
























(a) Excluding the provinces of Padua, Siena, Rieti, Latina, Frosinone, Isernia, Campobasso, Caserta, Benevento, Avellino, 
Salerno, Bari, Potenza and Trapani. 
(b) Excluding the region of Apulia. 
Source: Censis, based on data from ISTAT, 1995. 
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Table 4.15 - Community and national funding subdivided by objectives 










Former Art. 6 
DESCRIPTION OF OBJECTIVE 
Development and structural up-
grading of regions lagging in 
development 
Conversion of regions hard hit by 
industrial decline 
Fight against long-term 
unemployment 
Adaptation of workers to industrial 
changes 
Facilitating the development and 
structural up-grading of rural zones 
Adaptation of economic-production 
systems to the new market demands 





























Sum to be allocated annually 
Sum to be allocated annually 
5,257 4,093 9,350 
Source: European Commission, 1996. 
Table 4.16 - Community and national financing - Objective 1 regions -





DESCRIPTION OF OBJECTIVE 
Development and structural up-
grading of regions lagging in 
development 
Fight against long-term 
unemployment 


















Source: European Commission, 1996. 
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Source: based on data from Ministero del Lavoro - Osservatorio sul Mercato del Lavoro. 
(1) May-December. 
(2) Provisional. 
(*) 25 and over. 
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Source: Ministero del Lavoro. 
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Source: Ministerodel Lavoro. 
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* Situation at 1 July 1996. Investment in millions of lire. 
Note 1: 89 projects rejected; 68 withdrawn. 
Source: Società per l'Imprenditorialità Giovanile S.p.Α. 
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Table 4.21 - Projects submitted by branch of activity, to 1 July 1996 
BRANCH 
AGRICULTURE 
Farming and livestock 
Fisheries 
Other agricultural activities 
INDUSTRY 
Metallurgy 
Processing of non-metallic minerals 
Chemicals 
Manufacture of metal products 
Manufacture of machinery and mechanical equipment 
Manufatture of office and data processing machines 
Manufacture of electrical and electronic materials and equipment 
Manufacture of automobiles and accessories 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 
Manufacture of precision instruments 
Basic food processing 
Sugar, beverages and other food products 
Texiles 
Hides and leathere 
Shoes, clothing and draperies 
Wood and wood furniture 
Paper, printing and publishing 









































N. B. Excluding: a) projects withdrawn by the submitting company prior to decision; 
b) 88 projects carrying ISTAT code numbers not elegible for subsidies. 
In brackets, projects submitted under Law 236/1993. 
Source: Società per l'Imprenditorialità Giovanile SpA. 
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V. OTHER POLICIES THAT INFLUENCE THE LABOUR 
MARKET 
In modern-day Italy, labour market issues cannot be separated from other 
matters also crucial to employment levels, such as training, social security and 
industrial policies. 
1. Characteristics of the education system 
Quantitative data 
The Italian education system is divided into two main sub-systems: school and 
university education, and regional-based vocational training. 
School education is compulsory up to the age of 14, with all children following 
the same national syllabus. A bill is being drafted to raise the minimum school-leaving 
age to 16 to fit in with European standards. Once compulsory education is completed, 
youngsters must decide on the next level of education, which entails making a choice 
from three main groups: academic high schools ("liceo"), technical schools and 
vocational schools. 
In the 1994-95 academic year, a total of 10,801,586 students attended Italian 
schools and universities, a drop of 0.4% vis-a-vis the previous year. 
Compulsory education schools were attended by 100% of youngsters in the 
corresponding age ranges. In non-compulsory upper secondary education, 73.5% of 
youngsters continued to attend school, a rise of 2.9% vis-à-vis the previous year. This 
figure is rather high, considering that enrolment is optional, and that the courses usually 
last five years, with no early certificate available except in vocational schools (Table 
5.1). 
The rate of first-year enrolment was also high: the percentage of 14-year-olds 
enrolling in upper secondary schools was 90.3%, 20 points higher than twelve years 
previously. 
The fall in the number of first-year enrolments in the 1994-95 academic year (-
4%) should be attributed to demographic trends, although there were differences 
depending on study orientation. 
In the 1993-94 academic year, 500,151 students obtained the upper school-leaving 
certificate, 7.5% more than in the previous year. 
Despite the rise in the number of certificate holders, the success rate of upper 
secondary education shows that only 59.8% of 18-year-olds managed to complete their 
studies according to schedule. 
Figures show that in 1993, approximately 225,000 youngsters (8.2% of all 
students) left school without obtaining a certificate. Failure is most common in the first 
year of studies, when 14.4% of those enrolled leave. It should be considered, however, 
that in the same year, a further 130,000 youngsters re-enrolled on courses after having 
dropped out in previous years. 
The upper secondary school certificate is the only qualification accepted for 
university admission. Any such certificate allows access to any type of faculty. Student 
limits are imposed for a few courses only. 
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The positive trend of university student numbers was reversed after many years in 
the 1994-95 academic year, when 336,539 students enrolled, 22,250 fewer than the 
previous year (-6.2%). There continued to be a positive trend for the briefer, vocation-
oriented university degree programmes created by the 1990 reform, enrolments in 
which rose by 7.7%, which represented a slowdown in growth (Table 5.2). 
These results did not depend solely on demographic factors. The percentage of 
holders of school certificates obtained in the previous year enrolled at university fell 
from 72.3% in 1993-94 to 66.9% in 1994-95. One of the reasons was that the risk of 
unemployment for graduates had risen considerably in recent years. On average, it takes 
university graduates 18 months to find their first job, upper secondary diploma holders 
21 months, and lower secondary school-leaving certificate holders 26 months. 
Moreover, the probability of completing university studies is very low. Every 
year, the number of graduates (96,278 in 1994) is considerably lower than the number 
of newly enrolled students. 
Students seldom manage to complete their course of studies on schedule. The 
'productivity rate' of the Italian university system shows that only 31.3% of the students 
that enrolled in 1990 completed their studies on time (considering an average of five 
years for degree courses and seven years for medicine); 81.2% of students had taken 
more than the regular number of years (Table 5.3). 
Regional vocational training 
Each of the 20 Italian regions proposes a great variety of vocational training 
courses, depending on the type of occupation, target user type, duration, etc. 
Training structures are completely detached from the school-university system, 
although proposals have been made to link the two systems. Initial training given to 
school leavers is of interest to youngsters that leave school immediately after the 
termination of compulsory education or that drop out of upper secondary school, 
certificate-holders and university graduates. For the latter, courses are often specialized, 
whereas school-leavers are given general vocational training. 
In 1993, approximately 245,500 youngsters received training, 79.8% of whom 
were in search of their first job. The remainder were a mixed bag: disadvantaged 
persons, women, unemployed, workers subject to 'mobility' norms, employed persons, 
etc. In Italy, a system of on-the-job training is still not in place, although all regions, 
thanks to Community funding, are drawing up development plans relative to worker 
training. Activities organized for adults, workers and the unemployed are constantly on 
the rise. Post-secondary training provided by Regions has also grown considerably, 
representing 19% of total training vis-à-vis 4% in 1984-85. A sure sign of the need to 
renew the regional Professional Training system is provided by the under-use of the 
European Social Fund for the 1994-1995 period. By 31 December, 1995, Italy had used 
an average of 17% of available funds, a third with respect to totals of other Member 
Countries. 
National figures on the efficacy of regional training in terms of subsequent 
employment levels are not available. Studies carried out have been sporadic and are not 
comparable. 
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Labour market entry 
The transition from school to work is not immediate and consequential. Initially, 
there is an exploratory phase, and studies are often supplemented by temporary work 
experiences unrelated to the course of studies followed. 
The age at which youngsters find their first steady job has risen progressively, but 
there has also been an increase in the proportion that work and study at the same time 
(from 4% in 1987 to 8% in 1992) and in students with seasonal or temporary jobs (from 
25% to 32% over the same period). 
Job search is usually performed by the individual, as adequate career guidance 
systems or contacts between schools and businesses are lacking. 
In 1992, the most common way of seeking employment for young people aged 14 
to 29 was to ask friends and relatives. Career guidance and employment agencies were 
consulted by only 8.8% (Table 5.4). 
At the national level, there are labour market instruments to facilitate young 
people's entry, including apprenticeship and trainee contracts. These instruments aim to 
provide the necessary skills to perform a specific job. Currently, both sorts of contract 
are going through a period of crisis, and training requirements in Italy have traditionally 
been relegated to a secondary role. 
Apprenticeship contracts have also fallen over time, from 529,741 in 1990 to 
426,735 in 1994. Training currently plays a crucial role in the Italian government's 
active employment policies. The aim is to revaluate training and apprenticeship 
contracts and utilise student work experience programmes in order to combat youth 
unemployment. 
Professional opportunities for university graduates 
The unemployment rate for university graduates aged 25 to 29 (14.7%) is higher 
than that for young people of the same age in possession of upper secondary certificates 
(11.5%), who have had more time to seek employment. But the chances of finding a job 
remain better for the university-educated. Over 92% of graduates find a job within five 
years. Of those obtaining their degree in 1992, 42% found a steady job after three years, 
25% found temporary or occasional employment, 23% were still looking for a job and 
10% declared they were not seeking work for various reasons (family, military service, 
further studies, etc.). Employment rates varied with gender and geographical location, 
standing at 80% for males and 69% for females. Three years after graduating, 85% of 
young people in the North had found a job as against only 59% in the South. Also, 
26.3% of graduates had jobs for which the degree was not necessary. 
The chances of finding a job relatively quickly were better for graduates in 
dentistry, veterinary studies, engineering, business, and economics (Table 5.5). Finding 
work proved to be more difficult for law graduates (43% of whom were still jobless 
after three years) and for graduates in literary subjects and social sciences. Entry into 
the labour market was also troublesome for graduates in such scientific fields as biology 
(53.8% of whom were still unemployed after three years) and natural sciences (44.4%). 
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2. Social security and welfare 
Public spending in the field of social security and welfare takes up a considerable 
amount of the budget. In 1995 it amounted to 443.1 trillion lire, around 25% of GDP 
and over 50% of public spending. Per capita spending and the ratio to GDP are 
basically in line with the EU average (Table 5.6). 
In recent years, however, these values have fallen below the EU average, owing 
to social security cuts begun by the Government of Giuliano Amato in 1991 and 
continued under Carlo Azeglio Ciampi and Lamberto Dini. 
Breaking down social spending, retirement benefits account for around 70% of 
the total, while health takes up 21.4% and welfare 8.3%. Of this figure, actual social 
welfare benefits account for only 2.5% of spending, dwarfed by pensions and 
allowances. 
The social security sector has created many problems for the Italian economy and 
in particular for the labour market. In addition to the clear imbalance between services 
and benefits (amounting to over 75% of social security and welfare benefits), there is 
the high cost of the pension system, which includes welfare-based benefits and 
allowances improperly aimed at redressing labour market imbalances (notably disability 
pensions). There is also the problem of inadequate spending for families. Also to be 
noted is the inefficiency of the national health service, which has costs similar to those 
borne by other European countries but with lower service standards. The sector is also 
weighed down by high personnel costs to the detriment of investment. Scant assistance 
is given to the economically disadvantaged (the poor, the unemployed), whereas 
legislation does safeguard the rights of deserving categories such as the disabled, the 
blind, the deaf and dumb. Finally, there are important regional disparties in the quality 
and efficiency of the local health and welfare authorities. 
These problems are further exacerbated by the heavy tax and social security 
burden, which has reached 40.6% of GDP. In terms of labour costs, for every 100 lire 
in take-home pay, the corresponding gross earnings are 136 lire, while the cost to firms 
is 205 lire. These values are higher than in most other European countries (Table 5.7). 
Recent efforts to curb spending in the three sectors (social security, welfare and 
health) have produced varying results. Effects have been significant and visible in the 
health sector, and there has been relative cost stability in the welfare sector, whereas 
social security spending has continued to rise. Spending control has also been pursued 
by reviewing the costs borne by users. 
In the health sector, there have been drastic cuts in public spending on medicines 
(with a 16.8% reduction from 1993 to 1994), thanks to rules changes governing free 
and subsidized medicines and the reclassification of subsidized/non-subsidized 
medicines. Even so, the Finance Law target of keeping public spending on medicines 
under the ceiling of 10 trillion lire was not fully achieved. Hospital care spending 
continued to rise (by 2.2%), while spending for other services remained stable. 
A direct consequence of public spending cuts has been a parallel increase in 
private health spending. Figures clearly reveal the substitution effect: current public 
health spending diminished by almost 980 billion lire in 1994, a drop of 1.1% (Table 
5.8), while current private health spending grew by almost 5 trillion, or 13.6%. 
With reference to spending in the welfare sector, there was an 8.1% increase in 
the share allotted to civil disability pensions, which account for over half of the total. 
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In the social security sector, figures show that: 
• total pensions and annuities rose by 7.2% in 1994, accounting for 61.9% of 
all spending for social benefits; 
• spending on programmes linked to the economic cycle underwent varying 
fortunes (with a rise in unemployment benefits and fall in short-time 
earnings compensation) but generally fell in size vis-à-vis other allowances 
in the sector; 
• severance pay jumped by 18.4%, presumably due to a spate of early 
retirements in the public sector in advance of the freeze on length-of-service 
pensions imposed in September 1994. 
Major social security and health reforms in the interest of economy were initiated 
in 1995. 
The social security reform act, Law 335 of 8 August 1995, passed after protracted 
talks among social part, was intended to carry through measures already approved in 
1992 and 1994. This detailed, complex law governing compulsory retirement insurance 
and supplementary pension funds introduces a new system for younger workers (those 
with under 18 years of service at 31 December 1995) and for others (Table 5.9). 
For workers having more service (the group that had been working for at least 15 
years when the Amato reform came into effect and who had obtained greater 
protection), the traditional earnings-based award formula is retained, in that their 
pension will normally correspond to a percentage of the pensionable salary in the last 
ten years (520 weeks) of activity (the number of working years multiplied by the 2% 
accrual rate), with the exception of the pro-rata calculation of periods prior to the 
coming into force of the Amato reform. 
For new workers and workers with a length-of-service of less than 18 years (for 
the latter, there is the pro-rata calculation of the previous period according to the old 
rules), a new contribution-based system came into force on 1 January 1996, so that 
pensions will be calculated according to the total amount of social security 
contributions paid in. 
The savings projected by the law over the next ten years are sizeable: more than 
108 trillion lire, excluding the "costs" of supplementary social security (21 trillion) and 
the estimated fall in income tax revenue of 13.6 trillion. Analyzing the various items 
more closely, it may be seen that until 1998, the extra revenue exceeds the fall in 
expenditure. At the end of the decade, extra revenue will amount to more than a third of 
the decrease in expenditure, and most of the latter (roughly 18 trillion lire) will be 
acquired by the year 2000 (Table 5.10). 
In the health sector, the reform of the National Health Service was begun on 1 
January 1995, following the application of Legislative Decree 502/1992 (amended by 
Decree 517), the main points of which include a reduction in the number of Local 
Health Authorities to 228, their transformation into autonomous "firms", with economic 
accountability and having their own management; the creation of hospital "enterprises" 
(76); the introduction of a funding system for charges for standard diagnosis groups 
(DRGs); the introduction of the principle of competition in the sector and free choice 
for patients; and finally, charters for public health services to monitor service quality. 
This reform process has already encountered several difficulties, mainly in 
introducing a new financing and accounting system, renovating obsolete structures 
(there are still 254 hospitals that have fewer than 120 beds), and avoiding unnecessary 
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hospitalization. Clearly inadequate are home-help services and assistance to the elderly 
and the disabled (Table 5.11). 
In both the health and social security sectors, there has been a strong tendency to 
develop voluntary, supplementary forms of assistance. The creation of private funds has 
been sanctioned by the 1995 pension reform and by health reform decrees. 
In the sphere of pensions, Italy has moved towards the regulations of countries 
where pension funds are most developed by shifting taxation from the moment of 
accumulation to the moment when services are provided. Mutual fund management 
companies, like banks, securities firms and insurance companies, will be allowed to 
stipulate agreements for the management of pension fund assets. The types of pension 
fund allowable have been expanded to include not only defined-benefit and defined-
contribution organizations (already envisaged by previous norms) but also 
"management accompanied by guarantees for the return of principal". The rights of 
fund participants are further safeguarded through the introduction of the so-called 
"custodian" figure, charged with overseeing the fund's assets and monitoring the fund 
manager's activities. 
In the health sector, proposals for supplementary funding are less highly 
developed. 
The reduction of public social spending and the need to curb labour costs call for 
alternative sources of social security financing. In Italy, proposals include energy taxes, 
VAT increases and pollution taxes. 
In June 1996, the new Finance Minister announced in Parliament a reduction in 
social security contributions and in the number of taxes, tax rate cuts, the 
transformation of health contributions into income regional taxes, a review of the 
capital levy system, incentives for corporate restructuring and a review of consumption 
taxation. 
3. Industrial policies 
The economic and social gulf separating the central-northern regions of the 
country from southern regions has always been one of the most difficult problems for 
economic policy-makers. 
The search for solutions to socio-economic dualism has centred on the struggle 
against unemployment, which has taken on dramatic proportions in the South. Over the 
years, the state has focused on developing productive activities and creating jobs. 
The disparity between North and South is clear from the figures on gross product 
per inhabitant (Table 5.12). Taking 100 as the base value for Italy in 1993, central-
northern regions averaged 117.9, with peaks of above 121 in north-western regions. In 
the same year, the southern regions posted a value of 69.2. Following a brief recovery 
of this indicator in 1990 and 1991, the recession - which began in Italy at the end of 
1991 and lasted through 1993 - lowered per capita output in the South. Looking at 
relative figures, the rising importance of the Northeast and of the central regions in the 
formation of GDP is evident. 
The socio-economic divide stands out even more starkly if one considers 
unemployment rates (Table 5.13). Nationwide, the rate stood at 12% in 1995. In the 
northern regions it was 6.8%, in the centre 10.3%. In 1986, the North had had a jobless 
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rate of 8%. Since that year, it has always been below 7%. In the same period, the 
unemployment rate in the South has gone from 16% to 21%. 
Another indicator of regional differences is investment (Table 5.14). From 1981 
to 1995, the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP fell in both major areas: in 
the Centre-North, from 21.1% to 19,3% and in the South from 25.7% to 19.1%. Taking 
100 as the value of investment per inhabitant in the Centre-North, during this period, 
citizens in the South were allocated a smaller and ever declining share, dropping from 
an index of 72.1 to 55.0. The highest values for the South were registered during the 
mid-1980s. 
With unresolved problems such as mass unemployment, the poor quality of public 
services, and spotty communication and transport infrastructure, economic policy 
initiatives must be made more efficient (at both national and Community levels), in 
order to create the conditions for an autonomous and self-generating development of the 
economy in the South, centring on local resources and the creation of entrepreneurs 
capable of under taking and exploiting new business opportunities. 
Industrial policy goals, as outlined in the Community aid programme for 
Objective 1 regions for 1994-99, must necessarily include bringing southern regions 
back into the mainstream economy and reducing their unemployment rates. The 
Community Support Framework 1994-99 decided in 1994 by European Commission, 
provides, for the eight regions of Mezzogiorno, about 15.000 Mecu charged to 
Structural Funds and about 32.000 Mecu with the partnership of the Italian Government 
and public and private institutions. 
Monitoring Committees, formed by representatives of the regions, the 
government and the European Commission, are responsible for the implentation of the 
programmes. 
A territorial pact is an agreement among local public and private actors. It's aim 
consists of local development, mainly in the areas of the country with economic and 
structural problems and high levels of unemployment. 
The main tools used for the pacts are: flexible work, non-conflictual industrial 
relations, enterprise creation schemes, training plans and private and public partnership 
in financing the projects. 
These initiatives were established by three resolutions passed by the Inter-
Ministerial Committee for Economic Planning in May 1995, November 1995 and July 
1996 and are related to the targets of the Fourth Framework Programme. 
The local actors (firms, local authorities, unions and chambers of commerce) are 
responsible for promoting the territorial pacts. This is a significant contrast to previous 
practice where State Intervention in Southern Italy was mainly managed by Central 
Government, with a low level of efficiency. 
The territorial pact is based on the agreement among local actors and on a well-
defined project in which the content, the aims, the area and the methods of procedure to 
finance the project are outlined. 
The procedures for carrying out the pact involve the participation of three 
important institutions, whose role is to coordinate and to bring about the successful 
conclusion of the agreement. These are: 
• the Council of Economy and Labour, who receives and analyzes the 
proposals; supports the realization of the agreement; and appoints a 
consultancy to provide the development project with technical assistance. The 
promoters of the pact and the consultancy then do a feasibility study, 
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determine the evaluation and the terms for the realization. Finally, create a 
company which assumes responsibility for the project; 
• the Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning, who receives the complete 
project, confirms that is in line with the afore-mentioned methods established 
by Inter-Ministerial Committee's resolutions and supervises proceedings 
through a special committee; 
• the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Economic Planning, who finally 
approves the project and pays out the funds. 
By November 1996, 95 proposals had been received by the Council of Economy 
and Labour. Three projects - the pacts for Enna, Siracusa and Brindisi - are to be 
approved shortly. The total fund for the territorial pacts is approximately 400 billion 
liras (as laid down by the 1996 Financial Act). 
In more detail, it is possible to identify areas of intervention offering growth 
opportunities for the country in general and the South in particular: 
• infrastructure; 
• tourism; 
• preservation of the artistic and environmental heritage; 
• the development of productive activities in high-technology sectors, with 
special reference to information technology (electronics, telecommunications, 
etc.), new materials and biotechnologies. 
Each of these fields offers excellent growth opportunities that may have 
significant collateral benefits for employment and for the quality and efficiency of the 
national productive system. Official documents show time and time again that the hopes 
of national and Community economic policy-makers lie in these sectors. 
The sector requiring most urgent action is infrastructure. Table 5.15 shows the 
current situation in various areas, comparing them with the national average in terms of 
the availability of networks and systems that help create an adequate economic and 
social environment. An analysis was made of the state of infrastructure for energy, 
transportation, communications and water supply. Credit facilities were also included, 
as an essential element for the growth of economic activities. 
Category by category, the imbalance of infrastructures, very much to the 
detriment of the Mezzogiorno, is glaring. Taking 100 as the base value for the country 
as a whole, the North has a value of 115, the Centre 101.5, the continental South 83.5 
and the major islands 69.6. 
The imbalance is most pronounced for water supply networks, with the southern 
regions having a value that is just 50% of the national average, and even further from 
the values of northern regions. The situation is worse still for Sicily and Sardinia, where 
the relative index number is a dismal 39.8. 
There is also a great disparity between the major areas in communication and 
energy infrastructures, whereas the gap for credit and transport infrastructures is 
narrower. 
The investments of state-owned corporations have served, in part, to supply 
infrastructural resources for the nation (Table 5.16). According to figures from the 
Budget Ministry and the Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning, between 
1992 and 1995 there was a fall of roughly 9 trillion lire in total investment by state-
controlled corporations. This brought about a fall in investment in the Mezzogiorno 
from 6.7 to 3.6 trillion lire. 
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In manufacturing, services and infrastructures, the sharpest investment cuts came 
between 1992 and 1993, at a time when the effects of the recession were being felt 
most. In spite of the recovery in subsequent years, investments continue to lag. 
In the whole of Italy between 1992 and 1995, over 53 trillion lire was invested in 
services and infrastructures. The figure for the South was just over 9 trillion. 
There will presumably be a revival of investment spending in coming years, with 
the consequent possibility of reversing unemployment trends in the South. Yet growth 
opportunities may be hampered by budgetary constraints and the need to reduce 
inflation. These constraints will be given top priority by Italy considering the 
importance ascribed to the completion of European Economic and Monetary Union and 
will, thus, limit the scope for stimulus to domestic demand. 
Some of the most important local resources in the South - as in Italy generally -
are cultural and environmental. This sector offers considerable growth opportunities 
and could go far towards resolving job problems, encouraging entrepreneurial activities 
and enhancing structures pertaining to non-profit activities. A recent survey (Table 
5.17) identified important factors relating to the growth in demand for the goods that 
constitute Italy's immense artistic and environmental heritage. Between 1979 and 1992, 
the number of visitors to museums and similar institutions grew by 23.8%. The largest 
increases were recorded by technical and scientific institutions, and specialized and 
general local museums. During the same period, the range of structures offered to the 
general public in these categories was broadened. 
Furthermore, there was a significant rise in the number of visitors to nature 
reserves, botanical gardens, aquariums, etc. (40.7%) and in the number of structures 
open to the public dealing with the natural environment (122.5%). 
The preservation of the natural and architectural heritage of the regions and cities 
of the Mezzogiorno is closely tied up with the potential growth of the tourist industry. 
In addition to plans to expand supply of tourist facilities and raise the quality of 
services, it will also be necessary to do something about the state of decay in many 
areas of the South. 
Looking at the state of the Italian tourist industry, demand from abroad may be 
seen by the figures in Table 5.18. Between 1992 and 1994, the number of foreign 
tourists rose significantly from 63.4 million to 76.2 million. Of other countries studied, 
only Spain recorded a larger increase in absolute terms and enjoyed a larger demand, 
with 97.8 million foreigners visiting that country in 1994. 
Hotel accommodation capacities, taken to mean the number of beds available in 
hotels and similar facilities, may be considered as an indicator of the supply of tourism-
related services. Table 5.19 compares some European countries for the years 1991, 
1992 and 1993. During this period, Italy, Spain and Portugal raised their capacities, 
while the situation in Germany and Austria remained basically unchanged. In short, it 
may be seen that Italy has raised its potential in this sector in relation to rivals 
(especially in the Mediterranean), while Spain remains the number one destination for 
international tourism in Europe. 
Looking further at tourist-related structures, capacities may also be interpreted by 
taking into consideration the average number of beds per hotel. Of the countries 
studied, Portugal and Spain have the largest hotels, containing an average of 199.6 and 
166.5 beds respectively. In Italy, the average number of beds was 49.5 (Eurostat 1996). 
New entrepreneurial initiatives and employment opportunities may well come 
from high-technology industries. A priority objective for Italy is to establish itself in 
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this sector. Table 5.20 shows the shares of employment, exports, and value added of G7 
countries in recent years in high-technology manifacturing industries (aereospace, 
computers and office equipment, communications equipment and semiconductors, 
electronic machinery, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments). Between 1970 and 1991, 
the percentage of workers engaged in high-technology sectors grew by 0.9% in Italy, as 
compared with 3.4% in the United States, 4.8% in Japan, 3.1% in Britain and 3.6% in 
Germany. 
As regards exports, high-technology sectors grew in importance in all the above 
countries. In the United States, the share of total exports grew from 25.9% in 1970 to 
37.7% in 1991. In Japan, there was a rise of almost 16 percentage points, and in Britain 
the export share for these sectors practically doubled. On the other hand, high-
technology manufacturers in Germany and Italy showed less propensity to export. 
Italy's backwardness in this field can best be gauged by value added. All the other 
countries recorded a rise of at least 5 percentage points in the share of total value added 
accounted for by high-tech sectors during the period, while in Italy the share actually 
dropped. 
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Table 5.1 - School attendance (a) -1994-95 
Nursery schools 
Primary schools 






(a) number enrolled per 100 children in age group. 
(b) the figure may exceed 100 owing to pupils entering early or late or repeating years. 
Source; Censis based on istat data. 
Table 5.2 - University students enrolled by degree course 




























































































































(*) Provisional figures. 
Source: Censis based on Istat data. 
Table 5.3 - Productivity of university system by degree course 
area ( number of graduates per 100 enrolments 5 years 
previously) 































(a) Provisional figures. 
(b) for medical students, figures refer to enrolments 7 years previously. 
Source: FGB, based on ISTAT data. 
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Table 5.4 - Young people's job bunting methods (percentage values) 
Help of friends and relatives 
Registered at employment agency 
Participation in public examinations 
Applications to firms 
Replies to ads 
Presentation at businesses, schools, etc. 
Appeals to influential persons 
Recourse to guidance centres 



















































Source: lard survey, 1992. 
Table 5.5 -1992 University graduates present in the labour market in 1995 





































































(a) for medical students, figures refer to enrolments 7 years previously. 
Source: ISTAT. 
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Source: General report on the economic state of the nation. 
Budget Ministry. April 1996. 
























Source: Censis. 1995. 























Source: Istat. 1995. 
Table 5.9 - Innovations introduced by the pension reform 
Workers 
With 18 years 
or more seniority 
With less than 18 
years seniority 







Amount of pension 
Years of seniority χ 2% on 
the last 10 years of earnings 
Total of contributions 




Table 5.10 - Impact of the social security reform on public spending (values in billions of lire) 
<J1 
to 
Total savings deriving from the decree accompanyng the Finance Law 
presented on 30 September 1994 (articles 10 to 13 and paragraphs 1, 
2, 3 of art. 14) 
Idem, with material errors corrected and re-calculated as per 
observations of the Chamber of Deputies Budget Service 
Total savings deriving from the agreement with trade unions, 






extension of existing contributions 
additional income from changes to tax base and 
contributor group 
less revenue, of which: 
less income tax 


































































































































* Estimate for the year 2005. 
** Including the effects of the reduction of the period of contribution exemptions. 
Source: Sole-24 Ore based on Treasury Ministry data. 






Prov. autonoma di Trento 






























































































No. of authorities types services operational 
Home­
based Rehabilitad 
hospitalizai on day 
ion centre HLA 
1 1 23 
0 0 1 
1 sì si 
1 si 5 
0 1 1 
0 0 4 
0 3 5 
0 0 6 
0 12 13 
0 12 12 
0 1 5 
2 0 13 
0 11 12 
0 5 6 
0 0 1 
0 0 4 
0 0 n.d. 
0 0 3 
0 0 3 
0 0 9 





































































(·) Ν = refers to national project, R ­ to regional project, Ρ = to provincial project. 
HLA = Home integrated assistance. 
RUC = Reservation unified centres. 
GEU = Geriatric évaluation uiúls. 
153 


































Source: Budget Ministry, General report on the economic state of the nation, April 1996. 























































Source: Bank of Italy, 1996. 




































































Source: Svimez, 1996. 
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Source: Tagliacarne Institute and Ferrovie dello Stato, 1995. 
Table 5.16 - The investments of state-owned corporations, 1992-1995 (bil 
Sector 






























Source: Budget Ministry, 1996. 




Technical and Scient. Inst. 
Ethnography/Anthropology 
Nature Reserves, Botanical 
Gardens, aquariums 






















Source: ISTAT, 1995. 
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Source: ISTAT, 1995. 

























Source: EUROSTAT, 1995. 
Table 5.20 - Shares of employment, exports and value added a 


























































VI: THE DEBATE ON EMPLOYMENT IN ITALY: MAIN TOPICS AND LINES 
FOR REFORM 
1. The Italian model 
The Italian economy is at a notorious disadvantage with respect to its nearest 
European competitors. A major effort is still neeeded to stabilize the ratio of public debt 
to GDP and pave the way for the lira's return to the ERM, at an exchange rate that is 
sustainable in the long run. The disarray of the public finances, moreover, requires 
frequent spending curbs, while fiscal pressure (the ratio of tax revenue to GDP is higher 
than the European average) represents a severe constraint on any gain in the international 
competitiveness of Italian goods. 
Italy's difficulties are bound up with a number of specific features, involving both 
macroeconomic arrangements and the employment equilibria. The macroeconomic 
factors include (Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, 1994): 
• one of the highest saving rates in the industrial world; 
• higher structural inflation than in main competitors; 
• a rate of fixed capital formation two thirds slower than in the leading industrial 
countries; 
• public services that are poorer in quality and lesser in quantity than in most other 
European countries; 
• public debt that is larger than GDP, despite the fact that for four years the 
country has run a primary budget surplus. 
Among the specific features of the labour market, the following are worth 
recalling (Istat, 1996): 
• The employment rate is significantly lower than the average for the industrial 
economies. 
• Female participation is 10 percentage points lower than in the countries of 
northern Europe. 
• Rates of joblessness are perceptibly higher than in most OECD countries. Only 
half of all Italians of working age are involved in economic activity. The waste of 
resources is evident with respect to young people and married women, whose 
rates of joblessness are 62% and 64%, compared with just 27% for household 
heads. 
• The share of total employment accounted for by self-employment is significantly 
above the average for the industrial countries, and still rising. 
• The underground economy accounts for the equivalent of 4 million full-time jobs. 
• Part-time employment rates are some 10 percentage points lower than in northern 
Europe. 
• The level of skill of the labour force is considerably lower than in other industrial 
countries, and in a good number of instances inadequate to companies' needs. At 
present the formal education and vocational training of the Italian labour force is 
lower than the average for the leading EU countries; differences within the EU 
are even more pronounced when consideration is extended beyond the range of 
compulsory schooling. 
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It is clear, furthermore, that the two groups of features are interrelated. For 
instance, the underground economy and, in part, the extent of self-employment can be 
seen as causes of the difficulties of the public finances. Off-the-books work naturally 
generates next to no social contribution or tax revenue, while these non-regular workers 
are often entitled not only to the social benefits and health care enjoyed by all citizens but 
to additional assistance, stemming from their ostensibly disadvantaged status. 
The low employment rate means that every worker employed in the private 
sector must maintain more than two other people, compared with just one for a Japanese 
worker and 1.5 for an American. It is easy to see why for the Italian earnings must be 
higher, or else related costs in terms of public spending, hence taxes and social security 
contributions. 
Other things being equal, a lower employment rate produces a latent loss of 
competitiveness, which has to be offset by increments in productivity. Moreover, the 
labour market has historically been the source, at least in part, of the inflation that has 
undermined the competitiveness of Italian exports. 
A reading of the fundamental indicators highlights the essence of the special 
Italian situation by comparison with the other industrial countries with more harmonious 
economic developments: the labour force participation rate (especially for women), and 
the employment rate are still much lower than in other countries, owing in part to the 
relative neglect of part-time work. 
All the same, the difficulty of creating jobs during economic expansion is a 
problem common to all the industrial countries for some years now, albeit to differing 
degree. In Italy, since the mid-1970s GDP and employment have moved asymmetrically, 
with unemployment rising during recession but not falling significantly with economic 
recovery. Despite this continuing difficulty, unemployment in Italy is not significantly out 
of line with the rest of the EU. 
Unemployment in Italy does have some specificities, however. For one thing, 
while the increase in the number of mature workers losing jobs in industry is a trait 
shared with the rest of Europe, the groups hardest hit by unemployment are still young 
people under the age of 25 and women, with rates of 34.3% and 20.7% respectively, far 
above the averages in other countries. Also, the duration of unemployment is longer and 
the average age of unemployed workers is higher; those unemployed for more than 12 
months accounted for 63% of total unemployment in Italy in 1995. 
The key trends within the Italian labour market are thus (OECD, 1996): 
• increasing dispersion among regional unemployment rates; 
• the steep increase in structural unemployment for women and young people; 
• a sharp rise in long-term unemployment. 
According to the official documents, one of the top priority objectives of the 
Italian government is significantly raising the employment rate, especially in the South. 
Geographical disparities underscore the need for focused, multilevel action that views the 
European, national and regional dimension of problems and instruments. 
The Italian discussion on employment strategy cannot be understood without 
taking into account that labour policy measures have almost all been the product of 
concertation and negotiation with the social partners, both in major contract disputes and 
in general agreements on economic and financial policy. 
In general, the tripartite agreement of 23 July 1993 reflected the unanimous 
recognition by government, business and labour, in line with the indications of the 
158 
European Union, that combating unemployment would require a coordinated set of 
policy measures, combining three main elements: 
• selective investment, mainly in infrastructure and in new, labour-intensive sectors; 
• labour market flexibility; 
• investment in education, training and research, to maximize the quality of human 
capital. 
Such policy guidelines have been recently reconfirmed by the Tripartite Pact for 
Employment of 24 September 1996. 
It must be acknowledged, however, that despite the broad consensus on the "ills" 
afflicting the Italian labour market and on the path to its revitalization, in terms of 
practical responses much is still to be done. 
2. North-South dualism 
Italy's nationwide labour market indicators, it is well known, conceal immense 
differences between the northern and southern parts of the country. In the central and 
northern regions the unemployment rate is now between 7% and 8%, more or less in line 
with other EU countries if not lower. But in the South the rate is over 21%; moreover, 
the participation rate is low as well, especially for women, which suggests that the 
potential labour force is even larger than that picked up by the official statistics. 
The Mezzogiorno is a structurally dependent economy, in which consumption is 
sustained artifically by large-scale transfers of resources from outside (Leonardi, 1995). 
A number of factors have impeded the formation and expansion of businesses in the 
South, such as the lack of infrastructure, high transport costs and the invasive presence 
of organized crime. These obstacles have deterred inflows of private capital investment, 
both Italian and foreign (Oneto, 1993). The nationwide coverage of collective bargaining 
agreements has resulted in wage differentials in the private sector insufficient to 
compensate for the pronounced productivity gap. Only thanks to social contribution 
relief for employers have unit labour costs in manufacturing been kept in line with the 
rest of the country. 
Until 1993, public development programmes for the South included support and 
salvage measures, in the form of cash transfers as well as preferential social contribution 
rates, to hold down the non-wage portion of the cost of labour. These spending 
provisions, which tended to save jobs at the expense of efficiency, accounted for 4.2% of 
the gross product of the Mezzogiorno at the last cyclical peak in 1990. Extraordinary 
development assistance was terminated in 1993, to be replaced by support based on 
nationwide criteria, in line with Community rules. 
Another factor contributing to the disparity in labour costs between Centre-North 
and South is the share of non-regular employment. Non-regular work now represents 
some 34% of total employment in the South (33% in 1980), as against 18% in the 
Centre-North (16% in 1980). Non-regular or unregistered workers are most common in 
agriculture and construction. 
The geographical disparity in unemployment is striking, with a rate of around 
20% in the Mezzogiorno, compared with less than 8% in the rest of the country. 
Moreover, whereas in northern Italy the bulk of the jobless are unemployed workers (i.e. 
job-losers) in the South the largest group is first-job seekers. 
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As the tripartite agreement of July 1993 notes, "without a policy for inter-
regional equalization, economic recovery threatens to result in widening the gap 
separating the rest of the country from the areas that are economically less developed, 
areas in industrial decline, and areas of disequilibrium between labour demand and 
supply" (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 1993). The agreement pointed to the 
instruments that could be used to conduct a new policy of regional development: 
• sectoral coordinating authorities; 
• programmatic agreements between the central and regional governments, to concur 
on a scale of infrastructural priorities for the region and speed up the process of 
concession and authorization; 
• specific rules to remove procedural barriers, permitting swift approval and 
implementation of policies. 
In addition, in order to attenuate external diseconomies in line with the provisions 
of the Agreement, the Government pledged to relaunch the planning of public 
infrastructural investment, requalifying public demand as an instrument of support to 
productive activities. 
This regional policy was intended to facilitate the launching of measures for the 
reindustrialization of declining industrial districts and the promotion of new economic 
activities, mobilizing private resources as well. 
A series of Government documents (Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza 
Sociale, 1994) have stressed the need for constructive dialogue between central and 
regional governments and the social partners, to map out the most appropriate lines of 
action to foster the conditions for development in the areas selected. 
The terms of the 1993 agreement leave no doubt as to the general consensus on 
the main strategy for countering the dualism of the Italian labour market. But in practice 
little has been done. 
Actually, both in the course of Parliamentary discussion of the Finance Act for 
1996 and later, during the election campaign, discussion on the policies to relaunch the 
southern economy was much farther-ranging. There was some convergence between 
business and labour representatives, both on the general need for prompt government 
action (in view among other things of the worsening economic situation, which had 
largely spared the Centre-North and further aggravated the employment problems of the 
South), and on the need for effective application of the 1993 tripartite agreement. 
The debate continues vigorously, with essentially three positions facing one 
another: 
1. Confindustria (the leading industrial employers' organization) has called for 
derogation from national wage bargaining, in order to make up for the higher social 
costs of those investing in southern regions. The unions have responded in differential 
fashion; while CISL and UIL have shown willingness to discuss the question, the 
largest union, the CGIL, has dissented sharply. 
2. The labour movement, in its various organizational forms, appears not to favour 
derogation from nationwide wage bargaining; instead, it has proposed local 
agreements in which employers may gain labour flexibility, short-time, etc., in 
exchange for job creation. In other words, Italian unions appear to be aiming chiefly 
at plant-by-plant or locally limited pacts (such as that governing Fiat's plant at Melfi), 
while rejecting the idea of a general derogation that fails to take specific situations 
into account. 
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3. Some analysts (e.g. Brunetta, 1996)· cite the recommendations of the International 
Monetary Fund, not just to provide incentives for southern development but more 
generally to revitalize the entire Italian industrial structure. Such observers call for 
gradually going beyond the national, industry-wide collective bargaining agreement by 
progressively transferring such matters as job descriptions, hours and many wage 
items to decentralized negotiations, and keeping only the overall regulatory 
framework governing working conditions at the national level. 
This would go beyond the agreements on collective bargaining and income policy of 
31 July 1992 and 23 July 1993, assigning to second-level bargaining (at the company, 
province or district level) both the task of fully catching up with inflation, where and 
to the extent this is possible, and that of bargaining over productivity gains. 
In the opinion of such analysts, this would produce the requisite wage differentials for 
companies in different parts of the company, to bring earnings more closely into line 
with real productivity, as well as reflecting the differences in living costs between 
different regions, without rigid, nationally mandated wage limits for certain regions, 
which would truly bring useless rigidity. 
This last position, however, aside from the evident problem of social 
acceptability, also clashes with the empirical evidence on labour cost differentials 
between Centre-North and South. According to Istat, the differential was as wide as 16 
percentage points, on average, in 1993. Second, the agreement of 23 July 1993, which 
tied the purchasing power of contractual minimums (which account for about 80% of 
average gross earnings) to that date and made second-level pay agreements conditional 
on productivity (which rosé 3% a year on average between 1992 and 1995), is already a 
powerful mechanism for widening inter-company wage differentials. 
In the wake of the agreement manifested by the social partners on the approach 
to revitalizing the southern labour market, the Government sought to transcend Italy's 
traditional development policy for the disadvantaged areas, centring solely on 
extraordinary development assistance, with a series of measures mapping out a new 
strategy of action based on broader, "ordinary" regional developpment policies for all the 
disadvantaged parts of the country (OECD, 1996). 
Finally, there is agreement that a preliminary condition for speeding up economic 
growth in the South is effective action to combat organized crime (Brunetta and Tronti, 
1994), an area in which important though not yet definitive successes have been 
achieved. 
All in all, however, despite the lack of conflict between business and labour in 
terms of analysis and indication of the path to take confirmed in the recent Pact for 
Employment, little action has still been taken to overcome the dualism of the Italian 
labour market. 
3. Employment flexibility 
The Italian labour market has traditionally been characterized by a pervasive set 
of rules. The relaxation of this regulation is thus considered a major step towards 
increased employment. 
In the past, job-saving rules attenuated the loss of jobs in recession times but by 
the same token lowered firms' propensity to hire during expansions. By impeding 
mobility, in practice these rules segmented the labour force: on the one hand, 
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"guaranteed" workers with virtually iron-clad job security and on the other the long-term 
unemployed and new entrants, with little or no influence on wage formation in the 
official economy. At the same time, restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts (which 
remain relatively rare in Italy), has further limited the chances of finding work. Probably 
the impediments to flexible hours are one of the factors causing high unemployment and 
low participation rates for youth and women. 
Until 1991 Italian restrictions on hiring and firing were considered to be among 
the most rigid in the EU (Table 6.1). Moreover, temporary, seasonal and occasional 
work are still subject to strict rules that make further deregulation a must. The wage 
agreement of July 1993 called for introducing more flexible employment contracts; these 
forms of employment are still under discussion. 
To achieve the objective of expanding employment, Government and social 
partners have long agreed on the need for additional accompanying programmes to 
activate and strengthen the Italian labour market and bring it into line with the rest of 
Europe, by fostering the enlargement of employment in the "secondary segment" of the 
labour force (less than full-time, open-ended contracts). It is precisely measures of this 
kind that could have the potential for producing the expected increases in employment. 
The need for flexibility was recognized by the tripartite agreement of 31 July 
1992, which abolished the scala mobile after 46 years, and by that of 23 July 1993, which 
introduced a two-level bargaining structure. 
The signatories (all the main trade unions and employer associations) to the 1993 
accord agreed on the fundamental thesis that increasing employment would depend not 
only on stable economic growth but also, crucially, on more flexible regulation of the 
labour market and flexibility in bargaining as concerns forms of employment relationship 
and wages. Specifically, the agreement called for: 
1. the modernization of the legislation and regulations governing working hours, taking 
full advantage of and further expanding the gains of collective bargaining with 
safeguards for fundamental safety rights; 
2. the introduction of temporary employment relations, incorporating adequate 
safeguards to guarantee that such arrangements are not used as a means for doing 
away with permanent, steady jobs; 
3. special forms of fixed-term employment, administered by bodies sponsored or 
authorized by the Agencies for Employment, in order to encourage the re-
employment and requalification of workers on the mobility rolls or receiving special 
unemployment benefits. 
Enjoying the support of the social partners, the Government drafted a series of 
bills to implement the July agreement. 
1. As regards flexible entry and instruments for matching labour demand and supply, 
following the end, two years ago, of rank-order hiring from the State Employment 
Service rolls, the public monopoly on placement services was anticipated to be ended, 
with provision for controlled competition from private agencies and the definitive 
abrogation of the requirement of authorization for individual hiring. Actually, the 
limitations that the public monopoly places on freedom to provide services, 
undermining the overall efficiency of placement as such, are all the less tolerable in 
that the service provided by the State agency is now of very poor quality indeed. 
2. To foster labour market flexibility, a number of bills for temporary work have been 
presented. Clearly, however, the introduction of temporary employment (Italy is the 
only major European country in which it is outlawed) must not be overemphasized: it 
should operate chiefly in the interstices of the labour market. 
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3. The Government's solution concerning fixed-term employment contracts was in line 
with the approach of controlled, negotiated forms of flexibilty. The bill moved in two 
directions: 
• moderately extending and clarifying the model fixed-term contract envisaged by the 
law; 
• allowing use of fixed-term employment on the basis of general and temporary 
production requirements for a set portion of the work force that can be raised by 
collective bargaining agreement. 
Greater flexibility was provided in areas of economic crisis, where fixed-term workers 
can make up as much as 10% of a company's work force. In the developed areas, 
where the situation is closer to full employment and fixed-term work accordingly less 
necessary, the limit is 6%, in order to foster stabler forms of hiring. 
4. Extra flexibility linked with the employment situation was proposed as regards a hiring 
quota for the mobility rolls. The quota for areas in crisis was reduced. 
5. In implementation of the 1993 tripartite agreement, the Government pledged to 
promote part-time employment by eliminating the obstacle of more than proportional 
social security costs. Other flexibility measures included the simplification and further 
promotion of training stages. 
The controversial question of wage flexibility has not been dealt with directly by 
the Government, which holds that this is the prime province of management and labour 
negotiators; however, Government did pledge to ease, to some extent, the contributions 
levied on the productivity increases negotiated at company level. 
Possible measures could involve the revision of solidarity contracts (already 
effected, in part) and a redistribution of the social contributions depending on number of 
hours worked. These proposals have been made by a number of analysts, including union 
spokesmen, and should be further studied. As to overtime, the Government feels that the 
time is now ripe for revision of the legislation (dating back to 1923) on daily and weekly 
working hours. Another method for redistributing working hours that the Government 
has pledged to promote is job sharing between husband and wife. 
A decisive element in any effort to improve the performance of the labour market 
is increasing the flexibility of total wages and salaries, and above all that of relative 
wages. 
The most recent measures directly affecting the labour market have included: 
• a packet of provisions in June 1995 for the refinancing of solidarity contracts, 
streamlining the administrative procedures for approval of socially useful projects, and 
in many cases making unemployment benefits conditional upon willingness to work in 
such schemes. Employers' social security contribution obligations were revised to 
favour part-time and other atypical forms of employment; 
• agreement on new wage determination methods in the public sector, with greater 
emphasis on individual performance and less on seniority; 
• new incentives for investment in the depressed areas in conformity with EU criteria 
(August 1995); the creation of a guarantee fund for the consolidation of the debts of 
small and medium-sized enterprises in the South (April 1995); 
• the carrying out of major infrastructural public works projects in the South that had 
already been approved but were delayed by corruption scandals and procedural 
obstacles; finally, incentives for business formation in the South. 
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All in all, despite significant gains in flexibility and the joint indication of the right 
way forward by Government, business and labour, many of the proposals have bogged 
down in Parliament. 
In any case, it must be admitted that more flexible working hours have not 
produced precisely the results expected. A study of recent company-level agreements on 
the matter in 1990-1994 shows that large and small businesses in North and South alike 
have effected various modifications in working hours, to adapt them more flexibly to 
peak demand periods. Essentially, flexibility has taken two forms (OECD, 1996): 
• "adaptive", involving flexible starting and stopping times for daily working hours; 
• "strategic", involving all other hours questions. 
This large number of changes in working hours - daily and monthly or yearly -
has had virtually no positive effect on employment. 
4. Vocational training and human capital 
The Italian labour market is sharply distinguished from those of other European 
economies by its relative underendowment of human capital. Only 30% of all labour 
force participants older than 25 have more than compulsory schooling, compared with 
35% in the European Union as a whole; only 10% are university-educated, compared 
with an EU average of 25%. 
A number of empirical studies have demonstrated that in the industrial countries 
the growth of real per capita income cannot be explained solely by the increase of capital 
and labour (OECD, 1996). Changes in the quality of the factors of production must also 
be taken into account, as well as technical change and changes in the economic and 
social climate. Recently, new theories of growth have stressed the externalities of 
education, training and R&D. It is likely that these externalities have increased in 
importance in recent decades, with the adoption by some companies of new methods of 
work organization based on flexibility and workers' participation. One of the most 
striking shortcomings of Italy's education system is that, unlike other EU countries, it still 
does not extend compulsory schooling beyond age 14. Moreover, the dropout rate is 
high at all levels, especially in vocational schools and in the universities. Despite a 
number of initiatives, including some in the private sector, vocational education remains 
limited and very little diversified at the post-compulsory level. 
At both upper secondary school and university, furthermore, links between 
training and work access are difficult. Continuing training on the job still involves only a 
minority of firms and workers. 
It is evident that this severe disequilibrium also affects employment. Poor 
communication between the training system and the labour market means that not only 
the labour supply but also the demand is structurally underqualified (resulting in 
unemployment for the well educated) and, at the same time, that Italian products are 
relatively poor in intellectual content, hence unsophisticated, low-technology, and low in 
value added. This weakness may constitute a serious handicap for the growth of Italian 
exports, above all because it directs those exports towards traditional industries in which 
Italy finds itself in competition not with the advanced but with the emerging economies, 
with their comparative advantage in labour costs. The accumulation of human capital and 
techological modernization of products are thus both essential, if wage growth is not to 
damage the export sector. 
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Government and business and labour organizations have agreed on the need for 
modernization and requalification of education and training systems to enrich basic and 
vocational qualifications and skills, and improve the competitiveness of industry and the 
quality of services. 
The July 1993 agreement stated that this process would entail both resolute 
actions to improve and develop the various types of training offered and the evolution of 
industrial relations and corporate policies to implement initial training for work access, 
vocational requalification and continuing training. 
Italy needs quality training (Brunetta and Tronti, 1995), both in school and in 
extra-scholastic institutions, both for youths and for mature workers, for the employed 
and the unemployed alike, to make the most of our human capital resources. 
On these premises, Government, business and labour (Presidenza del Consiglio 
dei Ministri, 1993) concurred on the need for: 
a) regular, systematic linkage between the educational system and the economic system, 
among other things through the participation of the social partners in the institutional 
bodies of the central and regional governments in which the orientation, programmes, 
and evaluation and monitoring procedures for the training system are defined; 
b) the establishment of systematic inter-institutional coordination among the bodies 
active in the training process (Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Education, Ministry for 
Universities and Scientific Research, the Regional governments) to ensure the 
effective, integrated management of the system; 
c) the institution of a National Council on Vocational Training under the Ministry of 
Labour, with representatives of the ministries named above and of the Ministry for 
Industry, the Regional governments, and business and labour organizations; 
d) the prompt adjustment of the vocational training system with the revision of the 
framing legislation in this field, Law 845/1978, along the lines set out above, and 
taking account of the potential contribution of the school system, embracing: 
• emphasis on occupational orientation as an essential factor; 
• the setting of uniform national training standards, consistent with Community 
harmonization; 
• the reallocation of institutional responsibilities between the Ministry of Labour (the 
power to set guidelines) and the Regional authorities (the role of planning training 
programmes). In this framework, the Conference of Central and Regional 
Governments must be assigned the task of bringing training policies under a single 
planning and evaluation system; 
• the decisive role of observatories of vocational skill demand, instituted bilaterally by 
business and labour organizations; 
• specific consideration of action on behalf of the weaker segments of the labour force; 
• a pluralistic, flexible system of management; 
• the inception of continuing training; 
e) the extension of compulsory school attendance to age 16 through a legislative 
measure which, among other things, must provide for taking advantage of the 
contributions that vocational training initiatives can make to the school system. To 
increase the social efficacy of the measure, it must be accompanied by the design of 
suitable instruments to prevent and retrieve drop-outs, defining this activity as one of 
the possible applications of projects of collective interest; 
f) completion of the reform of upper secondary education, with a view to building a 
school system for the 21st century, with flexible integration between the national 
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academic and vocational training system and on-the-job training experience for young 
people up to age 18; 
g) taking advantage of the independence of schools and universities and qualified 
vocational training institutes to extend and improve the availability of training 
opportunities beyond the first vocational certificate, the high school diploma, and the 
university degree, with special reference to the preparation of technicians specialized 
in new technologies, with the necessary legislative support for such training processes 
and programmes; 
h) appropriation of the financial resources deriving from the levy of 0.30 percent on 
firms to continuing training, with emphasis on this line of action in the future 
Community reform of the European Social Fund; 
i) provision for a special three-year plan for the requalification and retraining of staff, 
including school teachers and vocational training instructors, to assist in the start-up 
of the reforms described above, 
j) revision of the trainee contract to provide for the generalization of the age limit of 32 
and to define two different types of contract, such as to permit adaptation of the 
training programme and its duration to different needs; 
k) placing greater stress on the skills-development function of apprenticeship, among 
other things through the intervention of the bilateral agencies and the Regional 
authorities, and certification of results. 
With the concurrence of the social partners, the Government undertook a number 
of initiatives to promote investment in vocational training by simplifying procedures, 
providing technical assistance, and meeting deadlines for public cofinancing. Law 
341/1995, Article 6, provides for territorial agreements. This is a new approach taking 
advantage of the contribution of business and labour to initiatives for the development of 
the South and areas in crisis. The bill on flexibility contains guidelines for apprenticeship, 
a traditional and still widely-used form of employment in Italy, but one that has now been 
largely emptied of real training content, in contrast with other countries. The bill 
accordingly makes the subsidies connected with apprenticeship contracts conditional on 
meeting a minimum training requirement, providing a transitional period for employers to 
adapt. 
Yet again, however, it can only be said that much remains to be done. Talks 
between the Government and the social partners resumed following the elections of April 
1996, have led to the tripartite Pact for Employment. 
5. The public employment service 
Work changes in quantity and in quality; now one of the qualities required is 
flexibility. The way in which labour is performed is being transformed (think of the 
possibilities inherent in the "home office", which make for an objective convergence 
between the condition of the salary-earner and the self-employed worker). There is a 
consequent need to reregulate employment relations, redesign the welfare system and 
redefine the system of industrial relations itself. 
The rules governing the working of the labour market must bring out the demand 
for labour, not depress it or foster the growth of the underground economy (Table 6.2). 
Second, since given Italy's present levels of unemployment no possibility must be 
left unexplored, government, business and labour agreed in July 1993 on the need to 
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make the public agencies for employment more efficient in actually matching demand and 
supply. 
The fundamental option in favour of concertation and negotiation with the social 
partners is an integral part of the Italian model of industrial relations. In this context, the 
Government has provided for local, territorial agreements pursuant to Law 341/1995, to 
provide stimulus and direction for local job creation initiatives responding to the needs of 
depressed areas. This strategy is based on the Committee for Employment, instituted in 
1992, and its subsequent action. The task force has taken three lines of action: 
• initiatives to accelerate public investment spending; 
• collective bargaining agreements in the major industries; 
• areas in crisis. 
There is broad consensus on the need for very significant decentralization of 
labour policies and institutions. To this end high-quality services, both public and private, 
must be available locally and in virtual networks. It is universally agreed that the role of 
the regions must be enhanced, while naturally maintaining a national system that ensures 
compliance with certain standards, first and foremost the crucial one of labour market 
statistics. 
The Regional Employment Agencies, instituted by Law 56/1987, have shown 
their usefulness in action, but are still less than fully satisfactory. Accordingly a national 
agency has been proposed for coordination - in no way diminishing the operating 
autonomy of the local agencies but centralizing such necessarily uniform functions as 
guidelines, standards and controls - and to revise the agency model in the light of Italian 
and European experience. 
The proposed National Agency for Employment should be a bilateral institution 
with full power over the resources allocated to it; it should be presided over by the 
regional authorities, and the representation of the central government should be in the 
minority. This proposal represents a major move towards decentralization of labour and 
employment policies and institutions. In the future, further progress can be imagined, 
innovations that are still premature. 
Finally, let us mention action to improve the organization and functioning of the 
public administration (Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, 1994). New 
models and mechanisms for greater efficiency, effectiveness and economy in production 
have been introduced, which should also bring some benefit in terms of employment. 
In this direction, a very important step is the phasing out of the public monopoly 
on job placement, with the authorization of private agencies, which could be spurred by 
the introduction of provisions for temporary employment. The effective capability of 
public employment offices to find jobs for the unemployed appears to be modest indeed. 
A comparison between the way people look for work and how they actually find jobs is 
revealing in the extreme. More than half of Italian job-seekers apply to public 
employment offices, but only 8% actually get placed through them. The most effective 
job-finding channel remains informal personal networks of relatives and friends. 
Public placement nevertheless retains a major role in agriculture (Table 6.2); in 
the North the public system places 27% of employed farm workers, and in the South 
39%. Whereas in the South public employment offices are a relatively good way of 
finding work in the public sector (25%) and in transport and communication (21%), in 
the North they mainly provide access (though less extensively) to jobs in banking and 
insurance (15%) and the non-market services (12%). 
167 
In a framework characterized by general expectations of liberalization and 
decentralization of public services, some experiments with private placement services 
have been conducted, all local and free of charge, by non-profit agencies and 
organizations of the social partners. While the legal registration of employment continues 
to be the task of the public offices, unemployed counselling, job search and vacancy 
signalling services have been provided by such institutions as the industrialists' 
association Confindustria in the region of Emilia-Romagna, some university graduates' 
associations in the North, and Catholic associations throughout the country. 
These experiments and the numerous efforts to reshape the public employment 
service have not obviated the need for overall reform. In particular, placement services 
need to be redesigned to capitalize on local structures and agents and to create a new 
placement system, bringing public, private and non-profit agencies together in a single 
network. 
6. Concealed and irregular work 
In terms of labour market regulatory provisions, Italy's low employment rate is 
reflected in a structural imbalance in the overall employment mix. While the segment of 
typical employment relations is more or less in line with that of our European partners, 
Italy suffers a disporportionately small "secondary" job market. By this, we mean all 
those employment relationships other than the standard, permanent, full-time job; as a 
rule such groups as women, young people and old people are overrepresented in the 
secondary segment. In particular, the low level of employment stems from the 
structurally substantial role of underground employment: work without a regular 
contract, off-the-books work, accounts for a significant portion of tax evasion. A policy 
of incentives to bring underground activities to the surface, combined with measures for 
training human resources, could raise the employment rate without making the entire job 
market precarious. This would directly increase social contribution revenues and, 
indirectly, tax revenues. The benefits of this policy approach would more than offset the 
costs, instituting a virtuous circle both in contribution and tax terms and in the enhanced 
efficiency of the economy itself (Brunetta, 1994). 
The measures required to bring underground activities to the service are not only 
complicated but also hard to carry out, in that they will alter deeply rooted economic and 
social equilibria. What is more, the introduction of tax and contribution incentives for the 
so-called secondary segment of the labour market, if not correctly implemented, could 
have perverse repercussions on the primary segment (Tables 6.3, 6.4). 
In short, what has to be changed is the system of income and social security tax 
levies on atypical employment (part-time, second jobs) to eliminate the existing 
disproportionate costs. Atypical jobs, with reduced social contributions and income tax 
incentives, could be associated with lesser social security benefits, especially for the 
young, postponing their full entitlement until they move on to the standard employment 
of the primary segment. 
At the same time, suitable forms of checking by the labour inspectorate need to 
be instituted, shifting staff from today's often pointless placement functions to those of 
inspection. In addition, measures are needed to do away with the present complicity 
between underground employers and workers. For instance, partial income tax 
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deductibility for domestic assistance would bring a good deal of today's off-the-books 
work to light. 
Although the paths for bringing underground activities to the surface are 
numerous and do not present insurmountable difficulties, so far Italian governments have 
not yet made a clear commitment to resolve or at least attenuate this anomaly, which 
damages not only the labour market but also the public finances. An indirect pledge was 
made in the 1993 labour cost agreement in the form of the government's recognition of 
the need to make atypical employment contracts attractive. The massive presence of non-
regular employment within the Italian economy stems essentially from a peculiar system 
of relative prices, i.e. a fiscal and contribution structure that has affected the structure of 
employment. In Italy, to cite just one example, one full-time worker costs more than two 
part-time workers. 
What has to be done, in brief, is to alter the structure of comparative advantages 
as between regular and underground activities while at the same time progressively 
changing, within Italian culture, the social welfare function. Greater responsibility needs 
to be accorded to all economic and social actors to shrink the area of non-compliance 
with contractual, tax and contribution rules (Brunetta, 1995). 
Of course, such a strategy would have costs, especially in the short term. Initially, 
revenues would drop owing to the application of incentives to secondary-segment jobs 
already registered. There would also be danger for marginal enterprises whose economic 
raison d'etre is bound up with the use of non-regular labour, at a savings of 50% 
compared with on-the-books workers. In the longer term, however, this could be more 
than offset by the emersion effect and the enhanced transparency and efficiency of firms. 
The strategy of fostering the emersion of the underground economy, then, is the 
only way of expressly enhancing the flexibility of the Italian labour market while 
contributing to the adjustment of the public finances, by raising the employment rate 
towards European levels. 
7. The general climate of confidence 
Italy's experience during the last two recession periods in 1979-83 and 1991-93 
shows that one way of avoiding a situation in which wage moderation is enforced by 
unemployment, as in the Phillips curve paradigm, is to conclude general incomes policy 
agreements that can minimize the social costs of reorganization and maximize the 
benefits of growth. Judging Italy's July pacts on the performance of the first three years 
(1993-1995), their achievements are unquestionably notable. Compared with the period 
from 1985 to 1992, the annual rise in unit labour costs diminished by about 5 percentage 
points, a slowdown second only to that achieved by the United Kingdom. This 
adjustment led to a pronounced improvement in microeconomic health, as evidence by 
the sharp reduction in structural inflation despite a 30 percent devaluation of the lira. 
Moreover, Italy has effected the most substantial public financial adjustment among all 
EU countries and is now running the largest primary budget surplus. 
These gains have greatly strengthened international confidence in the Italian 
economy and introduced major changes that significantly improve the regulation of 
employment relations and ameliorate the comparative advantage of new hiring (including 
the creation of open-ended jobs). However, they have not succeeded in instilling in the 
country the climate of confidence and optimism that is indispensable to the full and rapid 
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conversion of the increased profit margins into an expansion of the productive base. 
Certainly another indispensable element is a fall in bank rates, which cannot come 
without sweeping reorganization and modernization of the banking system. Yet 
employers do not seem to be shouldering their full share of the responsibility for the 
adjustment. Despite the enormous benefits they have obtained from devaluation and 
wage moderation, they have continued to hold a very high proportion of their profits in 
foreign currency and have significantly postponed the job-creating investment that should 
have flowed "naturally" from observance of the spirit as well as the letter of the 
agreements. Those agreements set a cap on overall wage increases (industry-wide plus 
company-level) corresponding to the evolution of companies' profits. This has introduced 
a powerful factor of economic participation capable of transforming not only wage 
determination but also the mode of working and relations between workers and firms. 
The new collective bargaining rules have sought to establish better balance 
between the powers of the two sides, but this has not yet translated into a general climate 
of joint responsibility, greater confidence and unity of purpose in industrial decisions and 
labour relations. Accordingly, the operations needed for job creation have not yet 
become as simple and economical as the "spirit of July" would wish. To be sure, the 
long-awaited turnaround in the employment slump has finally come. Between October 
1995 and July 1996 the equivalent of 200,000 jobs were created, net of the reduction in 
short-time compensation. Especially encouraging have been the signs of job stability in 
industry and the growth of payroll employment. There have been some signs of an 
improvement in manning levels even in large industry, which had suffered an authentic 
exodus beginning in the early '80s. Yet these gains are still modest by comparison with 
the sacrifices made by workers and consumers. And this itself is the main risk, for if the 
economy fails to "believe" strongly enough in the "spirit of July", what tenuous 
confidence there is could give way to mistrust and conflict (as the difficulty in concluding 
the contract of the metalworkers, the traditional wage leader, demonstrates). In this way 
the very substantial gains made by the economy could be undone before they produce 
meaningful success in what is by all accounts the most important area: employment. 
8. The Prodi government programme for employment 
The government of Romano Prodi made clear and explicit commitments 
regarding employment in the framework of its Economic and Financial Planaing 
Document for 1997-1999, presented to Parliament in June 1996 (Presidenza del 
Consiglio dei Ministri, 1996). The Document makes employment one of the 
government's priority objectives, with special attention to the South, where 
unemployment is mainly a problem of underdevelopment. 
Actions in this field form part of the overall framework of economic policy. They 
complement the policies of public financial adjustment and are coordinated with the 
latter. In the Document, the government notes that the key to dealing with the problem 
consists in extending to unemployment the method of concertation used in combating 
inflation, as in the 1992 and 1993 agreements. In this light, in the incomes policy session 
in June, serious talks were launched with business and labour organizations with a view 
to an agreement framing policy measures to reduce unemployment. The purpose is to 
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create an "Alliance for Jobs". Where necessary, legislative initiatives, administrative 
actions and collective bargaining agreements will follow. 
Structurally, the government has made a number of practical commitments: 
• promoting the enlargement of the productive base and supporting new enterprise 
formation and employment in small firms, with incentives to small and tiny businesses 
that are formed or that increase their work force, with a view to closer integration 
with large firms; 
• refoiming the state employment service through decentralization, liberalization and a 
lighter state presence making the most of the role of private parties; 
• revising, through concertation, both social shock absorbers and employment 
incentives to achieve greater certainty and less administrative discretionality; 
• planning socially useful projects in conformity with the principle of mutual solidarity; 
in this regard the government plans to promote the growth of the non-profit sector, 
which realizes solidarity in decentralized and generally efficient fashion and which will 
have a major role in providing services and creating jobs; 
• implementing a series of measures, in agreement with the social partners, for regulated 
flexibility on both the demand and supply sides of the labour market; total 
employment should be stimulated by new regulations on part-time work (including 
part-time work by employees eligible for seniority pensions, in order to allow hiring), 
temporary work, apprenticeship and trainee contracts; jobs should be better 
distributed and the market made more efficient; 
• drafting a plan for part-time hiring of young people by government departments; 
• urging initial and continuing tanning programmes both in and out of the school 
system, both in-service and for the unemployed, to improve and update human capital; 
• weighing actions to ease the tax and contribution burden on the cost of labour by 
shifting part of it (health service contributions, for instance) from payroll taxes to 
general taxation; 
• promoting and providing incentives for self-employment and enterprise creation by 
young people, with support to the law on youth entrepreneurship and "word-of-
honour" loans for young people, including student loans as well as business start-up 
loans. 
As we have seen, some of these themes were dealt with in the agreement of 23 
July 1993 but have been only partly implemented. One of the initial pledges of the 
government is the full application of the agreement. 
The Economic and Financial Planning Document reflects the awareness that none 
of the actions is sufficient in itself. Together, however, and combined with public 
investment in the South, these form the conditions for regaining competitiveness and for 
a climate conducive to an expansion of the productive base and employment. The 
planned measures thus represent an overall design to improve the efficiency of the labour 
market in a framework of greater solidarity and more certain protections, through new 
mechanisms, new types of action, new protagonists (the "third sector" of non-profit 
organizations) in the production of public goods. 
The ultimate target that the government appears to be seeking with these 
measures is a larger and more competitive productive base in the global market, in line 
with the plans for European union as drafted at Maastricht, which requires, among other 
things, reform of public intervention and of labour market institutions. 
The government has further pledged to complement the foregoing with a new 
investment policy, which is essential to competitiveness and to employment support, and 
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special attention to the South with its acute, unsustainable problems. To revive the 
southern labour market, government, business and labour agree on the need for new 
bargaining instruments to forge a system that can attract entrepreneurial initiatives. Ideas 
include the conclusion, in selected areas, of "area contracts" between central and local 
government departments, unions, employers, banks, and other interested parties. Under 
the area contract framework, agreements between unions and employers could seek to 
create the conditions for attracting new investment, expanding existing activities and 
maximizing the employment benefits. The area contract designates the person responsible 
for implementation, sets a timetable and quantitative targets, and identifies low-cost, 
equipped industrial districts. 
Clearly the job creation policies the government is counting on are partly based 
on structural measures to improve the working of the markets, but they could also be 
sustained by renewed investment to enlarge the productive base and increase 
productivity. The government wants above all to foster a propitious climate of 
opportunities that provides incentives for entrepreneurs and supports them in 
technological and organizational innovation. At the same time major infrastructural 
projects must provide the occasion to involve local productive forces and improve the 
competitiveness of the country as a whole. 
In addition to these nationwide measures, the planning document stresses the 
need to involve central, regional and local government, unions and employers in action to 
deal with Italy's gravest emergency, namely its worsening regional disparities. The 
government is aware that the southern question will require substantial economic policy 
innovation, with a shift from top-down, centralized policy to endogenous, self-propelled 
growth integrated into the national and European economies; this is the only way to 
achieve independent, unassisted growth. 
The government proposes to move in several directions: 
• fostering a favourable climate for investment, economic activity and the exploitation 
of local resources by extending tax relief to firms that invest and create jobs; 
• testing, in the South, new forms of labour market flexibility, with special attention to 
young people; 
• developing local pacts and company agreements for flexibility, which have succeeded, 
in the past, in shrinking the underground economy and encouraging capacity 
expansion and new investment; 
• stepping up the vast array of real services to industry, service businesses and the 
tourist sector; 
• upgrading public administtation; 
• promoting investment in transport and communication infrastructure to facilitate the 
movement of people, goods, services and above all information. 
In its vocational training policies the government seems to have gotten off on the 
right foot, with an effort, finally, to connect basic public education with vocational 
training. Naturally, this departure has come very late. 
There has been some dissent in trade union quarters as regards the labour market 
policy measures, with contrast between rigid and flexible doctrines. The government's 
proposals are prudent and based essentially on continuity with those of the previous 
legislature. Note that the July 1993 agreement itself now appears partly outdated. It 
would not be a bad thing if the government took the initiative (in such areas as 
temporary work, entry-level wages for a set period, less job security for new workers) 
rather than leaving these matters to the social partners. 
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In conclusion, it must be acknowledged that the new government has begun to 
move, although action must be accelerated. Not only is there now universal awareness of 
the serious condition of the Italian labour market, there is also an official convergence of 
the social partners on possible solutions. Such a convergence has been formalised in the 
75 pages of the Pact for Employment of 24 September 1996, presented in detail in the 
following pages. Nevertheless, it is often difficult to translate the conclusions of the 
tripartite agreements into practice, with the result that the Italian labour market could 
still be at a severe disadvantage with respect to its nearest competitors for a long time. 
The Pact for Employment, 24 September 1996 
The tripartite agreement signed on 24 September outlines an overall policy on 
jobs, designed to tackle the employment emergency but also lay the foundations for 
upgrading the labour force, improving firms' competitiveness and moderning the labour 
market and employment services. The pact is certainly an appreciable measure, with such 
positive features as less rigid discipline of apprenticeship, innovations concerning part-
time contracts, and so on. 
The intent to effect structural changes in the management of the labour factor 
takes essentially three paths: 
1. broadening the range of measures; the idea is not to confine labour policy to its 
traditional precincts, but to mobilize all possible instruments (from resarch to public 
works); 
2. manpower flexibility: from new regulations on temporary employment businesses to 
the drive to bring underground work to the surface, the entire programme is based on 
flexibility as the main principle of labour market innovation; 
3. the "localization" of problems and solutions, which runs throughout the pact, from the 
assignment of training initiatives to small local enterprises to the proposal to revitalize 
local vocational training, research and guidance structures. This approach is clearest 
in the provisions on areas of crisis. 
It must be understood, however, that the Pact does not consist in effective 
decisions, but only in pledges by government and the social partners that must still be 
realized. Essentially, it sets out guidelines for reforming the training system, relaunching 
research and innovation, active labour policies, relaunching infrastructural construction 
projects and upgrading public demand. It also introduces the so-called "Area Contract" 
for intervention in the least developed districts. The agreement, therefore, pledges the 
government to rapid implementation of the instruments and measures set forth. 
With the pact, government, business and labour seek to outline a strategy to end 
or attenuate structural unemployment in Italy: public works, incentives directed to 
specific population groups and areas, "regulated" flexibility, reform of working hours and 
training. The three parties agree on the urgency of a special employment plan to raise the 
employment rate, especially in the South. The involvement and participation of all sides 
is needed to meet the challenge of job creation, in the awareness that public financial 
rehabilitation, the establishment of the conditions for stable growth, and employment 
policies are not alternative but concurrent objectives. 
Government and the social partners underscore their conviction of the need for 
an integrated strategy involving macroeconomic policy, labour market measures and 
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employment policies. Fiscal policy is recognized as fundamental to the growth of 
employment; the government pledges to act consistent with this recognition, with a 
reduction in payroll charges that increase the cost of labour as soon as the budget for 
1997. 
As to labour policies, the pact not only endorses the priorities set by the Essen 
Council of the EU and the contents of Italy's tripartite agreement of 23 July 1993, with 
appropriate adjustments, but also confirms the need to pursue the Maastricht 
convergence criteria through rigorous budgetary policy. 
The dialogue on employment in Italy actually forms part of the broader dialogue 
throughout Europe, which was intensified during the Italian presidency with the tripartite 
conference in Rome, organized within the programme of action for employment 
proposed by Santer. 
The guidelines of Italian employment policy are drawn from the Delors White 
Paper, which stressed the exigencies of infrastructure, training and research, services for 
local or virtual communities of small and medium-sized enterprises and the new job 
opportunities, ranging from environemntal protection and urban renewal to social 
services and care, especially in the non-profit sector. 
For the implementation of the Pact, further to the provision of 9 trillion lire aimed 
at financing an investment program, the July 12 decision of CIPE (the Interministerial 
Committee for Economic Planning) has devoted 1 trillion to the improvement of active 
labour policies along the lines difined in the Pact itself. 
The resources, necessary to fulfil the commitment to social contribution relives, 
taken on with the European Commission, are to be budgeted by the 1997-99 finance bill. 
The extraordinary effort for promoting employment will require for 1997 an additional 
funding of 1.5 trillion, to be financed through the reduction of tax evasion and the 
privatization of State-owned companies. Fiscal incentives for new enterprises will be 
funded through a restructuring of the tax burden. 
The signatories to the pact emphasized the extreme importance, for the success 
of these initiatives and the creation of an environment propitious to new investment in 
the South, above all of the restoration of law and order. 
Following these guidelines, the pact details a series of measures that will affect 
the Italian labour market profoundly. 
A) Trainine 
Government and the social partners are agreed that the quality of the education 
and training system is fundamental to present and future competitiveness. Hence the 
government's commitment to jobs and employment involving business and labour 
organizations as well, must be based, consistent with EU guidelines, on adequately 
financed structural measures to improve the efficiency and efficacy of Italian education 
and training systems. 
The objective of the signatories is on the one hand to increase both the quantity 
(length) and the quality of schooling; and on the other to bring about the conditions for 
continued access to training throughout one's working life, adapting to changes in the 
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competitive conditions of the labour market and meeting the need for adaptability and 
constant aptitude for learning. 
The government pledges to extend compulsory schooling, to ensure the right to 
training and to devise special plans for measures to overcome the disparity in training 
between different parts of the country, with special attention to the South and other 
districts of social distress. In this, local governments, social forces and voluntary 
organizations should be involved. It is considered essential: 
• to realize the autonomy of school districts and institutions; 
• to transform vocational training centres into training agencies; 
• to conclude the overall reform of the school system; 
• to develop higher education: 
• to favour the broadest possible use of training stages; 
• to promote effective guidance for young people, with the participation of universities, 
regional authorities and schools and training institutions. 
B) Apprenticeship 
Objectives of the reform 
• Enhance the training content of apprenticeship, which is unquestionably sadly 
neglected today, with special incentives for the firm's role; 
• make apprenticeship into a special channel for alternating skill acquisition by young 
people lacking qualification or having qualifications relevant to their actual job; 
• expand access to apprenticeship (in terms of sectors, educational qualifications, 
vocational profiles, and age) and promote its regulation via collective bargaining; 
• deal with the transition from training to work, and between external and on-the-job 
training, within an overall project that is flexibly managed, sensitizing firms and 
fostering the necessary organizational adjustments. 
Apprenticeship will now be a possibility for all sectors, including agriculture. The 
agreement assigns the decision as to vocations covered to collective bargaining. 
Apprenticeship is opened to young people aged 16 to 24 (26 in the South). 
The essence of the reform is the trilateral structure of apprenticeship, which will 
now involve the young person, the company and the training structure from the start. 
Government and the social partners pledge to oversee the quality of the entire process; 
the final certification of the qualification obtained is to be entered in the worker's training 
record. 
C) Continuine trainine 
Objectives of the reform 
• to promote training investment by firms and develop a system of recognition of 
workers' training credits; 
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• to promote entrepreneurs' training and updating in all sectors; 
• to redirect the system, which still overemphasizes initial training, through the reform 
of vocation training legislation; 
• to promote collective bargaining on this issue. 
D) Permanent trainine 
Objective of the reform 
• to introduce a flexible tool for the workers' benefit, along the lines of the most 
advanced experiences in Europe. 
The model proposed 
To permit access to training, leave for training purposes will be regulated, both 
by law and through collective bargaining. The government considers that a proper 
instrument may be training grants to replace the income of a worker planning an 
investment in training; such grants would be decided by the bilateral training agency for 
the industry concerned. An especially flexible variant could be temporarily switching 
from full-time to part-time, with the training grant making up for some of the income 
loss. 
E) Temporary work 
Objectives of the reform 
As we know, temporary employment businesses are new to Italian labour law. 
The intention is to serve a segment of labour demand and labour supply, especially in 
large cities, that is appreciable in size but limited because temporary employment is more 
costly than fixed-term hiring. The main advantage that government and the social 
partners expect from the introduction of temporary employment businesses is the 
emersion of currently unregistered employment positions. 
The model proposed 
Temporary employment will be introduced in the areas and sectors and according 
to the principles of the tripartite agreement of July 1993. In agreement with the social 
partners, the government will assess the results of the experimentation after two years. In 
agriculture and construction, temporary employment may be introduced experimentally, 
upon completion of ministerial examinations, with agreement between the parties as to 
the procedures for experimentation. The agreement expressly excludes certain cases: 
replacement of strikers, plants where there has been a staff reduction for the tasks 
involved in the previous 12 months, jobs that require special medical oversight or that 
are especially hazardous. 
The temporary employment business can hire a worker either on a contract for 
the same duration as the task to which he will be assigned, or on an indefinite contract, 
with the proviso that he work only through that business. In the latter case the worker 
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will be guaranteed, either by law or by collective bargaining agreement, a minimum 
salary for the periods of availability. As to the general features of the contract, there will 
be complete parity between the temporary worker and regular employees of the firm 
using the temporary worker's services. As an incentive to vocational training, a fund 
financed by contributions from the temporary employment businesses will be used, with 
joint funding from the Regions, to finance training activities for the temporary workers 
and imputed contributions for their training periods. 
F) Incentives for hours reduction and reorderine, part-time 
Objectives of the reform 
The September Pact affirms the parties' intention to transpose the Community 
directive on working hours by the deadline set. The government pledges to enact 
incentives for bargained reduction of hours and to promote reordering of work 
schedules, taking into account the establishment of multiperiod hours (several weeks, 
monthly, annual) both in general and for specified categories. 
Further, to encourage the use of part time and equalize social contributions for 
this form of employment, the government will offer incentives both in general (with 
further contribution relief) and for specified categories: young people at their first work 
experience in Objective 1 districts; women returning to the labour market after a 
prolonged absence; older people phasing out their work engagement, provided that they 
be replaced by young hirees. The extension of the part-time provisions to the agricultural 
sector, on a collectively bargained basis, is also provided for. 
In the foreword of the Pact, the Government states its commitment to adopt the 
European Decision on working time (no. 93/104), according to what will be agreed by 
social partners. In any case, the new weekly standard of 40 hours (as defined in the 
European Decision) will be ruled by law. 
G) Socially useful projects 
Objectives of the reform 
The design is for thorough revision of current rules with organically refoimed 
legislation (a framing law) to enhance and make the most of local initiative. The reform is 
intended to meet the needs of large numbers of workers, with priority going to those 
who have lost their entitlement to income support programmes (social shock absorbers), 
but also extending the programme to groups so far excluded. The pact calls for the 
development of projects and business plans with special reference to such spheres of 
activity as the recovery of abandoned industrial areas, water control projects, 
environmental recovery, asbestos protection and clean-up, protected areas, nature parks, 
the artistic heritage. 
H) New employment services 
To further the transition from a policy of passive income support for the jobless 
to a policy of active employment promotion, the government pledges to redesign the 
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instruments and rethink the structures assigned to the task. The reform of employment 
services will be based on three main approaches: 
• institutional decentralization; 
• regulated liberalization (opening to private agencies, an active role for joint union-
employer bodies); 
• a strong role for the centail government in regulation, guidelines and planning. 
I) Contribution relief and tax reductions 
The pact sees tax reductions as essential incentives for creating jobs. 
Transfer of social contributions to general taxation 
In order to reduce the cost of labour, legislation passed by the government under 
an enabling act for the reform of regional and local finances will abolish payroll health 
contributions (currently paid by employers, employees and pensioners as well as the self-
employed) and instead levy a general tax. 
Contribution relief for Objective 1 areas 
In the regions designated by general legislation, action will take account of EU 
constraints on assistance. In particular: 
• 
• 
one hundred percent social security contribution relief in all sectors for new workers 
hired in 1997 to open-ended contracts increasing manning levels. For 1998 and 1999 
the measure will be agreed with the EU Commission; 
partial reduction of contribution rates, with the programme being phased out starting 
1 January 1998. 
Tax reductions 
The government attaches special importance to the development of the non-profit 
sector with a view to reordering the functions performed directly by the state and by 
non-economic public agencies, safeguarding and providing incentives for job 
opportunities for young people. In this regard the government, after consulting the social 
partners, will submit a draft enabling act for regulation of the entire non-profit sector, 
laying down the conditions and key prerequisites for such organizations. 
Tax breaks for new businesses 
The government intends to enact a measure to spur economic recovery and the 
expansion of employment, with special tax treatment for certain specified types of new 
business. Specially favourable tax treatment is to be provided for: 
• young people up to age 32 starting up a business for the first time; 
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• workers on short-time compensation or mobility; 
• the handicapped; 
• persons starting up activities in environmental protection sectors. 
The tax benefits consist in exemption from corporate tax and from personal 
income tax on artistic or professional activities up to a set amount for the first two years. 
For the same period, there will also be reductions in the local real estate tax and the 
incipient regional tax. 
The ordinary system of tax reductions for those eligible is extended to five years 
for entrepreneurial initiatives in Objective 1 areas. 
J) Emersion of undereround employment 
In view of the positive results already perceptible thanks to Decree Law 
405/1996 which sought to favour the emersion of off-the-books employment by 
providing for agreements for the gradual phasing in of contractual minimums, 
government and social partners agree on the usefulness of extending this type of contract 
to additional sectors and to step up experimental bargaining initiatives at the local level. 
To provide additional incentive for firms to stipulate phasing-in agreements, the 
parties stress that employment brought to the surface should be treated like new 
employment on the date that the regular collective bargaining terms are fully phased in. 
This will make the company eligible for whatever new employment incentives are in 
effect as of that date. 
K) Area contracts 
In parts of the country with low growth rates and the worst employment 
problems, especially the South, it is particularly urgent to create a propitious 
environment for new businesses and job creation. In a word, this means fostering new 
investment by rapid, certain administrative action, concomitance of the different 
departments' decisions, especially good union relations, a cost of money no higher than in 
other parts of the country, effectuation of investment and the commitment to reinvest 
profits to strengthen the individual company's capital base and technological assets. 
The signatories accordingly seek to develop a new instrument for intervention in 
designated areas among those covered by the Coordinating Committee for Employment 
Initiatives under the prime minister's office. The new instrument consists in operating 
procedures and new bargaining tools that can forge a framework of administrative and 
financial certainties, drawing in new business initiatives in various sectors, taking account 
of specific opportunities and propensities. 
For each of the areas initially selected, an Area Contract will be signed within 60 
days by the central and local government departments involved, representatives of unions 
and employers, banks and any other participants. The contract designates a person 
responsible for its execution, the objectives and timetable for execution in terms of size 
and type of investment, the availability of low-cost, equipped areas, and the private 
resources involved as well as those deriving from ordinary legislation, which will be 
appropriated under accelerated procedures. 
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The Area Contract must also provide for a framing programme stipulated by 
government departments, public agencies and publicly controlled corporations as well as 
an agreement between employers and trade unions. The portion relating to action by 
government departments and agencies may also provide for considerable administrative 
flexibility, with the development by these bodies of a framing programme agreement 
indicating all the features of the programme to be implemented. There will be agreements 
between employers and unions instituting advantageous conditions for new investment or 
for the expansion of existing businesses and for maximization of the job impact. 
The government will promote the formation of an agency assigned exclusively to 
promoting investment in the designated areas by Italian and foreign investors. Promotion 
of these areas, with the advantage of the contract agreements themselves, will be 
performed by the local promotion firms linked to the agency for the promotion of the 
nation's industrial areas, envisaged in the Constitution. 
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Table 63 - Employee labour units, 1995 
(in thousands) 
Branch 
Market goods and services 
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries 
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Source: Istat, Occupazione e redditi da lavoro dipendente, 1980-1995, May 1996. 
Table 6.4 - Employee labour units, 1995 
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